'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎96r] (196/294)

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pipe-lines. To sum up, however, the following may be taken as the
main lessons in the protection of all forms of communication:-
(a) Repressive measures against those guilty, or even suspected,
ot sabotage will be the best preventive. For this purpose legis
lation and other action by the civil authorities will be necessary.
(b) All forms of communications will have some vulnerable points
where sabotage will have particularly serious consequences - such
as pumping stations, telephone exchanges, bridges, railv?ay work
shops & etc. - and these will require permanent guards.
(c) There will also be many vulnerable points of less importance
where passive defence measures can be of use.
(d) Over the rest of the system it will seldom be possible to pre
vent sabotage at night, and to attempt to do so will only lead to
waste of effort. Furthermore, night patrols on the actual line of
the communications will always be at a disadvantage since they
provide a good target for snipers and can seldom hit back with
effect. The best deterrent will be patrols working by surprise
methods on the flanks of the line. Good lighting of the
communications will of course give great assistance.
(e) By day the line of communications must either be observed by a
series of posts or must be patrolled at frequent intervals. The
line must be inspected at dawn before being opened to traffic, and
repair parties must be escorted.
(f) On the roads and railways military effort will best be expended
in guarding the system rather than the traffic upon it, unless it
is intended to use the traffic as a bait with which to bring the
enemy to battle. Small escorts to traffic may be necessary but
these -will be reduced to a minimum when traffic is confined to a
fixed daylight schedule, starting only after the line lias been
inspected and repaired where necessary. In the case of the roads
this will necessitate conpulsory convoying.
(g) Finally the ideal form of protection will be a series of posts
covering vulnerable points on the line, the garrisons of which will
provide:-
(i) Surprise patrols as a deterrent against sabotage by night.
(ii) Inspection patrols at dawn, and perhaps escorts for
repair parties.
(iii) Observation of the line during daylight.
In addition technical troops - R. E. and R. Signals - will usually
be necessary to reinforce and protect the civil staff, ihey will
operate best under an independent commander who can work in close
touch with the civil department responsible.
This ideal will of course be expensive in troops, ^ and economies can
be effected by using mechanical transport for duties (ii) and (iii).
They will, however, always be at a great disadvantage at night,
theref ore of reduced value for (i), and in any case if they are tie
to the communications which they are del ending will always place
their occupants at the target end of any attack and there y ^sen
their chances of closing with the enemy.