'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎80v] (165/294)

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their employment as organized units in the proper sense, even though
acting in support of the police.
The British Police
During the period of rebellion the British Police totalled some 900
odd, of which well over 100 were recruits in their first year of service
A fair proportion, including most of the older hands, were ex-soldiers
and the standard of quality throughout was very high. The educational
qualifications were exacting - a first-class certificate at least was
demanded of army candidates - and in recent years a number of young men
from the public schools had been attracted to the ranks of the Force.
By far the greater majority was concentrated in the three main towns -
Jerusalem, Jaffa-Tel Aviv, and Haifa - where the constant danger of inter
racial outbreaks required the presence of ample reserves in normal times
and v/here the lion’s share in the suppression of riots always fell to the
British constables. For the same reason Hebron and Safad, which held
Jewish minorities, contained small detachments of British Police. They
were also stationed in small numbers in Nablus, Tiberias and Nazareth
and a small mounted contingent patrolled mural areas. Thus it was only
to be expected that with the exception of the mounted branch the majority
of British police were more used to dealing with tov/ns and townspeople ”
and only a small number had any knowledge of the villages and inhabi- ’
tants of the hill areas which were to become the haunts of the armed
bands. In normal times these areas were the domain of the Arab police
and so they remained for the most part throughout the rebellion.
Shortage Ox personnel and transport and difficulties of supply prevented
any British police being posted to the chain of rural stations in the
hills around Nablus, and in consequence these posts in the very heart of
tne arm^d band country ceased to be of practical value so far as suppres
sion ox reoellion was concerned and much valuable information was lost
thereby.
i may well be argued tnat a better division of defence would have
b een f '° leave the Bri oish x'olice in the towns to deal with riots and to
concentrate the troops on the subjugation of bands in the rural areas,
ihere were two potent reasons why this was not so easy as it sounds.
If 1 . first place^ there were not enough British police - evidence of
w icn may be seen in the early call for troops in the first day's riotii
a u a xa. and no surplus existed v/hich could provide a central reserve
J? r ^ in±orc c hard-pressed districts. The second reason was a psycholo-
gical one, but hardly less important. The type of Englishman which mac
yjfx. nc ", rl • r i 0 ll ce 7/ & 3 not one to be content with a secondary role:
• , '^ina.ora p ne too wanted to play his part in the fighting, and pl&j
i, ..tdia with conspicuous gallantry. The British Police were after
• xf LireG ; d ® s ^ ,ndants of the Gendarmerie of 1922-26, they were trained
emnl°nvp^ S Yn° - ^ nnd^Lewis gun, and in normal times were often
and lookpn du ' tde ^ wd ile the Arab police walked the beats
c rtair i n■f - v»n sdde policing. There were in addition
of fiobt-i-" G ° n \* 10ns w ' aic ^ ma de this type of man welcome any char
nomat W ioln>r Pe r m SOme 0f the more distasteful features of
se^i, under n ^ the first P^ce he would as often as not be
in ordir n rv fir ° ffl0erj a situation which was difficult enough
in ordinary tir.es and far more so when the loyalty of the entire Arab
Secondly the continual spectacle of rebels, vvl
section was in doubt.
had been brnno-hf i i , " ^ 0 oontmual spectacle of rebels
risk escaoin^ in f 1 '' J0CV i tle P°II Ce a fter much hard work and no ^
and ka^^fatL" ef^r" Fi-^n PUnishment had a
country that he could -’k. FlTlcil }K was only in the hills and the op
tions and without boinJcaft *"• without a11 SOTts of
order to excise nnc-o-rV " u P° n LO account for his every action m
° ^ CaSe posslble suggestions of using Excessive force’*.