'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [25r] (54/294)
The record is made up of 1 volume (142 folios). It was created in Feb 1938. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.
44816-1
35
Under this heading the urgent need for secrecy alone would have
supplied the answer* The leakage in official and police circles has
already been referred to, and so long as the military acted in aid of
the civil power and therefore had to lay their plans before it so long
were operations imperilled by lack of secrecy. Curfew certainly, and
also a form of censorship was enforced by the civil power so far as the
law allowed; but, to quote the opinion of the Royal Commission, H the_
penalties provided by t he Press Ordinance and the action tak en under it
were insufficient to coj^e with an aggravated evil like the Palestin e Press.
Restrictions on circulation were not imposed, and yet it would have^oeen
of inestimable value during the operations had inhabitants of certain
areas been forced to carry passes which could have been checked, say,
with fingerprints. Had this been combined with legislation to force
them to sleep each night in their own homes, villages could have been
visited in order to round up strangers and to note absentees for
apprehension and p uni slime nt • Such action would have gone a long way
towards curtailing the activities of armed bands, and is one of the
many ways in which martial law might have helped "to protect life and
property" without necessarily involving violence against the population.
(ii) Is the existing legal system, or the authority of the existing
criminal courts, inadequate to provide a deterrent against crime pr_
does the situation demand the more summary punishment of offence s^
which martial law alone can provide?
There can be little dispute that the failure of the existing system
under this heading alone was ample justification for the declaration of
martial lav/.
Here figures can be allowed to speak for themselves. To take
murder alone, 260 cases were reported in 1936 of which 67 persons were
convicted and yet not a single dea.th sentence was carried out. ihe
Royal Commission in quoting these figures, after comparing them with
the results of action taken against rioters in 1929, remarks "in_1936^
convictions were even fewer. Yet the prompt and adequate punishment
o f crime is a vital factor in the maintenance of law and order .^
Little more need be said here, and it is unnecessaiy to dwell upon the
influence exerted by the Arab judges and prosecutors whose sympathies
with the rebels were scarcely disguised. There are hov/ever two minor
points which are worthy of note for the future. Where rebels have
a substantial central fund the imposition of money fines on individual
offenders is a poor deterrent, since they are cither reimbursed by the
leaders or regard themselves lucky to have been able to contribute to
the "cause" by an often insignificant sum of money rather than by
personal inconvenience. It was noticeable in Palestine that many
members of gangs were youths of 16-18 years whom it was obviously
undesirable to sentence to capital punishment or long terms of
imprisonment. Here martial law might have provided a strong deterrent
in the shape of corporal punishment followed by a period of employment
in a special labour unit on v/ork of educational value.
fiii') i s the disorder so grave, and the situation so out of han d,_
that no consideration of the loss of prestige consequent upo n^hc^
abdication of the" civil power or its supersess ion can weigh
the call for immediate and drastic measures which the civil powe r
cannot provide?
This must always remain a matter of opinion and one on which the
military commander and the civil authorities are least likely to agree.
It is the civil official whose prestige is at stake^and naturally he
will regard abdication with extreme distaste, especially as he will
probably look upon it as a final confession of failure. A special
responsibility in this direction therefore-rests upon the commander
who recommends martial law, and he will be well advised to point
out that if repressive measures have to be taken which may leave
bitterness in their wake it is better for the soldiers to
About this item
- Content
Report detailing the military lessons of the Arab rebellion in Palestine in 1936 that was compiled by General Staff, Headquarters, The British Forces, Palestine & Trans-Jordan.
The report is divided up into chapters as follows:
- Introduction
- A Short History of the Rebellion I - to the end of June, 1936
- A Short History of the Rebellion II - from the 1st July, 1936 to the end of the year
- Conditions in Palestine as Affecting Operations
- Commanders and Staffs
- Intelligence
- Intercommunication
- Administration
- Transport
- Weapons and Equipment
- The Employment of Various Arms
- The Employment of Aircraft in Co-operation with Troops
- Defensive Action
- Protection of Communications
- Offensive Action
- Conclusion - Summary of Main Lessons
The report contains 46 photographs and a number of diagrams which are located throughout the volume. It also contains four maps, found at folios 140-143.
- Extent and format
- 1 volume (142 folios)
- Arrangement
The volume contains a contents page on folio 3.
- Physical characteristics
Foliation: the foliation sequence commences at the front cover with 1 and terminates at the inside back cover with 144; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. Pagination: the volume also contains an original printed pagination sequence.
- Written in
- English in Latin script View the complete information for this record
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Copyright: How to use this content
- Reference
- IOR/L/MIL/17/16/16
- Title
- 'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936'
- Pages
- front, back, spine, edge, head, tail, front-i, 2r:110v, 111ar:111av, 111r:139v, back-i
- Author
- East India Company, the Board of Control, the India Office, or other British Government Department
- Usage terms
- Open Government Licence