'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎80v] (160/248)

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cases of fracture were not even in splints. Many of the
steamers were overcrowded and filthy, not only with
mud and remnants of food, but also with faeces and
urine. The condition of things, indeed, was so bad that
it is difficult to describe it.
141. We have now to consider the causes which led to
this very serious breakdown in the medical organisation,
and to state whether the officers on the spot were in any
w ay to blame for this condition of affairs. In our opinion
the main causes of the breakdown were fourfold :—
(1) The lack of proper hospital river steamers.
(2) The lack of river transport.
(3) The insufficiency of the medical and subordinate
staff and of medical stores and accessories ; and
(4) The weather conditions.
We have already discussed the want of provision of
proper hospital steamers and the lack of river transport.
The insufficiency of the medical and subordinate staff
and equipment was, in our opinion, almost entirely due
to the failure on the part of the embarkation authorities
at Marseilles to despatch the medical units of the 3rd
and 7 th Divisions simultaneously with the fighting troops
of those divisions. We think it necessary to set out the
facts of this failure in some detail, as we regard it as
one of the main causes of this breakdowm.
142. We understand that it is a recognised principle
in embarkation work that units despatched for service
oversea should be embarked in the order in which they
are required to land, and that each unit should be shipped
complete, with its equipment, technical vehicles and
transport. As each brigade has a field ambulance allotted
to it on service, it, follows that a field ambulance should
have been despatched from Marseilles with every four
battalions embarked, so as to enable each brigade to take
the field as soon as it landed at Basrah. Instead of adher
ing to this well-knowm rule, the embarkation staff at
Marseilles despatched the combatant units of each division
first, keeping back the medical units till the last. Besides
separating brigades from their field medical units, they
added to the confusion so caused by breaking up the latter
in order to economise shipping. The result of this was
that, when the field ambulances arrived at Basra, it was
found in most cases that their personnel was on one ship,
their equipment on another and their transport in some
cases on a third. To make matters worse, certain of the
transports employed were of too deep draught to cross the
bar at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, thus necessitating
transhipment at Kow r eit. In consequence of these
unbusinesslike arrangements, the medical units from
France were not only late in arrival at Basra, but had to
be detained there for some days, while their personnel
and equipment was being sorted out and collected. Their
transport had in every case to be sent up later, generally
by march route, as the shortage of shipping precluded its
despatch by river steamer. The length of the march
and the delay caused by floods and other obstacles retarded
progress considerably, so that the animals and vehicles
of most of these field ambulances did not begin to reach
the front until March.
143. We have found it difficult to ascertain why the
•mbarkation staff at Marseilles adopted this unusual
procedure, and we realise that there may have been
reasons for their action of which we are not aware ; but
so far as they can be gathered, the facts of the case appear
to be as follows. Troop trains in France are of two fixed
types—the “ type combatant ” and the “ type pare.”
The railway transport authorities would not despatch
any “ type pare ” trains until all the “ type combatant ”
trains had started. The “ type combatant ” trains are
unsuited to the conveyance of units such as field ambu
lances which are equipped with a relatively large amount of
transport. Similarly the “ type pare ” trains are unsuited
to combatant units. The field ambulances were thus
perforce the last units of the 7th Division to entrain, and
though all the trains arrived at Marseilles from the front
within a period of 26 hours, and a rearrangement at
Marseilles would thus appear to have been feasible, the
order of arrival seems to have governed the order of
embarkation, with the result that the medical units
were the last to be shipped.
144. No objection to this arrangement seems to have
been made by the divisional commander concerned, firstly
because the entraining arrangements were in the hands
of the higher authorities, who presumably had full informa
tion as to the requirements of the situation, and secondly
because the War Office, in a letter dated November 1st,
1915, had stated that the primary destination of both
divisions was Egypt, where they would be reorganised,
prior to despatch to Mesopotamia in vessels which could
cross the Fao bar. This is borne out by the fact that the
transports were only rationed for the voyage to Egypt,
and that a camp was actually prepared at Tel-el-Kebir
for the reception of these Indian divisions.
145. During the embarkation of the 7th Division the
embarkation staff found it necessary to separate units
from their 1st line transport and drivers from their horses.
The divisional staff objected to this proceeding, but was
told that the Base Commandant had strict orders to allow
no transport to sail without her full complement of troops
and animals. The splitting up of units was held to be
unavoidable as, owing to differences in sanitary and cook
ing arrangements, some transports had to be reserved for
British and others for Indian troops. We are informed
that the recommendations of the divisional staff would
have provided for the embarkation, with the headquarters
of each field ambulance, of the whole of its equipment, and
a sufficiently large portion of personnel to allow of its
being employed as soon as it landed. Owing, however,
to the non-arrival of certain ships, the whole trooping
programme had to be recast, and the piecemeal embarka
tion of units was insisted on, so as to utilize shipping to the
fullest possible extent. We gather that the confusion
resulting from this arrangement must have been consider
able, as the w agons and ambulance vehicles of two medical
units were crowded out at the last moment and left on
the quay at Marseilles. Besides breaking up units and
delaying their embarkation, the order of despatch of
medical units was changed so as to conform to shipping
requirements. Thus, instead of giving priority to the
field ambulances w hich would be required by their brigades
immediately on landing, one of the first medical units
of the 3rd Division to be embarked was the Secunderabad
General Hospital, which could only be used at the base
or on the lines of communication, and was less pressingly
required than the mobile medical units.
146. The urgency of relieving General Townshend made
it necessary to expedite the despatch of troops to Basra,
and the orders for the disembarkation of the two Indian
divisions in Egypt were accordingly cancelled. With the
exception of two or three units which transhipped and
were accommodated for a few days at Tel-el-Kebir, the
troops proceeded direct to Mesopotamia, no opportunity
being given them to reorganise or collect their scattered
personnel [and equipment. A statement is attached *
giving full particulars as to the dates of despatch and
arrival of each medical unit belonging to these two
divisions. It will be observed that on the date of General
Aylmer’s starting for the relief of Kut, namely, January
4th, not a single complete field ambulance had disembarked
at Basra, though portions of some units had just arrived
there. The embarkation staff made great efforts to
despatch these ambulances up-river as quickly as possible,
for the need of medical reinforcements at the front was
fully appreciated. None of them arrived, however, until
•fter the battles of Shaikh Saad and the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. had been
fought. The late arrival of the medical units of the
3rd and 7th Divisions thus created a temporary but very
serious shortage of medical personnel and equipment
in the Tigris Army Corps, which could not have been
foreseen, either in Mesopotamia or in India. The earlier
arrival of these units would not have removed the hard
ships caused to the wounded by rain, cold and exposure,
or those arising from the lack of suitable river transport.
It would, however, have secured the presence on the field of
battle of a large number of fully staffed and well-equipped
medical units, and so would have facilitated the rapid
collection and removal of the wounded, besides providing
the latter with the personnel required to cook and dis
tribute their food and attend to their bodily wants. We
consider that the breakdown which occurred after the
January battles was largely, though indirectly, due to the
unsatisfactory way in which the medical units of the 3rd
and 7th Divisions were despatched from Marseilles.
147. We may explain that our remarks in regard to
the despatch of medical units, apply also to supply units.
* Annexure III.