'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎63v] (126/248)

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13. It is difficult to say whether Lord Hardinge or Sir Beauchamp Luff was primarily
responsible for this attitude of negation. For instance, the Viceroy cabled, September 18th,
1914 “ Although I have practically met all the demands that have been made upon me,
even at some risk, there is a limit beyond which risk becomes a serious danger • • •
Commander-in-Chief will also never agree to any weakening of these frontier divisions
To which Lord Kitchener replied, September 19th— You hardly seem to realise t xe
seriousness of our position on the Continent ... I cannot understand your refusa to
accept the 15-pdr.” This 15-pdr. gun has, of course, since been used by our troops on
the Continent. The Viceroy replied, September 23rd—“ Duff was so strong on the subject
of the inconvenience of having two kinds of artillery in the country that I had to give
way to him . . . Duff, though most willing and anxious to co-operate, is far more
nervous than I am.” Next day Lord Kitchener again appealed—“ I do not think you
yet quite realise in India what the war is going to be. If we lose it will be worse for India
than any success of internal revolution or frontier attack. The Yiceroy having spo 'en
for the Commander-in-Chief, the Commander-in-Chief then spoke for the Viceroy and
wired, September 25th—“ A Governor-General can hardly sit quiet and see the whole
control of Indian defence withdrawn from him altogether. l T ou must remember that
the Viceroy and his Council cannot be disregarded.” ... The evidence before us
showed, however, that the Council was not consulted as to the war, and whenever India
was asked for help she responded generously. This incident, connected not only with the
question of the guns, but also with direct correspondence between the A\ar Office and
Sir Beauchamp Duff, ended as follows, the Viceroy wired, October 1st—“ Duff objected
strongly to Kitchener . . . and received an angry message m reply ... We
have now practically got to the bedrock.”
14. It would almost seem as if jealousy for the conservation of the Army m India
affected their attitude towards every attempt that Lord Kitchener might make to meet
India’s wishes. He offered Territorials to replace regiments of the Line, and the V iceroy
replied, September 20th—“ We cannot regard Territorials as fit to cope with Pathans m
hill warfare. . . . We cannot raise new forces, because we have given up to the
Imperial Army all our new rifles and practically all our artillery and owing to number of ^
our officers given to meet demands in England we are already very short and with no
possibility of replacing them. Of course, any idea of an expedition to Basra will be out
of the question since we could not send Territorial Infantry and Artillery against the
Turks.” This cable was sent just at the moment that the rifle difficulty was most acute
at home, but new forces were being raised here and training proceeding, with or without
rifles. Two days later we are told that the Indian Government were " issuing an appeal
to gentlemen in India to join the Reserve (I.A.R.) ” ; they had evidently made up
their minds to try to deal with the “ impossibility ” of replacing officers.
15. But what seems to me most symptomatic of their attitude towards any change
in the established order of their world is their resentment of the Territorial When
these troops arrived, after Territorials had done good work in France against Germans,
the Commander-in-Chief cabled, January 20th— The . . . Territorials are, of
course, quite unfit for frontier work ” ; on January 30th, the Viceroy wired—“ Second
Line troops from home can hardly be regarded as suited for frontier defence ”; and
on February 1st—•“ It would be madness to send Territorial troops to the ISorth-West
frontier.” ■ And we have seen that it was deemed “ out of the question ” to use them
against Turks. It is not merely that their estimates of Territorial troops were mistaken,
the serious point to my mind is that this estimate was one which suited a policy of obstruc
tion. If Territorials were not fitted for frontier war, they could have learnt that as they
have learnt worse forms of warfare.
16. If the Indian Government gave grudgingly and was reluctant to accept the help
offered, it was also apathetic. We learn in a cable from the Viceroy, October 7th, 1914,
that “ Turkey ... is not in a position to give real material assistance to the enemy.”
But in that matter Turkey has done more for Germany than India had done for England
up to this present year. It was energy that was lacking. The Viceroy wrote on
October 21st,—“ I inquired of the Commander-in-Chief whether proper provision had
been made for warm clothing for the troops. He told me that he was relying on private
charity for this.” This, of course, the Viceroy vetoed ; but that such a suggestion should
have been made shows, either that the matter had been forgotten, or that the policy of
starvation had run mad. On January 5th the Commander-in-Chief cabled,—“ As regards
reinforcements, our reservists are turning out disappointing.” Yet the population
of India is 315,000,000, of whom some 50,000,000 belong to fighting races. At last, on.