'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎24r] (52/294)

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The Policy of Conciliat ion
It is understandable that no G-overnment will adopt an immediate
pbiicy of repression without considerable reluctance, but it should also
be clear that unless there is a fair chance of conciliation succeeding
the sooner repressive action is taken the less will be the degree of
severity required and the less will the country suffer in consequence*
In Palestine there v/as never any fair expectation that conciliation would
succeed. It had been tried and had failed in every previous outbreak
and there was no reason why 1936 should have proved any exception.
The Royal Commission Report leaves little room for doubt in this report:-
"Our point, once mo re, is that conciliation, like impartiali ty,
has^ failed* If the patient treatment of Arabs last year has
been shar xily criticized, its critics must confess that i t had _at
least this merit. It prov ed to demonstration that conciliation
is no use* It has now been tried for 17 years, and at the end
th e Arabs, taken as a whole, are more hostile to the Jews and much
more hostile to the Government than they were at the beginning ,"
There were probaoly two chief reasons for its failure. The first
will always apply. The very fact that rebel leaders have resorted to
violence to attain their ends is evidence that they are no longer
prepared to conciliate without some concession on the part of the
G-overnrnent. As a rule they dare not, and perhaps even cannot, call
a halt until they receive sufficient compensation in the shape of a
partial accession to their demands or can bow to an overwhelming show
of force. In fact the first and third courses are really the only
uractical policies for the authorities to adopt in such circumstances*
In Palestine, where political murder is frequent, many of the more
moderate leaders, frightened at the pace at which they were being
dragged along, would have welcomed an opposition strong enough to con
vince the rank and file before it was too late that further resistance
was useless. It was noticeable that those leaders who were interned
at an early stage were seldom dissatisfied at their personal fate*
The second reason for the failure of the middle policy was the old
story of the East - moderation mistaken for weakness. The Arabs, used
to the repressive measures of 400 years of Turkish rule, were encouraged
by the immunity with which they could commit their misdeeds. Recent
events in connection with Abyssinia had not raised British prestige in
their eyes, and the leaders quoted India, Ireland and Iraq as evidence
that the British Empire will give way to force. 'Then violent crime
continued to go unpunished or only half published they attributed it
either to real weakness or to a sneaking sympathy with their cause
which resulted in only half-hearted measures being taken to crush the
rebellion. The latter belief was encouraged by petty successes such
as successful protests against ’’excesses'’ by troops, treatment of
internees etc,?which greatly enhanced the prestige of their leaders.
All this not only led the malcontents to redouble their efforts, but
also led many Arabs to join the rebels who might otherwise have
remained aloof•
The Policy of Repression
It has been shewn hew the continued failure of conciliatory
methods at last forced the authorities to adopt a policy of repression.
It is significant that the mere announcement of the change went a long
way towards ending the revolt. There is little doubt that a similar
announcement at an earlier date would have saved time and the destruc
tion of much life and property. In the meantime many repressive
measures had crent in through force of circumstances without any out
ward change of policy, and mostly they were more severe in nature than
would have been necessary in the early stages had a strong front been