'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎95r] (194/294)

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me alternative is of course to enrol more Supernumeraries, and it
will be an advantage if they are placed under the orders of the
military commander.
The protection of trains should be ensured automatically if the
permanent way is properly protected, but certain additional precautionary
measures will also be advisable. No night running should be permitted
and the train schedules must be arranged to give time for inspection
vehicles or platelayers patrols to sweep the line at dawn and for the
results of night sabotage to be repaired before trains enter the danger
areas. ^ight trafxic only offers the enemy a chance of cheap success,
since sabotage will seldom be detected in the dark and offensive action
is not likely to be effective. A pilot trolley, running some two
miles in front of a train will be needed as a precaution against quick
daylight sabotage, but ic is important that armoured trains, locomotive
patrol units ^ etc. should not be used for this purpose as their own
derailment will in itself produce a serious obstruction. Military
train guards ought not to be required: the train crews may need
strengthening by technical troops, but the personal safety of the
passengers will best be left to a small police escort.
So far as the permanent way is concerned it is as well to recognise
from the start that sabotage cannot be prevented and that any attempt
to do so by force of arms will lead to a waste of military effort.
The object should be to secure adequate protection for the really
vulnerable points, and for the rest to provide some form of deterrent
and depend on rapid detection and repair to reduce the effects of
sabotage that has occurred. The following analysis of railway sabotage
in Palestine in 1936 (excluding sniping or attacks by fire alone) will
show that even with a skeleton protective system a fair degree of
immunity can be given to the most vulnerable points
Interference with the railway line itself 308 cases
Interference with the telephone system 125 M
Attacks on stations and other installations 10 M
Attempts to destroy bridges 47 M
Acts of violence against railway workers (x) 50 w
Acts of violence against passengers (x) 7 w
(x) Apart from those incidental to a derailment.
As a dete r rent against night sabotage patrols on foot, v/orking by
''surprise 1 ' methods, undoubtedly achieved the most success, while in the
daytime the ordinary platelayers' escorts served as additional foot
patrols. Patrolling in railway vehicles of various kinds was useful
us a means of economising in personnel but should be confined entirely
to daylight. It was found that patrolling by vehicles required at the
most one fourth of the men necessary for the sparsest system of picquets-
and-foot-patrols; but it had the gravest disadvantages at night, since •
the vehicle patrol itself was liable to fall an easy victim to sabotage
in the dark and as a rule could only detect it by its own sacrifice.
A final lesson concerns the command of railway protection troops.
The system adopted in Palestine of placing them all under one independent
command gave good results; but it was never popular with the area
commanders, who still remained responsible for stopping sniping of the
railway but who had none of the railway troops at their disposal. The
best system of command must of course depend upon the method of pro
tection adopted. Where protective troops are tied to the line itself
through lack of numbers and have to patrol in railway vehicles, an
independent commander who will be in close touch with the railway