'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎111r] (228/294)

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ihe Choice of an Object in the employment of the Fighting Pbrc es
The defeat of the enemy's armed forces is the main object of the
three services in war, and should be the same in rebellion, which is only
a lesser degree of war. Every possible effort should therefore be made
to free fighting men from defensive duties to take the field against
armed rebels, and this will usually be accomplished by the employment of
the police in the defensive role. Certain communications and vulnerable
points will of course always De essential for military purposes and for
this reason some troops will have to be diverted to their protection,
but every soldier or airman employed upon such duties will be one less to
oppose the armed rebels in the field and it is on the existence of the
armed elements that the fate of the rebellion will depend.
The V/eapon of Martial Law
Military operations in Palestine suffered under three main handicaps:
a lack of information, coupled with much loss of secrecyj restrictions
on the use of force, which deprived the services of making proper use of
the weapons with which they were equipped and the methods of war to which
they had been trained; and the fact that the enployment of the forces
was dictated by the needs of the civil government and was not necessarily
devoted to the attainment of the best military objects. Pbr all three
disabilities Martial Law would at least have supplied a partial cure,
and there can be little doubt that once the armed forces have become the
principal weapon with which to defeat rebellion and are no longer serving
merely as second string to the police, their task will be much facilitated
by a declaration of Martial Law. It is however all inportant that the
full effect of Martial Law should be felt from the very start, and this
will necessitate careful preparations beforehand.
TACTICS IN REBELLION
Command of the Fo rces
Operations under conditions of rebellion are mostly composed of the
actions of small units, and a wide degree of decentralisation of command
becomes necessary. This is best achieved by dividing the country into
military areas, allotting troops to each area, and leaving the commanders
as free a hand as possible within their own boundaries. In drawing these
boundaries the aim should be to keep them identical with those of the
civil administrative districts and sub-districts; and subsequent
re-arrangements of areas will be easier if division is made into two,
four, or eight parts. The troops in each area should be strong enough
to provide their own local reserves, and if a central general reserve^ is
required it may be best ensured by earmarking certain units or formations
already allotted to areas. This will be more economical than holding
units back in H.Q. reserve to meet a contingency which may never anise.
An exception may be made in the case of locally-raised forces, which are
better employed without any area responsibilities in an independent role
direct under Force Headquarters.
The employment of the various Arm s
Though all arms were employed in Palestine it was inevitably upon the
infantry and the aircraft that the heaviest demands were made. The
former were necessary for all work in the town areas, for e ensive^
duties, and for co-operation with the aircraft in offensive ac ion i-- e
hills; while the aircraft was often the main striking power in the hands
of the commander and was always the only arm which had superior mobility
over the enemy in all conditions. There were few actions m Palestine