'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎24v] (53/294)

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presented from the start. With many people - and especially the .Arab-,
it is better to bark loud even if you are not going to bite very hard
rather than to bite without barking.
Repression has an ugly sound andj though it may frighten the enemy
into subjection by its mere threat, it is equally lively to alarm a
cautious Administration. It is a misconception of what a repressive
■policy involves which generally makes the civil autnorities reluctant
to enroloy it. In oractice it is usually the more merciful of uhe two
in the end, and it is imoortant to appreciate its implications. As a
rule it imolies martial lav/ in some form or other , so tnat it will be
convenient to consider both together.
THE WEAPON OF MARTIAL LAV/
A feature of the rebellion - and this is a feature common to most
serious disorders in the East - was the successful evasion of respon
sibility by the leaders. The Arab Higher Committee, which v/as allowed
to function freely throughout, openly preached continuance of the strike,
which was legal. But they were never held responsible for the ever-
increasing violence and the formation of armed bands, although it soon
became clear that such activities were the results of their incitement
by the Committee 1 s agents and partisans. The only ones to suffer were
the rank and file.
The essence of martial law is the power it gives to go to the root
of the trouble - to strike at those who instigate but will not come out
into the open, to curtail the licence of irresponsible leaders, and to
deal severely with those who use the patriotism of others as a cloak
under which to further their own ends. A declaration of martial law
would have forced the rebels to realise three unpleasant facts: that
the leaders would have to accept that responsibility for the consequences
of their acts and words which so far they had successfully evaded, that
punishment would become proportionate to the seriousness of the crime;
and that vigorous military action would at last become possible.
At the same time it should be realised that even vigorous military
action under martial law does not necessarily entail M severe repressive
measures" which at the time were so repugnant to the civil government,
and the reputation of the British soldier is the best answer to those
who fear that strong measures must involve brutality. The very
magnitude 01 the power of martial law is the best guarantee that it will
no’k used oppressively, even were that possible in the glaring light
of modern puolicity. The bigger the stick the less likely is one to
risK being struck by it. It would indeed be a misuse of power to use
martial^ law solely to crush misled peasants. But its use to ■paralyse
the activities of those who were morally responsible for the violence,
incendiarism and destruction of life and property which took •place in
Palestine in 1936 would have been merciful and saved much misery.
This is not the place to consider in detail the reasons why martial
law was never applied to Palestine, It is sufficient to record that
i' was neve... declared Put, as its imposition was continuously advised
y ^ e commander at ohe time, it is instinctive to consider what
assistance it could have given to the conduct of the military operations.
The Jar Office pamphlet " Notes on Imperial Policing 1934" quotes five
consi orations which must be borne in mind by a commander who is called
upon to advise the imposition of martial law.
Are military ope rations which are for the restoration
~- 7 y r " s " rva ^^ Qn 0x or ^-er, or for the succ ess of the camp aign, bei ng.
gravei y hampered, ana can those op erations only hR narHRd outTf
a( dQpte d which the existing l aw cannot enforc e, e vg«>
pyrfew, censorship , restrictions on circulation etc .?