Coll 28/39(2) ‘Persia. Printed Correspondence, 1937–’ [‎157v] (314/320)

view was that Russia had refused to come to an agreement with Germany for
tne division of tne Middle East, and that Bulgaria, in adopting a firmer atti
tude towards Germany, and also Turkey, were acting under Russian direc
tion.
9. The reaction of the local population to foreign affairs is far from be
ing logical and does not as a rule extend beyond the immediate future.
Russia and Great Britain are still regarded as the traditional enemies of Iran,
and this is, perhaps, the strongest and most constant factor determining local
reaction to’foreign affairs. Germany under Hitler was from the first regard
ed as hostile to Bolshevik Russia, and in spite of the Russo-German agree
ment that belief, in general, is maintained in a somewhat modified form.
Hence she is regarded as a counterweight to both of the powers^ who are
traditionallv regarded as hostile to Iran. In the past Great Britain and
Russia had been played off by the Persians against each other. In Germany
the Persians saw a friendly power, hostile to both of Iran’s traditional ene
mies, and thus believed that she would first defeat one of these, namely Great
Britain, and would then restrain the other. The idea therefore that Germany
might make a favourable political agreement with Russia came as a shock to
local opinion, and when it appeared that this plan (if indeed it had ever exist
ed) had not succeeded relief was great. It was nevertheless not accompanied,
as might have been expected, by a reaction against Germany. The indica
tions that Russia had no designs in the immediate future on Iran, but was
rather looking westward and supporting the independence of Bulgaria and
Turkey were welcomed. Lastly, the evidence of a tendency towards a
rapprochement between Britain and Russia did not create the alarms that the
possibility of a political agreement between Germany and Russia had done,
but, was, on the contrary, and perhaps somewhat illogically, favourably viewed.
This was largely because it was considered that neither side would be pre
pared to allow the other at this moment to gain a dominant position in Iran,
and that therefore Iran was, for the moment, safe. The belief that Iran
occupies a position of paramount importance in our scheme for the defence of
India dies hard, and it is generally believed that Britain will not, if she can
help it, tolerate the establishment of Russia in Northern Iran, while she her
self, being a satisfied power and elsewhere fully occupied, does not, at least
for the moment, threaten Iran, whereas a Russo-German combination would
do so immediately, both powers having shown their readiness to incorporate
foreign countries within their own domains.
(35)
From British Legation, Tehran, No. 154, dated the 23rd December 1940.
Tehran despatch No. 275-E. to F. 0. of 23rd December 1940.
Enclosure to Serial No. 35.
Despatch from British Legation, Tehran, to F. 0., London, No. 275-E., dated
the 23rd December 1940.
With reference to Mr. Eden’s despatch of the 4th November 1936 (No.
14409|92|50), and my despatch No. 215-E. of the 12th October 1940, I have the
honour to transmit to Your Lordship, herewith a quarterly return, extracted
from the Monthly Customs Bulletins, of Iranian imports and exports during
the three months from the 22nd March, to the 21st June 1940, with comparative
figures for the previous year.
2. Imports show an increase, principally due to large imports of cotton
piece goods from Germany and Japan, and railway material. German im
ports were large, whereas practically none came from the U. S. S. R. As re
gards exports, Germany easily retains the first place, dried fruits being the
principal commodities furnished to Germany.
3. A copy of this despatch and its enclosure is being sent to the Depart
ment of Overseas Trade, and to the Secretarj 7 to the Government of India in
the E xternal Affairs Department.