'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎111v] (229/294)

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xn which the closest co-operation of infantry and aircraft was not
rea^ired to secure the best results: the success of that co-operation
ln was largely due to the organization of the system of XX calls
an the working of that system in the field was perhaps the most striking
feature of the whole of the operations.
Of the other anus the armoured cars were perhaps the most important-
even with the whole of the 11th Hussars and a company and a half of Boval
Air Force cars there were never enough to meet all demands, and improvi
sation had sometimes to be resorted to or tanks used in their place.
The results achieved by the single tank company amply justified its*employ
ment in Palestine, though perhaps tanks come near to being in the luxury
c ass in rebellion if sufficient armoured cars are available. Motorised
cavalry were particularly valuable as a mobile reserve or for employment
in esert areas, but the absence of a horsed regiment for work in the
mils was much felt throughout. There was little scope for the employ-
ment of artUlery, except for weapons like the naval pom-pom which could
e firea from a road vehicle: otherwise the infantry mortar filled the
normal role of the gun. There was ample demand for engineers to justify
^e normal proportion of field companies: railway units were also needed
ami very good use was made of an anti-aircraft searchlight company in
the protection of communications.
The Protection of Communication s
experience showed that the requirements of a system of protection
are much the^same in all types of communications. It is necessary to
give protection only to those which are really vital to the military
needs, which will generally correspond with the most necessary of the
civil needs. Where sufficient troops are available protection will be
be ^ er forded by holding the ground from which attacks can be delivered
rather than by guarding the communication system itself. This will
lead to the establishment of a chain of posts v/hich vail be expensive
in troops: economy can be effected by substituting patrols in their
place, but these can seldom do more than act as a deterrent and as a
meano of detecting sabotage. It will generally be impossible to protect
tne whole length of communications, and protective efforts will best be
concentrated upon those points where sabotage will cause the greatest
. ama S e * PinchLly in rebellion more than any other form of war perhaps
it is true oo say that offence will provide the best defence.
Offensive Action
in the defeat of armed rebels the greatest difficulty will usually
b ? t ° 1 br J ng them to action at all. The methods of doing this will
U ° U 4 - / ©pend upon the information that can be gained, but arrangements
must be made to hit the enemy hard whenever he appears. This will
require b e organization of air and land striking forces which can
concen rate rapidly at any point where the enemy has shown himself, and
p ro ^ c ' s ° bbe c^c^-tion of a M bait H to make him show himself; Once
ontact has been gained it is essential that it should not be lost
until the full force of the blow has been struck: the rebels will
1 ^ u, bo avoa( ^ ^his by making use of darkness to retreat, and
^roops mus be able to keep out at night in order to maintain contact so
to r ® new the battle in the morning. Offensive action at might -
xce ^ or approach marches to obtain surprise - will usually place the
enemy a an advantage. In the attack envelopment will always achieve
e ^results, since the chief difficulty will be to prevent the
n my using his superior mobility to escape. Jbr the rest, the main
requiremen o of offensive action will be good information, a continual
s raving a ter surprise, good training in night movement, independence
oi a line of communications, and certain legislation which will facili-
a e mi 1 °P e rations. In addition a B.A.F. organization which can
ensure supplies by air being delivered at short notice will be a most
valuable adjunct.