'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎64r] (127/248)

February 5th, 1915, Lord Kitchener cabled,— c ‘ Cannot you organise the volunteer forces
that you have so that they could either relieve your garrison in India or . .
And again on February 12th,—“ I should certainly take some slight risk ... I
should in addition call on European residents and Indian volunteers to enlist for general
service.” Yet nothing was done in this direction until this present year. The
Commander-in-Chief replied on February 8th,—“I am endeavouring to organise the
volunteers in India, but . . . even for service in other parts of India,-few of those
are willing to leave their civil posts.’ This objection has been felt in England also and
in a measure surmounted ; in India it immobilised a force of 44,000 trained and enrolled
men. We had no evidence that efforts had been made to get the volunteers to volunteer
for general service.
17. Meanwhile complaints of the <£ denudation” of India continued. The Viceroy wrote,
November 5th, 1914,—“ I am receiving complaints from the provinces that they are
denuded of troops, and that Europeans are anxious as to the future.” We had no
corroborative evidence on this point, but Englishmen, though anxious everywhere, were
not the less willing to risk their lives. When the Home Government began to
press for fresh units to be sent to Mesopotamia complaint grew to protest. Lord
Hardinge telegraphed, February 16th, 1915,—“ We are strongly of opinion that "we have
reached limit of risk which can justifiably be imposed on the people of India, who pay
for the Indian Army.” On February 25th—“ We feel that we have not been treated
fairly . . . It is the old story of treating India like a milch cow, and this creates such
a deplorable impression here.” Not only do these two telegrams show a glaring example
of the “ India not at War ” theory, but the latter one is an unfair suggestion. The people
of India knew nothing of the demands that were being made, and when demands were
made on them after Lord Hardinge left, they met them with as much patriotism and as
little complaining as any part of the Empire.
Nor will the people of India appreciate Lord Hardinge’s cable of March 3rd—“ I do
not think that we ought to be asked to take further risks, and in fact we must refuse to do
so . . . If the facts were generally known there would be an outcry in this country.”
On the same day he cabled— £t India has therefore done her duty to the Empire, and it
is quite impossible, in view of the situation on the frontier and in interior, to do more.
It is no use to suggest to us that we should take further risks in India.” To these cables
Lord Crewe replied—“ His Majesty’s Government definitely order the strengthening of
General Barrett’s force at once, and that you are both entirely relieved of responsibility for
consequences.” It seems to me a question whether Lord Hardinge ought not to have
resigned office on receipt of such an order couched in such language. The Home Govern
ment seem to me also to have a certain responsibility for retaining him in office. Lord
Kitchener wired to Sir Beauchamp Duff on the same date—“ I advise-you as an old friend
to reinforce Basra. It appears to me that the attitude adopted in India is excessively
dangerous.” I hold that the Commission should show that it was, in fact, dangerous.
18. Still the complaints continued. On March 9th the Viceroy wired: ” I cannot
spare any more troops—an opinion in which I have the Commander-in-Chief, the whole
of my Council, and all responsible people with me ... 1 receive an imperative order
The Commander-in-Chief . . . has stated his opinion . . . that he
would like to see every European woman out of the country.’ This protest fell on deaf
ears as it deserved to do ; and on March 14th the Army Council stated its opinion to the
Secretary of State, Lord Crewe—“ The maintenance of British rule in India is a duty of
high importance . . . but it is not a duty which can claim to be paramount over
all others.” On April 29th, 1915, was made the last protect, the last for many months for
a reason which will appear. The Viceroy wires—“ The lives of loyal British and Indian
subjects are imperilled by the demands made upon our military resources.”
19. General Nixon had now been sent from India to Mesopotamia with a large increase
of force, and the attitude of the Indian Government changed. I cannot avoid the conclusion
that the prospect of kudos to be gained by a successful expedition affected the judgment of
thg,t Government. Unfortunately it did not change their attitude towards the Home
Government, but merely their afnbitions. No sooner did the expedition assume a creditable
sizje than the Indian Government, without inquiry as to its wants or altering the policy of
alcWness, began almost to urge the ill-equipped force forward.
20. As early as January 20th, 1915, the Commander-in-Chief cables— An advance
to Amara . . . is required by political considerations. ” Their instructions in March to
Gei ieral Nixon, on his leaving for the Gulf, were to occupy the whole of the Basra Vilayet,
which included Nasiryeh, Amara and the Tigris river nearly to Kut—while the Home