'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎40v] (85/294)

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in places where land lines were subject to continual saootage and where
ground was too difficult for the transport of v/lieless sets. Similar],,
in offensive operations, once the troops had left routes passable to
M.T• they were dependent upon visual for coninunicaoion oack to the
wireless sets which linked them with their cwn headquarters and with
co-operating aircraft. The comparative lightness of v/T equipnent rr.ai
it eminently suitable for this purpose. Infantry rrigade Signal Sectb
experienced a shortage of visual apparatus, and it would have been most
useful had a pool of 12 heliographs and 12 lamps oeen held by Divisional
Signals at Divisional HQ for distribution to Brigade sections as requbf
Training in visual signalling was not generally found to be up to
the standard required for the work in hand. In the Infantry Brigade
Signal Sections pressure of W/T work had in some cases resulted in a
serious fall in the quality of the visual work, particularly in regard
to station discipline, and it seems possible that V/T training in the
Brigade sections had been reduced too much. In Battalions there was
a tendency to lean too much upon the W/T resources of the Brigade, where
better use might have been made of their own V/T facilities. For this
type of warfare it would be useful to include in routine training the
employment of semaphore communication be'tween sections and platoon head,
quarters, A simple "battle code", designed for speed and not for
secrecy, was employed by some battalions and resulted in an appreciable
quickening up of V/T within the units.
Verey Lights
Light signals were used on a much wider scale than usual, and for
certain kinds of v/ork were the only satisfactory means of communication,
They featured prominently in the daily routine work of convoy escorts
and railway troops, while all troops in contact with the enemy employed
Verey lights to convey simple messages and warnings — particularly to
airci . Light signals also formed the principal means of comniunioa-
tion of the Supernumerary Police, whose training had necessarily to be
too short to include any other form of signalling.
1 he or awing up of a code of light signals was found to be no easy
^ as T? an< ^ ru l es emerged which experience showed must govern their
a .P.'P- L - J -Gata. o n« ^ The first rule was that the code must be absolutely uni-
Ve ! S ^ * . was^not so at first in Palestine where railway and police
as military and R,A.F, commanders, had devised
,-10 signals to meet their individual requirements, and it was not easy
c n nn 0 e rese later. In the end however the code which is given belff
l eVeryone wh0 used a Verey pistol or flare, and only then
was ° r ? obtained. The second essential of any code
obtain aa w ul ^ ^ S ^ oun<i that ’ this is by no means so easy to
local i apl ° ear > a ^ f irst. But it is obvious, where untrained
code of the nt USZL ?? signals on a wide scale, that only a
rf^l wav oht S ^ iCity ° an be ex P ec ied to succeed. The only
some sort of dana^ SU ? n . a C °^ e Was to make ovor y red light indicate
lights had to QVQrj \ £ reen light a sign of safety, vhile v/iiite
illumination nurpose° = '' e iho Ud n d t ? permit of their free 036 for
are usually aJ-vJLa into a l meanln gs of rod and green lights
alone it was dangerous to m L empl0y0e, aild for thls rcason .
and "safetv" respeotivelv thelr '. to “o-an anything else but "daneer
combinations, the follav~bb H t0r e:i! l >0 rii.ienting with all sorts of
and proved to be th,.g i b Was eVt3 ntually adopted in Palestine
of universal anolioationli ° t P ed Whioh fulfilled the two requirements
a application and extreme simplicity.