'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎40r] (84/294)

44816-1
57
The line equipment of the signal units was totally inadequate for such
distances and, as the civil lines were unsafe and unreliable, wireless
remained of necessity the primary means of intercommunication.
Yfireless
The army wireless equipment consisted of No. 1 sets with a normal
range of 5 miles and "C M sets capable of up to 50 miles. The only
long-range facilities were afforded by No. 3 sets lent from Egypt and
operated by the Corps Signals. The capabilities of the No. 1 and "C"
sets are discussed later in Chapter 10, and it is only necessary to
say here that neither had sufficient range nor mobility to meet local
requirements. Furthermore they could not always work to the R.A.F.,
T.J.F.F. and Police sets already in the country, and it became necessary
to retain the whole of the R.A.F. \l/T network even after the full com
plement of R. Signals units had arrived. Where Army and R.A.F. sets
could work together, difficulty v/as experienced on account of operating
differences between the respective personnel. This may have been due
in part to inexperience, but it v/as noteworthy that difficulties seldom
arose in intercommunication between the R.A.F. and the R. Navy and it
may be that R. Signals operators need more practice in inter-service
work.
R/T was little used, owing to its limited range and to the fact
that few officers seemed to know how to use it properly and consequently
found W/T quicker.
Telephone
It has already been explained, so far as telephones were concerned,
that the chief task for the signal units was to help maintain the civil
lines and be ready to take over operation of the whole system if necessary.
This revealed at once a need for Permanent Line Construction Units, out
neither Corps nor Divisional Signals had the necessary equipment to pro
vide them nor sufficient men trained in the work. This is a state of
affairs that may well occur again, and it would seem that more training
in permanent line construction and maintenance might be included in the
normal curriculum of R. Signals units.
Under many conditions of modern warfare it may be preferable to
utilize existing civil lines rather than to construct temporary military
lines. It will be necessary for a clear policy in this respect to be
lo.id down from the start, for on it will .depend the proportion of
permanent line personnel to accompany the Force. So far as imperial
policing is concerned it might be possible to decide this in peace to
meet various likely contingencies, and in such cases a special sca.le
of reserve equipment to meet the local requirements could be held in
this country. 7/here use is made of the civil system the closest co
operation between Posts and Telegraphs officials and the Royal Corps
of Signals is of course essential, and this is prooaoly best obtained
by appointing a Signals Liaison Officer in each Post Office district to
v/ork with the civil engineer in charge. In Palestine it was found
that there were too few officers with practical Post Oifice experience
to fill these posts.
VISUAL SIGNALLING
Visual signalling by means of flag, lamp, heliograph^and Verey light
was used extensively and proved of exceptional value. Pioquets found
it particularly useful and it was sane times the sole means of communication*