Coll 28/103 ‘Persia. Perso Russian Relations’ [‎21v] (42/190)

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the new Minister of the Interior, M. Saieh. It was found that the idea had by
now reached M. Saleh, who was already studying the question; and a few days
later he suddenly issued orders that the Provincial Councils Law of 1907 was
to be put into execution and elections held at once. He had decided that it was
politically desirable to take action at once rather than to wait to remedy the
defects in the law. He spoke of amendments being made, but it is understood
that these were all directed towards reducing the councils to the status of
advisory bodies to the Governor-General—a fantastic suggestion at this time^ -
or day. Closer examination of the law showed that it was what might have
been expected trom the first Persian Parliament (1907), when the enthusiasm
was in inverse proportion to the experience : it is a mass of ill-selected,
unco-oidinated provisions which would defeat a council with far more experience
energy and goodwill than any Persian council is likely to have. It refers vaguely
to responsibility in regard to roads, bridges and education, but fails to define
the powers or the kind of schools, &c.; it has nothing about public health, except
for references to hospitals, orphanages and asylums; its financial provisions are
completely unintelligible; and, in some ways, it increases centralisation instead
of diminishing it.
15. Mr. Byrnes United States Secretary of State, had Persia placed on
1 r a^ 0SC0W Conference, but at the first meeting agreed to
M. Molotov s suggestions that it should be removed from the agenda and reserved
xor informal discussion. The Persian Government, supposing that the Persian
question might be discussed, had reminded Great Britain and Russia of their
right to be consulted m virtue of article 5 of the 1942 Treaty, but had not quite
asked for an invitation to be represented at the conference. The Russians
naturally wanted no action to be taken about Persia; the American delegation
had no pohcy except an appeal to the United Nations Organisation. The
British delegation felt that it would be a pity to go to the United Nations
without first trying to find a solution through the three Allies during the
presence of whose troops in Persia difficulties had arisen with which she seemed
unable to cope alone, and proposed that the three Powers should suggest to
the Persian Government that they should appoint a tripartite commission to
advise the Persian Government on the establishment of a system of local govern
ment and on the possible use of minority languages for educational or’ other
purposes. I he full story has been told in the Foreign Office print but for con
venience the Anglo-American proposals, as modified by the insertion of the
amendments put forward by Stalin, are given in the annex to this despatch
I he British delegation put forward the nucleus of the scheme, the American
delegation turned that into complete terms of reference, embroiderino’ the
language and, m particular, adding the provision in paragraph 2 which included
m tne duties of the proposed commission the submission of recommendations
to the Ihree Powers on the acceleration of the withdrawal of Allied troops
from lersia. It seemed to the British delegation that this provision might
perhaps serve as a pretext to the Russians to delay withdrawal beyond Bl
ind March, but the Americans clung to it as the only clause that did not appear
to be casting reflections on the Persians, so it was retained
, , ^ During the course of the negotiations both Stalin and Molotov declared
that they did not oare whether the Persian question were brought up before the
Umted Nations Organisation or not; they had nothing to blush for. Nevertheless
the Anglo-American proposals at first had a quite good reception from Stalin'
and it was a disappointment when, after his amendments had been incorporated’
Molotov rejected the scheme the ostensible ground of rejection being that though
he lealised that the proposals could not be adopted without the Persian Govern
ment s consent, the Soviet Government found it equally impossible to consult
the I ersian Government. Hie British delegation had added to the preamble
the words and are submitting this agreement to the Iranian Government for
their concurrence as a matter of form, since, under article 5 of the Tripartite
reaty of 1942, Great Britain and Russia undertook “ to consult the Government
of His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah in all matters affecting the direct
interests of Iran. It is quite possible that Molotov’s excuse for rejection was
a pretext. After consideration the Politburo may have decided that with a
little more pressure from Russia the Persian Government would give in and
consent to leave such matters as Azerbaijan, the evacuation of Soviet"troous AV
for direct discussion with the Soviet Government. * ’ ’
17. His Majesty’s Government determined, nevertheless, to make an
attempt to get the Anglo-American scheme through by securing the aonroval
of the Persian Government, hoping that if three parties'were agreed, the consent