'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎80r] (159/248)

157
describes the condition of that camp in the following
words:—“ On arrival here we found about 195 British
and 800 Indian sick and wounded in an irregular camp
situated on filthy muddy ground behind the village. . . .
There was one Indian temporary I.M.S. officer in charge
of the Indians, and he was ill. He had two sub-assistant
surgeons and some of the personnel of an improvised
cavalry field ambulance to help him. He had no dressings
left, and many cases still had on the first field dressings
which had been applied on the battlefield. About 200
of the patients had dysentery, and there were no proper
latrine arrangements. The state of the camp was inde
scribable. Near the middle of the hospital tents was a
pile of bags of atta, &c., mostly ruined by the rain, which
I was told represented 10 days’ rations.”
137. In the meantime, on the 13th, the camp at
Musandaq was broken up, some of the patients being
evacuated to Basra and others removed to Shaikh Saad.
During this time the only medical staff for this hospital
was 3 medical officers for 1,200 patients. For the hos
pital at Shaikh Saad, where the number of patients
varied from 2,200 on the 11th to 1,000 on the 18th,
4 medical officers only were detailed. Of these 2 got ill,
and for some time therefore 2 officers only were available
for duty. It must also be remembered that this medical
staff could ill be spared from the very small establishment
of the field ambulances with the force. There was,
besides, a great shortage in subordinates, and of various
kinds of medical and surgical stores and appliances.
138. In the battle of January 13th and 14'th the medical
organisation continued to be equally unsatisfactory. The
weather conditions had by this time become very bad.
On the evening of the 8th it began to rain, and continued
to do so intermittently from that date until the 21st,
when very heavy rain fell for some days. Even at the
time when the battle of Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. was fought, the difficulty
of moving sick and wounded in the rain and heavy mud
was considerable, and the field ambulances attached to
the force were still very inadequate. The evidence
indicates, however, that the available medical staff did
all that was possible to collect the wounded as soon as
the action ended, and to give them such shelter as was
available. Many were collected in an enclosure not far
from the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. and were there detained for the night.
We do not doubt that everything that was possible was
done to assist them, but the suffering from want of food,
cold, and lack of proper treatment was severe. On the
following day they were evacuated to Shaikh Saad, and
accommodated in the steamers moored there. On the
15th the steamers accompanying the force moved up
to the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. , where they remained during the action
of January 21st and 22nd, the hospital at Shaikh Saad
being left in charge of the Meerut Stationary Hospital.
The medical establishment had by this time been slightly
reinforced, but was still much below normal. The action
took place about 3 miles from the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. , and shortly
after it began there was a heavy downpour of rain. This
made the country, which was already difficult to move in,
almost impassable. The attack on the enemy’s position
was unsuccessful, and the casualties were very heavy.
The w'eather was extremely cold, and the whole country
was practically a quagmire. In such circumstances the
sufferings of the wounded would have been very great
even with the best possible organisation. They were
accentuated by the insufficiency of medical personnel,
equipment and stores, and by the fact that there was
also for some time considerable confusion arid want of
organisation. Throughout the day and the following
night wounded and many unwounded men struggled
back to the camp as best they could—walking, riding
or carried on stretchers, or in transport carts. The
whole country was a sea of mud, and many fell from
exhaustion on the way. Those who were in the camp,
and unwounded men returning from the battlefield, did
their best to assist their wounded comrades to shelter,
but we cannot doubt that a large number failed to reach
their destination and died from exposure.
Evidence has indeed been given of one case in which
not only a wounded man, but the stretcher-bearers
bringing him in, died from this cause. We think that
the condition of affairs is well illustrated by the following
extract from the evidence of a medical officer who was
present: “I shall never forget that journey. The
wounded and sick were in army ira viport carts, and my
(C 48—176)
personnel and myself on foot. We started off by crossing
a nullah in which there was 3 feet of water, and then
stumbled across country, sinking every step knee-deep
in mud. We were obliged to take a zigzag course to
enable the carts to avoid ditches and other obstacles.
It was a terrible night, bitterly cold, with a driving
sleet. We were wet through, and had had no food all
day. I remember I had an attack of ague when I reached
the ship. With great difficulty we got our sick and
wounded up the two slippery steep planks which formed
the only means of getting on the ship. The ship was
overcrowded and understaffed.” To add to the diffi
culties a number of tents which had been pitched for
the accommodation of the wounded were, by an unfor
tunate error of judgment, struck, the officer in charge
being under a misapprehension that orders had been
issued for the force to advance. When, therefore, the
wounded reached the camp the only shelter available
was the hospital steamer “ Julnar.” To this steamer,
and to any other steamer they could find,'both wounded
and unwounded crowded for shelter and warmth, but
large numbers failed to secure any protection. The tents
that had been struck were repitched, and a certain number
of patients were accommodated in them ; but as they
had been pitched after the rain began to fall, and on
gro\ind knee-deep in mud, they were oi little use to
persons wet through and numb with cold. Nor were
those on the steamers in much better case, for many
of these vessels were not weather-proof ; the men crowded
anywhere they could, in gangways, in the stokehold and
in the cabins for warmth ; but many were and remained
for some days wet through. The small medical staff on
the spot, and officers and men not connected with the
medical services, did all they could to improve matters,
and to feed and assist the wounded. In spite of all
these efforts the evidence conclusively shows that the
sufferings of the wounded were so grievous that it would
be difficult to exaggerate them.
139. It is impossible to deal separately with the evacua
tion of the wounded from these three engagements, for
many individuals wounded in different battles travelled
down the Tigris together. The hardships of the voyage
were much increased during this period by the constant
rain and cold that prevailed. As the steamers were not
weatherproof, the patients were wet through and numb
with cold, and remained in this condition for the whole
journey. The steamers were overcrowded, and the
defects in the arrangements, to which we have already
referred, were more pronounced than on any previous
occasion. We cite the following extract from the evidence
of an officer as to his experiences on his way down. It
would be easy to quote evidence of a more sensational
character, but we think that the following is fairly
typical:—
“I left Shaikh Saad on the morning of January 12th,
on board the “ P. 5,” with about 300 other wounded.
This boat had arrived at Shaikh Saad the previous day,
and had just discharged the personnel and mules of a
howitzer battery. There were no proper arrangements
for food for the wounded on board, and we had to live
on bully beef, biscuits and jam ; tea was also issued, but
there was no bread to be had. We all had to lie on the
deck ; blankets were issued out. The medical staff on
board consisted of one doctor and one assistant surgeon
of the Indian Subordinate Medical Department and two
sweepers. On arrival at Amara the assistant surgeon
was taken off this boat for duty on shore. No one was
sent in his place, so from Amara to Basra the one doctor
had to attend to some 300 wounded, the majority being
stretcher cases. It was impossible for the two sweepers
to attend to all the wounded properly, and I know of
many cases of men urinating and defcecating in their
boots. It rained hard the whole of the voyage down
from Shaikh Saad to Basra, and everybody on the boat,
and those on the two barges, were soaked to the skin.
Bread and meat rations were put on board at Amara,
but owing to the want of cooking arrangements we never
received a proper meal.”
140. The conditions were indeed, in many ways, much
worse than after Ctesiphon, and when the steamers
arrived at Amara the wounded were in a pitiable state,
wet through, dirty, without any dry clothes or covering,
benumbed with cold and very hungry. Their wounds
had not been properly dressed, and in some instances
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