Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎7v] (14/544)

forward in North-West Persia, through Hamadan to the Caspian.
If we succeeded in this we should control the capital far better
than from Ispahan. Meanwhile, we should endeavour to influence
the Bakhtiari from Ahwaz, where we were already established.
Dissent from this view was expressed by the military members
and by Lord Islington. The real danger was primarily to Tehran
threatened by a pro-German Jangali invasion, which would be
followed by a propagandist tide sweeping southward and eastward
towards Afghanistan. In this region lay our greatest danger. Our
cordon on# the Perso-Afghan frontier was very thin ; our cordon
between Mesopotamia and the Caspian did not yet exist. A show
of force in the centre might dispel the whole danger ; inaction
would increase it.
The balance of opinion, however, was in favour of adhering to
the previously agreed policy.
It was decided —
That the Foreign Office should obtain in detail Sir C. Marling’s
plans for dealing with the Bakhtiari.
Financial
Assistance in
respect of
Hamadan and
elsewhore.
5. The Committee had before them a telegram from Sir C.
Marling (E.C.-29) advocating relief for the distress in Hamadan.
On behalf of the Treasury, Sir R. Chalmers stated that the
preliminary assurance required was that stores of grain did exist in
the area. He was now satisfied that they did (see telegram No. 252
from Tehran (E.C.-37). Secondly, he asked whether Hamadan
could be regarded as a distinct enclave An area of land belonging to one country and entirely surrounded by land of just one other country. or whether influx of money
or grain there would not cause a flow of population from the rest of
Persia to set towards it. This might increase our liabilities
ad infinitum.
It was pointed out that Hamadan could be considered in
isolation from the rest of Persia, as it was a stage on our projected
advance to the Caspian. Supply of funds or grain there could be
considered as a form of penetration in advance of our troops.
Lord Islington stated that the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. agreed to pay half
the cost in respect of food (military expenditure, costs of roads, &c.,
excluded).
On this condition Sir R. Chalmers agreed, on behalf of the
Treasury, to furnish the necessary finances.
He asked, however, that the Treasury should be relieved as
soon as possible of expenditure on behalf of the Russian troops,
who did not appear to be of any further service to us.
Mr. D. Ward stated that there was an estimate of 6,000,000
kran on behalf of this force for April; I93,000Z. had already been
paid.
It was decided—
That enquiry should be made by the Foreign Office from
Sir C. Marling regarding the situation of these troops and
the advisability of continuing or suspending payments to
them.
Suggested Aetion
by Amir of
Afghanistan for
Recovery of
Panjdeh.
6. The Committee had before them a note by the Political
Department, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. (E.C.-12).
The Committee adopted the view that no suggestions should be
made to the Amir. He should be left to act, if at all, entirely on
his own initiative.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.,
March 28, 1918.