'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎80r] (164/294)

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yhere was probably no Arab in Palestine who did not come under one of
t} 10 se headings, though admittedly (h) covered the greater majority of the
population. Of the various categories, (a), (b), (g) and (h) naturally
conducted their activities in as unobtrusive a manner as possible and did
no t demand actual physical defence against their methods. They were in
fact more the concern of the civil authorities and the police. (f), the
;\rmed Bands, were a purely military problem requiring direct offensive
sction. It was therefore against (c), (d) and (e) that active defensive
measures were most required. To reduce categories still further (c)
and (e) may be classed together for practical purposes. The gunman or
bomber was only another degree of the intimidator, and since both attacked
life rather than property they can be taken together under that heading.
The saboteur on the other hand attacked property first, and any loss of
life which his efforts might involve was more incidental than deliberate.
Under whatever heading the hostile elements may be classified they
demanded certain precautions in common. The very casualness of their
methods encouraged a relaxation of vigilance at the very moment when it
was most dangerous, while their usual lack of originality in attack
contributed towards a successful surprise on the few occasions when
variation was produced, either by accident or intent. Constant vigi
lance on all occasions and all-round protection in all positions was
therefore essential, and all the more difficult to ensure from the very
fact that it seldom seemed necessary. In those countries where a
watchful enemy exacts a heavy penalty for every false move it is probably
far easier to keep troops on the alert than in a country such as Palestine
which seemed on the surface to be pervaded by a serene air of peace and
where risks could be run with impunity nine times out of ten. It was
too easy to forget that there might be a tenth time, until some incident
like the attack on the York and Lancaster bathing party at Beisan^or the
ambush of the newly-arrived Lincolns in the orange groves of Qalqilya
served as a grim reminder that things were not quite so peaceful as^ they
appeared. It is true that the rebels were lazy and lacked enterprise,
but invisible eyes were usually noting every activity of die troops and
the detection of a careless habit served as a hint that cheap^ victories
might be picked up by those who were prepared to bide their time,
this the Arab was always ready to do. Newcomers in particular were
hard to convince of the danger: units would arrive keyed up with
expectation, would find that deceptive air of peace, might go for nays
or even weeks without seeing a shot fired, and too soon the origina^
precautions would start to slacken off. Time after .ime not. ing mign
happen, until one risk too many would be taken.
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stories of a
with implicit
THE DZ PENCE FOBCES