'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎95v] (195/294)

44816-1
144
authorities will be better able to control them. But where there are
sufficient troops to hold the ground overlooking the line - by means of
picquets etc. - they should uftdoubtedly be under the orders of the
commanders of the areas in which they operate. In practice however
a combination of both will usually be necessary; and in that case the
infantry who patrol on foot or in road vehicles can remain under area
commanders, while the technical troops who man railway vehicles and
reinforce railway employees can be placed under a separate H 0 .C.
Railway Troops”.
A Summary of the Requirements of a System of Railway Protection
To recapitulate, the conclusions arrived at above point to certain
definite requirements of any system of railway protection which may be
summarized as under :-
(a) No rail traffic at night.
(b) A system of posts throughout the line each manned by troops or
by police according to local requirements, under the oonmand of military area
commanders. Posts to be sited v/here they can command vulnerable
points; and platelayers' gang posts to be located close to them.
The garrisons to keep the line under observation during daylight
and to supply platelayers escorts by day and permanent way patrols
b y night. Patrolling to be done on foot or in motor vehicles off
the railway line with the object of obtaining surprise.
(c) Technical railway troops under an independent commander work
ing in very close touch with the railway authorities. Railway
troops to man line inspection vehicles and trolleys for daylight
piioting, and to reinforce civil train crews and breakdown parties
wnere required, at the same time learning the system with a view
to operating it in the event of defection of the civil staff.
(d) Military or police guards, under the area commanders, to
protect railway centres, such as workshops, etc. not already
covered by the permanent way posts, and to prevent the
intimidation of their staffs.
• ^ rregU } a f P° liGe at any points where the scale of attack is
insufficient to Justify the use of troops.
(f) Passive defence measures - obstacles and booby traps - at
mor vulnerable points not under guard.
cur'fpw^liio meaSUreS a ssist protection, such as declaration of
sabntPio-P re P r ® s s :LV e measures against villages implicated in
vehicles ? et 6 pr ° V:Ls;Lon of hostages to be carried in railway
SUMMARY OF THE KAEi LESSffi'-iS IN THE PROTECTION OF CQMMUNICATIOKS
of communication^ 6 ^ that proteotive measures used for different so
diffi™ to enuno^r ea °l produced . v ery similar lessons, and it is no
applicable to all. Indict 1 the^ 0 ^ 1 ^ W ^° h 0an made e 'l ually .
above could ^ 4 . reca P :L tfrlation of railway lessons give
above could easily be adapted to suit either roads, telephone lines or