'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎64v] (128/248)

J26
Government were left under the impression that the General’s role was a purely defensive
one. In June, an appreciation by the Chief of the General Staff, India, urged as a reason
for advance—“ Now we are well equipped with River Transport, the Turks have little.”
No sooner was Nasiriyeh taken than the Viceroy wired, July 26th—“ We consider it a
matter of strategic necessity that Kut should also be occupied.”
21. When the critical decision as to the advance on Bagdad was under consideration
the following series of cables came from the Viceroy, 6th October, 1915—“ . . . ^Nixon
with forces at his disposal could without much difficulty capture Bagdad.
October 21st, 1915—“ . . . Take and occupy Bagdad. This will present no difficulty
whatever.” October 23rd, 1915—“ I am confident that the right policy . . . is to
tak^ the risk and to occupy Bagdad . . If the Commander-in-Chief had thought
of going himself to Mesopotamia he could have seen at once that the force was unfitted
for such an expedition. If he had only kept in touch with their transport and medical
requirements, if he had merely seen and spoken to the men that returned from that country,
he could never have made such a mistake.
22. But the attitude towards the Home Government did not change. It almost
seems to have spread throughout the Service, for we have the following amazing minute
from the Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief addressed to the Military Secretary
to the Viceroy, "October 17th, 1915 —“ . . . It is proposed by the Chief that the force
he has named should be assembled . . . for eventualities, but that the Home Govern
ment should not be informed of this . . . The Home Government are very anxious
that Bagdad should be taken, and they will send us the required force if we hold out, but
they will give us nothing if the least sign of willingness to find reinforcements is shown by
us.” The Indian Government “ held out ” while Serbia was being overrun, and while our
last man was being put in at Loos. But to my mind the most regrettable feature is that
no shame was felt, even among subordinate officers, at showing not the “ least sign of
willingness.” As arranged, the Home Government was not informed, and the Viceroy
cabled, October 17th—“ . . . . In no case could I undertake to supply from India,
even temporarily, a further fprce of the strength of a Division.”
Ctesiphon produced almost the same results as peremptory orders from home ; and v
on November 25th, the Viceroy wired—“ I have agreed to Commander-in-Chief’s
proposal to despatch immediately two brigades of infantry and one of artillery from
India. . .”
23. The incapacity to extemporise supplies from India is also a feature to which one
must draw unfavourable attention. It could not have arisen from inability, since
supplies are now drawn from that country. Except as regards river steamers, and that
late in the day, commandeering private or public resources does not seem to have been
even contemplated. That must be the conclusion from the following cables : December
15th, 1915—“ The battalions should be despatched from England fully armed and
equipped as w r e can do nothing more as regards providing material.” February 2nd,
1916—. . Additional transport cannot be provided from India.” February 5th—
“ . . . Ordnance, stores . . . local output is strictly limited.” February 7th—
“ . . . A.T. carts and draught mules . . . This demand cannot be met from
India.” One may properly contrast with these a telegram to India from the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, February 10th—“ . . . What steps are you taking to supply
deficiencies and in what way can I help.”
24. It would be superfluous to quote further refusals of help, but another aspect
of the Indian Government attitude cannot be passed over. A desire to put all possible
expenditure off their shoulders on to the British taxpayer was present and seems to me
to be mean at such a time as this. This desire interfered, as the majority of my colleagues
have shown, with the construction of the railway, and is illustrated by the following
telegram from the Viceroy—“ The expenditure (on a cable from Bushire to Fao) will be
debited to the Imperial Government.”
We are not building any new railways in England ; indeed, we have found it necessary
to pull up railways in this country in order to provide rails for France. What then can
be said of an objection to a light railway in Mesopotamia raised by the Commander-in-
Chief as late as April 27th, 1916—“ To construct an efficient two-foot six line, railways
in this country would have to be closed down, or progress on others stopped.”