'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎39v] (83/294)

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It was found that the local broadcasting station (on a wave-length
of 449.1 metres) sometimes caused serious interference - especially
No. 1 sets. During Operation "X", which took place within a radius
of some 20 miles of the P.b.S. transmitting station at Ramallah, it
was necessary to close the broadcasting station while the operation
was in progress. This is a point which it may become more and more
necessary to bear in mind when planning future operations. The T.21
set, being simple and reliable and of long rtinge capacity, gave
excellent service, but in the later stages when wireless congestion
began to be felt its restricted wave frequency band and flat tuning were
found to be distinct drawbacks.
Telephone
The civil telephone system was subjected to intensive sabotage
which resulted in serious interruption of the service. It was also
quite unsafe from a point of view of secrecy, and native operators
were not above suspicion of deliberate obstruction of military calls,
R. Signals personnel protected loyal v/orkers, guarded installations,
acted as monitors in the exchanges, supervised and helped line main
tenance gangs, and at the same time learnt the system with a view to
operating the entire service in the event of a strike of Ptosts and
Telegraphs employees. The existence of the civil permanent lines made
it unnecessary to lay military land lines, and the army linemen could
concentrate on the task of keeping the civil lines open.
Despatch Riders and Couriers
Motor cyclist despatch riders were obviously so vulnerable to
ambush on the main roads that for all practical purposes their use had
to be restricted to local runs in the towns and camps. On the ,l safer"
roads it was sometimes possible to run D.R*s in pairs during daylight,
but otherwise the D.R.L.S. was conducted mostly by means of armed
trucks. Though uneconomical, the D.R. truck had several incidental
advantages: it could carry small stores and parcels beyond the
capacity of a motor cycle, could transport individuals, and its move
ments could often be synchronized so that it might act as escort to
staff cars etc. The Courier Service with the daily M.T. convoys was
at first conducted by the infantry N.C.O.s of the escorts with a view
oo economising in R. Signals personnel, but it was soon found that the
volume of mails necessitated a more elaborate procedure. In the end
he R, Corps of Signals had to take it over, and the Courier Service
was absorbed into the normal D.R.L.S. system. A daily Courier Service
y passenger train between Egypt and Palestine was however conducted
successiully by non-Signals personnel.
THE SYSTEM AFTER TIE ARRIVAL OP THE EMERG-ENCY FORCE
5 A C ° rpS the 1st and 5th Divisional
ti^al nk Sept ! mber Very soon to light the fact that both the
to S the ?3 n k atl0n ^ nd the s^ipnent of these units were quite unsuited
course IT. thSn ±n The reason for this of
the size of faCt the Foroe was de Pl°yed - even in a country
fare for which '?+ _ ° ver ' far .S rea '*' er distances than in the type of war
ty no means PIPP tmits were normally intended, though they were
nearly 100 ais p'; ces for a colonial rebellion. In Palestine
Brigade HO mi^ht h ° ne Divisiona i Headquarters from Corps, a
sars.'&sE s arss * »««*.»»»
^ en 20 miles from one of its companies.