'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎79v] (158/248)

156
discomfort resulting from the lack of attendance was less
felt. On one steamer, indeed, the arrrangements made
were fairly good, and the number of patients was so small
that there was little ground for complaint. It is right
also to state that on arrival at Kut and again at Amara,
all possible efforts were made to feed, dress and tend
the patients, and that some of them were either landed
en route, or transhipped to other steamers which were
less crowded and better equipped.
Nevertheless, the evidence of the medical officers and
of the wounded who formed part of these convoys, and
of others who saw from time to time what the condition
of affairs was, has satisfied us that on several of these
steamers the patients suffered from cold, hunger, thirst
and want of care. Wounds which required dressing and
re-dressing were not attended to, and the condition of many
of the patients who travelled by these steamers was,
when they reached Basra, deplorable. There the wounds
of many were found to be in a septic condition and in
urgent nee.d of re-dressing. In some cases bed sores had
developed, more than one patient arrived soaked in
faces and urine, and in a few cases wounds were found
to contain maggots. These are the facts upon which,
differing from Sir John Nixon, we find that the medical
arrangements were lamentably defective. While, how
ever, we think it our duty to criticise these arrangements,
we freely admit that the difficulties of the situation were
such that the evacuation of the wounded at all was a
great achievement, for which the military and medical
authorities in the field deserve very great credit.
135. Operations for the relief of Kvt in January .—We
now come to a period when the breakdown in the medical
arrangements of the campaign was more marked than at
any other time. The military situation and the reasons
which, in the opinion of those best qualified to judge,
rendered an immediate advance to the relief of Kut
necessary, have already been explained, and it remains
onlv to examine the medical arrangements for these
operations. In January, 1916, when the order to advance
was given the total strength of the expeditionary force
in Mesopotamia, excluding the division besieged in Kut,
was approximately 51,000 men. Throughout the year
various reinforcements had been sent out, and in December
and January two new divisions arrived from France.
The medical establishment of the force was, as has already
been showm, insufficient before the arrival of these tw r o
divisions, and this deficiency was accentuated by the
fact that they were despatched from France in advance
of their medical units. On January 3rd, when the force
marched from Ali al-Gharbi, no part of the medical
establishments of these divisions was available for service
at the front. It may also be added that when these
units did arrive, their personnel, equipment and transport
were found to have been sent on different ships, and it
was impossible to get them despatched immediately to
the front, as all the river transport was needed for more
urgent purposes. When, therefore, General Aylmer con
centrated at Ali-al-Gharbi, his only possible course was
to improvise medical units out of the resources available,
and for this purpose all the personnel and equipment
that could be collected was employed. By strenuous
efforts seven field ambulance sections were thus provided
for the 7th Division, upon which the brunt of the fighting
fell. Eight sections were allotted to the corps troops
and two sections of a clearing hospital were placed on
the “ Julnar,” which was to receive the wounded. Many
of these units were, however, deficient in personnel and
equipment, nor was the subordinate establishment com
posed entirely of properly trained persons. To make up
deficiencies in equipment the hospitals were depleted of
any material they could spare, purchases were made
locally of cloth and muslin for bandages, and we are
informed that sheets and tablecloths were collected to
be used in case of necessity. Orders had been issued by
the Director of Medical Services, Mesopotamia, that a
consignment of medical accessories, then lying at Basrah
and intended for the advanced medical depot at Kut,
should be forwarded to Ali-al-Gharbi for use in case of
need. By a series of unfortunate mistakes this supply
was not sent on by steamer in accordance with the orders
issued, but was despatched by mahaila and arrived too
late for the earlier actions. The omission to forward
this consignment, the lack of which was severely felt,
was the subject of a court of enquiry, and the officers
responsible for the failure to carry out orders were cen
sured by the Army Commander. With such deficiencies
in medical establishments and equipment, it was not to
be expected that the arrangements for the treatment of
the wounded could be very satisfactory, even in a suc
cessful engagement with few casualties. The resistance
offered by the Turkish force was, however, more strenuous
and the casualties were far more numerous than had been
anticipated. The medical staff was entirely unable to
cope with the number of patients, and drugs and dressings
ran short. On the 7th, when large numbers of wounded
began to come in, there was not room for all of them
on the “Julnar,” or in the few tents which had been
pitched for their reception. In consequence, the great
majority had to lie out all night on the river bank without
shelter, or sufficient clothing, food, or medical attendance.
On the 8th more tents were pitched, mainly by the efforts
of officers who were not responsible for the medical
arrangements, and some organised effort was made to
afford the necessary medical relief. For some time,
however, there was a great want of organisation, the
supply personnel was less than a quarter of its proper
strength, and the unfortunate sick and wounded appear
to have been in great measure dependant on their regi
ments and on the kindness of officers not attached to
the medical services, both for shelter and food. We have
every reason to know that many of the executive medical
officers on this occasion, as indeed throughout the cam
paign, worked unremittingly to do what was possible
for the relief of their patients ; but both on the “ Julnar ”
and on the river bank the latter appear to have suffered
very greatly from want of food, shelter, and medical
treatment. While this result was mainly due to shortage
of staff and equipment, we consider that much of it
might have been avoided if the medical administrative
officers had been more prompt and resourceful in utilising
available material. We refer in particular to conditions
on the left bank of the river. On the right bank, though
the field ambulances were much overcrowded, the organi
sation was better and more systematic, and every effort
was made to do all that was humanly possible. W 7 e are
not satisfied, however, that this was the case on the left
bank. We are aware that there was a shortage of per
sonnel and equipment; but we do not see why better
accommodation and shelter should not have been pro
vided for the wounded, and an adequate supply of food
and hot drinks prepared for them. The tents were
available, and food was on the spot. On the 8th addi
tional tents were pitched by fatigue parties, and food
was supplied to most of the wounded. We think also
that better arrangements should have been made for
feeding and treating the patients on the “ Julnar.” We
are told by the officer who acted as Assistant Director,
Medical Services, 7th Division, that he estimated the
probable number of casualties in that division at 2,000.
Such being the case it appears to us unfortunate that
tents, blankets, and food were not prepared for this
number. We may add that the arrangements for feeding
the patients, alike in the tents and on the “ Julnar,” were
so unsatisfactory that they were at the time severely,
and we think justly, criticised by a General Officer who
has given evidence before us. We have indeed to con
clude, on the evidence adduced, that many of the wounded
were indebted to the enterprise of regimental and other
officers not connected with the medical services for any
food or shelter they received.
136. After the occupation of Shaikh Saad on January
9th about 2,000 of the wounded were moved to a new
camp there, the remainder numbering 1,200 bfeing left
in a camp on the left bank of the river at Musandaq in
charge of a small medical staff. The condition of the
camps at Musandaq and Shaikh Saad have been described
to us by various witnesses, and we are constrained to find
that the arrangements for the accommodation and treat
ment of the wounded there were very defective. The
medical staff was so small that the wounds of many
remained undressed for some days. The camps were in
a very insanitary condition. The supply of surgical
stores and appliances ran short, and there was practically
no subordinate staff to see to the welfare of the patients.
The suffering and discomfort endured by the unfortunate
wounded in these camps were very great, and even up
to January 18th, when the Meerut Stationary Hospital
took over charge at Shaikh Saad, this condition of affairs
continued there. The Officer Commanding this hospital
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