'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎112r] (230/294)

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AInD ADbIL'IISTItATI^ of the ARyff
Admini stration
The chief administrative lessons were the need for constant imorovi-
sation especially in the early stages when units of some teohnicafS^s
were not represented m the force; and the difficulties of conducting
operations on active service under conditions of peace-time accounting.
Transport
. give tr °0Ps an ali-round superiority in mobility over their
lightly-equipped native opponents an anple supoly of light fast motor
vehicles and of pack animals was required. 'loth were obtained Tr
s^fficienu. numbers from civil sources. The pack animals had to be suit
able tor carriage in M.T. vehicles, and for this purpose donkeys were
far the best.
Weapons and Equipment
So far as experiences of weapons and equipment went the most notice
able lessons were provided by the success of the infantry mortar in this
^ype oi ..ariare, the need of a light mobile searchlight and of an improved
_ set with more range than the No. 1 set and more mobility (for pack
transport) than the ,, C H set.
Intercommunicatio n
The main lesson was the necessity for wide reliance upon W/T. Distances
were usually too great to permit of military lines being laid, while the
civil lines were continually cut by saboteurs and were a constant source
of leakage of information. Despatch riders were far too vulnerable to
ambush; and in fact W/T became of necessity the only safe and really
effective means of communication. The scale of W/T provided for signal
units in Palestine was insufficient for the purpose.
"Notes on Imperial Policing, 19 54”
Frequent reference to this War Office publication has teen mace in
these pages. Its application to the situation in Palestine was nearly
uncanny; it might almost have been written specially for those condi
tions, and throughout the rebellion it served as a close and constant
guide to the forces engaged in its suppression.
CONCLUSION
The rebellion in Palestine provides perhaps mere than any thing else
an example of the consequences of delaying the application of force
meet force. The failure of a policy of conciliation lea in -he end to
the despatch of a Field Force from England and the adopt ion ^of mere
severe regression than might perhaps have been needed rad it teen apt—ed
from the beginning. The years which followed the rebellion show the
results of a failure to carry repression to its logical conclusion cy
leaving the armed forces of the enemy intact in the fie_a. In rebellion
as in war, peace can seldom be res tore c. in full -=0 long as the la—e.^
remain undefeated; to defeat them, therefore, should be the first ana
foremost object of the Fighting Forces.
THE END