Coll 28/39(2) ‘Persia. Printed Correspondence, 1937–’ [‎157r] (313/320)

B. A. F. concentrates upon economic targets, receives little attention ; the
adverse elfect of these operations on Germany’s war potential is largely
ignored, whereas the heavy damage inflicted, for example on Coventry ana
Southampton, by German raid^ makes a great impression on the public. This
difference is largely due to. the fact that Germany’s feats are explained and
exaggerated by wireless bulletins in Persian—a form of propaganda which we
hope to see in use by the B. B. C. very shortly.
3. Interest in the Greco-Italian war is growing, as also the appreciation of
Greek successes. This is probably due to various causes. The Italians are
generally despised and disliked. Secondly, the victory of a small state over
a larger one cannot but fail to be encouraging to Iran, who has periodically felt
herself menaced by great powers. Further, with the Italians being pushed
back by the Greeks the war is, at least temporarily, receding from Iran rather
than getting closer. Lastly, it must be remembered that the natural tendency
of the Iranian is to side with the victor, whoever he may be.
4. In Tehran it is realised that Britain has given and is giving considerable
help to the Greeks, which has had a favourable effect on our prestige. Reports
from the provinces, however, suggest that this realisation is not widespread
outside the capital.
5. The successful operations in the Western Desert will no doubt re
inforce the favourable effect of the Greek campaign. As yet it is rather too
early to report on local reactions. The good impression created by recent
events should not, however, be over-estimated ; it does not extend beyond a
rather limited number of persons, chiefly in official circles. The Near East is
considered only as a minor theatre of the war. It is widely thought that the
main war theatre is the west and that it is there that the final decision will be
reached. The defeat_ of Italy is not, therefore, considered to be of great im
portance. The view is expressed that Italy is a burden rather than a help to
Germany, and that her disappearance as a belligerent would not weaken the
latter’s position. Many are of the opinion that Germany is allowing Italy to
suffer setbacks in order to be able, at the critical moment/to step in and rescue
her, and so to reduce her to complete sub-ordination.
6. The intellectual classes tend to take their reaction from the French,
and are not favourably impressed with our chances of victory. They are more
over strongly influenced against us by their ever-growing hatred of the Shah
who, as 1 have repeatedly stated, is regarded as being maintained in power
by the British. 1
7. Financial and commercial circles are also hostile to us. The British
failure to produce an effective commercial policy for Iran has convinced them
that we are weak and have little chance of winning the war. The unfortunate
impression has also been created that we do not really wish to help Iran. This
has naturally reinforced the tendency, already strong for a variety of reasons
described in former despatches, to turn to Germany. As opposed to our lack
of a comrnercial plan in Iran, the Germans have achievements to show* At
tlie beginning of the war, under the Irano-German cleafing agreement Ger
many owed Tran some 44,000,000 Rm. As a result of recent negotiations in
ilerlin the balance of German indebtedness to Iran under the clearing agree-
ment has been wiped off, though it is true that most of the goods covered by the
balance have still to be delivered. The effect of this upon the Iranian when
compared with the absence of any result of British commercial activity it is
hardly necessary to dwell upon. The desire of the Iranian is to continue his
normal existence untouched and unaffected by the war ; anything which dis
turbs this is resented What interests him is to obtain the goods he requires
Trhnia ^ that Great Britam cannot spare him anything because her
whole effort is concentrated upon her own war production. Germany recog
nises this, and although the arrival of German goods in Iran is irregular and
s 16 is unable to fulfil all Iranian demands, yet goods of a kind do arrive.
8. Anything effecting Russia is of paramount importance in determining
local opinion and perhaps the most important development as regards public
ooimon concerns the reaction to events in the Balkans which have followed
Molotov’s Visi to Berlin. At the time of this event, a state of panTpre
J ailed among the upper and middle classes and in official circles. Nviien no
immediate changes followed this visit, opinion was reassured. The general