Coll 28/103 ‘Persia. Perso Russian Relations’ [‎21r] (41/190)

troops into Persia was envisaged by the Soviet—Persian Treaty of 1921. This
treaty has been quoted more than once by pro-Russian newspapers in Tehran and
both Stalin and Molotov quoted it to the Americans during the Moscow Con
ference. Neither Stalin nor Molotov mentioned the 1921 treaty to the British
delegation; this may have been out of politeness, because the 1921 treaty obviously
has one eye on His Majesty’s Government, or it may have been because they have
a greater respect for our knowledge of public documents than that of the
Americans. The British delegation might have reminded M. Stalin or M. Molotov
that the relevant provisions of the 1921 treaty, narrow as they are, are still further
restricted by a subsequent exchange of letters which was made between Russia
and Persia. On the 12th December, 1921, the Russian diplomatic representative
in Tehran wrote to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs assuring him that
articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty which provided for the entry of Soviet
troops into Persia in certain circumstances, were “ intended to apply only to
cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable armed attack on
Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her.”
(b) Treatment of the Azerbaijan 'problem as one of Persian Local Government in
general.
14. The plan put forward by the British Embassy at the Moscow Confer
ence, in December 1945, whereby Great Britain, Russia and America would
assist Persia to solve the Azerbaijan question as a part of the problem of local
government throughout Persia, was not invented on the spur of the moment.
While we have regarded with scepticism the support given by the Soviet
Embassy and the Tudeh party to the candidature of Qawam-es-Saltana to the
premiership, in view of the fact that he is everything that the Tudeh profess
to hate, and while we have not joined the Soviet Government every time it
began, for reasons of its own, to call the current Prime Minister a Fascist, we
have always tried, however ineffectively, to induce successive prime ministers
to accept measures within the capacity even of Persia, whereby the Administra
tion might be improved. The chief measures suggested during the last three
years or more have been (1) the establishment of a civil service commission
to deal with at least the upper posts, in order to avoid the nepotism and confusion
of the present system; (2) treatment of the tribes as an integral part of the
population instead of as pariahs; (3) application of a system of local govern
ment for the whole country; (4) recognition of minority languages at least in
the primary schools. The first proposal appeals to every Persian statesman
when he is out of office, but only then. The second was acted upon to the extent
that M. Soheily, early in 1943, made a statement in the Majlis about the tribes
which, though sadly watered down from the suggestions made to him, might have
been of value if he or his successors had made serious attempts to put it into
execution. Recognition of such languages as Kurdish and Turki is not a policy
that appeals to the Persian, who, to begin with, cannot believe that anyone does
not appreciate the Persian language at the value put upon it by the Persians
themselves. As to local government, all the Persians that were consulted! were
agreed that it would make use of local patriotism and talent then running to
waste, relieve the over-centralisation which is one of the main causes of
administrative stagnation, and act as a check on the abuses committed by
officials sent—often for short periods—'from Tehran. In June 1943 His
Majesty’s Ambassador was able to report to the Foreign Office, when sending
a copy of the relevant articles of the Constitution and a summary of the Provincial
Councils Law, that he had discussed the question with the Shah and the Prime
Minister (M. Soheily) and that “ both appeared to be sympathetic, and to favour
some degree of decentralisation; and both seemed to realise that a spontaneous
grant of local councils to all the provinces might perhaps forestall a demand
from Tabriz or the Kurdish areas for still wider concessions.” No action was,
however, taken by the Persian authorities at the time, thougih His Majesty’s
Ambassador spoke of the scheme to every Prime Minister in turn and one of
them went so far as to decide to take it up. By November 1945 “ Tabriz and
the Kurdish areas ” in Azerbaijan had put in their demands for “ wider con
cessions,” backed by the force of Soviet Russia, and it was already late in the
day when an appeal from the Persian Government to the Governments of Great
Britain, Russia and the United States made it possible for His Majesty’s
Ambassador, with the authorisation of the Foreign Office, to put the provincial
council proposal to the Prime Minister as his personal suggestion. M. Hakimi
was vaguely sympathetic and authorised His Majesty’s Ambassador to speak to