'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎79v] (163/294)

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CliAPTER 13
DSI^TuSXVE ACTION
Xlvl
RODUCTCRY
It is unfortunately necessary to record that ’’Defensive Action"
covers the greater part of the work of the armed forces in Palesti
that must he the excuse for giving it precedence in these pages^ ^ ^
policy of the Administration and the methods adopted by its onoonent 6
forced the Services on to the defensive from the start", and for most 5
the period the initiative lay with the enemy. It was not until 'the ^
end, when the Emergency Force had arrived and preparations had been mT
for the full application of Martial Law, that the initiative was in 6
way regained. It is significant that the rebellion came to an end ^
immediately that point was reached.
Since military control was never in fact put into operation in
Palestine the selection of an ’’Object’’, towards’ the achievement of which
all combined efforts were to be directed, lay with the Administration ‘
In general that Object was ’’the maintenance of the normal life of the*
country”, and it was only after a change of policy had been announced by
the British boverament on the 7th September that the employment of the
arme-u. forces was directed towards crushing rebellion by force. /umin
final tha ? the - mere announceme nt of this change heralded the
+’ P lb ? trugsle - pri0r to that the defeat of the rebels
hau *or tue mop part oeen the aim of the civil departments only, usini
and hfs 6 m ?b° aS il aCke ^ by political and legal weapons, while the lAj,
to keep tlehiff “ F® meanwhile endeavoured by the use of force
to keep the line of tne country going in its normal course - or in a fair
considersd°l'itp’ ^ T* 0 * of a revsrEal of methods All be
hasteen distfl-l ^ ^ plication of this defensive role in practice
na 0 oeen aissecoed m more detail. 1
tjo inbbb bnh'^ U ' :>b dferation Instruction No. 23 was issued by Ibrce
"inst^ctiors ^ e,arX T mlitaj ~ y - oroblems at the time were revised and
rcob of"! f T V !b aS b° th6 methods *0 be applied in their solution,
graph 2 the "fir-t^nf ^ 1 .- 1011 - ^ s ^ re[jrod ^ Geci here as Appendix XIX. In para-
prevent inter-f’ev^no ^^^^^ry oojects is described as being: "To
5—:—hi ^cr., m mce with the noimal life of the nmvn-f^r n ^ ^ m-in.
con^icati^s^dJ^ te Ct Ufa and o^nert; . b
of the energies nfr OI COmraun d c bions exhausted far the greater portion
?he scecial bbab i° rC f ’ and . the next oha P ter will be devoted to
chapter the orotectiD off - f . 0r d 3Jllzatlon '3 which it demsmded. In this
some consideration 0 c Vyf / S imd P^perty will be taken in turn after
were available for their ^Atectio^ 1 ^ threatened them ^d those whioh
THE EKEifl-
Operation Instruction Ho. 23 divided the hostile elements into
(a) Leaders and Agitators
(°) Intelligence Organisation
(c) Intimidators
(a) Sabo teurs
( t ') " err °rist gunmen or bombers
( - J iirmed Bands
Uj Signalling organisation
0l) 31036 engaged in a P u ^ly Passive attitude