'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎63r] (125/248)

123
The Charge against the Indian Gocernment.
11. It is precisely Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff whom I cannot
merely charge with honest human error. They, and they alone, as is shown by my
colleagues, formed and were the Indian Administration during that part of the war under
consideration. Throughout their conduct of the war they seem to me to have shown
little desire to help and some desire actually to obstruct the energetic prosecution of the
war. As a reason for this obstruction they gave—the situation in India ; and I for one
feel no sense of obligation to them for placing “ risks ” in India above the dire necessities
of the British Empire, and the welfare of their own troops in Mesopotamia.
To charge two high officials with “ little desire to help and some desire actually
to obstruct the energetic prosecution of the war ’ is a serious accusation, and one difficult
to accept. I have therefore felt bound to support it by a considerable body of evidence.
Such evidence must necessarily take the form of extracts without context (till the evidence
is published in full), extracts from letters or cables from Lord Hardinge or Sir Beauchamp
Duff, extracts from protests by Lord Kitchener or Lord Crewe, extracts from speeches
by Lord Hardinge or his Financial Adviser, Sir William Meyer, extracts from evidence
given to the Commission on oath as to the view taken by the War Office in England of the
Indian attitude. Extracts are not a satisfactory method of carrying comdction, but the
subsequent publication of the volumes of evidence will show that the full correspondence
conveys no better impression, and that the extracts have been taken with all the fairness
possible. Furthermore, I have felt it advisable to back up the extracted evidence with
a list jof the measures for helping the Empire that India has adopted since the departure
of Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff, many of them having been previously waived
aside as impracticable by these same officials in written evidence before the Commission.
Such a list will confirm my finding.
Although I had the advantage of being able to cross-examine Sir Beauchamp Duff
and the other Anglo-Indian officials that came before the Commission, I was unable
to be present when Lord Hardinge himself came under examination. My colleagues
examined him on none of the passages which I extract ; he may be able to give satisfactory
explanations for all of them ; he may deny the implication I give to them in every case.
But of the meaning of plain English the public can judge, and the effect of the attitude
was such that it caused the very civilians in India to complain of the pretence that “ India
is not at war.” Explanations given now do not efface the impression conveyed then.
A. EVIDENCE AS TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT
FROM CABLES.
12. On the outbreak of war the Indian Government responded, liberally according
to our then estimates of what the war was likely to be, and despatched considerable
expeditions to France and to Egypt. Very soon, however, the grudging spirit made itself
visible. On August 6th the loan of 15 Indian officers was refused, a small matter which
was reversed two days later. Then, on August 12th, before indeed the defeats in France,
the Viceroy wired—“ Although we are ready to run some risk . . . The Commander-in-
Chief complains that he is absolutely crippled by this last measure relating to officers.”
In his next telegrams the Viceroy showed his position, safety of India must come
first. August 15th—” We have, however, never wavered in our readiness to assist the
Empire to the utmost of our power, limited only by considerations of the safety of India.”
August 27th—“ We have spared no effort . . . running even a certain amount of
risk by the depletion of our stock of rifles, ammunition.” On August 27th he must have
known of the disasters in France, but he may not have known how serious they were when
he talked of “ a certain amount of risk.”
The appeals from home to which these telegrams were a reply have not been before
the Commission, but we have a sample in Lord Kitchener’s wire of September 3rd—■
“ Can you manufacture any guns yourself ; ” and the reply was—‘ Our manufacture of
guns is negligible.”
No effort seems to have been made in these early times to do anything to increase
the resources of the Empire in material or men. The Commander-in-Chief wared
September 5th —“ It was thought here politically inadvisable at present to agree to your
request for Nepal troops for Egypt ” ; and this though the suggestion had been made
by His Majesty himself.
(C 48—176) • Q 2