Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎6v] (12/544)

2
The Committee agreed that no decision was required for the
time being on the matter.
2. The Committee had before them telegram No. 519 from Sir
R. Wingate (E.C.-3L).
Financial Assist
ance to the Idrisi.
General Macdonogh expressed great doubts of the propriety of
supplying more money to the Idrisi, without some assurance that he
would spend it in accordance with our wishes. He might be
sharing it with the l urks. It was true he had taken Loheia, but
there was nothing to show that he had fought to take the place ; he
might have bribed the Turks out of it. There was now intelligence
that the Turks were concentrating outside Loheia, and possibly he
might walk out of it, as he had walked in.
The question of a British liaison officer to the Idrisi was raised.
Sir Mark Sykes pointed out that this was a delicate question, as
the Idrisi, by reason of his peculiar sanctity, would not allow himself
to be seen by a British officer save in the dark with face veiled.
It appeared, however, from the telegram cited above that an
Indian liaison official was going to Loheia, and that Sir R. Wingate
was trying to obtain a qualified British liaison officer attached to the
Idrisi’s forces.
The Committee felt that it would be unsafe to send the Idrisi
more money without any means of checking his use of it.
It was decided—
That a telegram shoidd be sent from the Foreign Office asking
Sir R. Wingate what had been done, or what was proposed
in this respect, and expressing the doubts of the Committee
about the use the Idrisi made of the money supplied him.
Sir R. Wingate should be asked whether he considered the
presence of a British liaison officer would afford the
security desired, and what steps were being taken to
appoint one.
The Committee had before them a telegram from Sir R.
Attitude of Emir
Faisal and the
Sherif.
Wingate (E.C.-19).
Lord Curzon drew the attention of the Committee to various
signs of disquiet in the mind of the Sherif. The causes of this
disquiet might be that the military situation was represented to him
as disadvantageous to us, or that Zionism and French designs in
Syria caused him misgivings. The intrigues of his sons with the
Turks might be symptoms of this state of mind or additional
disturbing factors.
Lord R. Cecil added that he might also be anxious about
rumoured negotiations between us and the Turks, to the detriment
of the Arabs. There was evidence that rumours of this kind had
reached him. It was clearly desirable to do something to dispel his
doubts.
It was pointed out by General Smuts that the most serious
trouble lay in the Sherif’s knowledge of the Sykes-Picot agreement,
the misleading version of which, issued by the Bolsheviks, might
have affected him. He might argue that if things went well with
us Damascus would fall not to the Arabs, but to the French.
The abrogation of the agreement was discussed in its various
bearings. It w^as admitted that it would be difficult to meet the
French objection that we, having gained our share, had nothing to
lose by abrogating the agreement, while the French share was still
to be got. Italy’s aims would also have to be regarded as a
contingency in any discussion of the question.
As there seemed a possibility that M. Gout, of the French
Foreign Office, might persuade his Government to abandon the
agreement, save as an expression of aspirations recognised by us,