Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎141r] (290/312)

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[ on tHe Oxua might mean expulsion from CenlraT
• Asia. One of the many newspaper reports lately
circulated said that General Skobeleff (I think) in
quired whether it was true that an English division
had been sent to raise Central Asia on the Rus
sians. If such a step were taken, it might inflict
awful calamities on the Russians, though I do not
believe that it has ever been proposed. In
such circumstances a prudent and courageous man
commanding in Turkestan may well think that a
forward, aggressive policy is the road to safety,
and that the readiest way to obtain such a position
as I have sketched is by an Afghan alliance. The
inducements to such an alliance which the Russians
can hold out to the Afghans are very great indeed.
In the first place, the Afghans within living memory
possessed a considerable part of the Punjab,
which we afterwards conquered from the Sikhs. In
the second place, from the earliest time the plunder
of India has been the ideal, not unfrequently rea
lized, of the northern tribes individually and col-
1 lectively. In the first place, if the choice is to be made
between a Russian and an English alliance, there is
absolutely nothing to be got in the way of plunder
by attacking the Russians, nor do the Russians, or,
indeed, we or any one else, want anything from
the Afghans except military positions. Are not
these just the elements out of which an offensive
alliance is likely to be formed? Is not such a
contingency one against which we ought to take
precautions, not dependent on the good faith or
good will of either Russians or Afghans ?
One more observation must be adde^ in order to
appreciate fully the position of affairs. When we
j speak of " the Russians " in Central Asia, what we
really mean is the Russian Governor-General of
Turkestan and his advisers for the time being.
However litilejnay be known of these gentlemen
personally, some points in their position are both
notorious and obvious. They are at an immense
distance from head-quarters. They have no Parlia
ment and no public opinion adverse to war and con
quest to hamper them. It is highly improbable
that either the Emperor or his Ministers exercise
over them anything approaching to the same de
gree of control as the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. exercises
over the Viceroy. In the crisis through which
Russia has lately passed they have, probably,
( been left very much to their own discre-
1 tion, and is not this just the sorb of
position in which active, enterprising, courageous
men, passionately anxious to distinguish them
selves by war and conquest, undertake and carry
out great enterprises ? Clive and Lord Wellesley i
were similarly situated. We need not, however,
look at historical parallels. We have notorious
facts before our eyes. If the Embassy to Cabul
was not a step to an alliance against England, what
did it mean ? If its object was purely commercial,
why was our Embassy rejected ? Even in judicial
inquiries the absence of satisfactory explanation is
sometimes equivalent to proof of guilt, and surely
it would be pedantry to require in political affairs
that a hostile intention should bo proved more
strictly than guilty knowledge is required to be
; proved in Courts of Justice.
/ shp^l be sorry to join in all that is said in the
| Press about Russia. 1 do not think that it is either
j dignified or just to find fault with others for look-
: ing after their own interests without regarding
ours. If General Kaufmann sees his way to"taking
up a position and so making an alliance which will
give him the upper hand over us, I do not see why
he should abstain from doing so ; but I do see
many cogent reasons why, if we can, we should
defeat his plans.
The more the matter is considered the more dis
tinctly will it, I think, appear that the real ques
tion is this :—Inasmuch as England and Russia
must meet in Central Asia, where is the frontier
between them to be drawn c i and how can we take
security for its being so drawn that Russia shall
not have the means of invading us at pleasure ?
Our past experience, both Russian and English
appears to me to prove to demonstration that
barbarism and civilization cannot be coterminous
permanently. England, Russia, and China will,
sooner or later, divide Central Asia betw-een them'
and Afghanistan, like many other countries, will'
sooner or later, either form part of the dominions
of England or Russia or else become practically de
pendent and subordinate.
Without the smallest feeling of hostility or ill-
will to Russia, I think the English people ought to
say, quite quietly, but also with unmistakable
firmness, we do not mean to lie at the mercy of our
neighbours. We have already more territory and
wider responsibilities than we want. We should be
sorry indeed to add to either, but we intend to
retain our hold upon India, and to take, if neces
sary, by force of arms, whatever may be essential
to the maintenance of our power there.
If a defensible frontier is required, and can and
ought to be obtained, it is hardly likely that we
shall have a better opportunity hereafter of getting
such a frontier than we have at present. If every-
j thing now falls back into the drifting position in
i which it has been for a series of years, Russia and
Afghanistan will at once be in alliance, and the j
! difficulty of any advance on our part will increase |
1 b y ever y year that passes. I do not doubt that
whenever the enterprise of securing the i^n^ier is
undertaken, it will involve a very serious effort ;
but I do not see why we should expect to be
stronger hereafter than we are now, and we are not
now under any special difficulties. I do not think
that, as matters stand, the Russians will interfere.
They will do all they can to frighten us ; they will
give any amount of sympathy, and, perhaps, under
hand, some arms, some money, and a certain
number of officers to the Afghans ; but it seems to
me most unlikely that just at this moment they will
go to war with England upon such a quarrel, unless,
indeed, the Turkestan authorities manage to commit
the Emperor to the step. As for the special threats
of the Russians, they do not impress me very much.
Their papers seem to dwell principally upon the
native princes and their armies ; the population
" eager to throw off the British yoke and the
disaffection of the native troops. These seem to
me to be ignorant, conventional commonplaces. If
British power were upset, no native prince in
India would be sure of anything whatever, except
that he would be plunged into a bottomless whirl
pool of war and confusion, whereas under British
rule his position is perfectly secure, though it may
not be absolutely satisfactory. If any native prince
tried to upset British power and failed, he would
certainly be dethroned, and would in all probability
be hanged. Every native prince in India knows all
this perfectly well. These are plain and strong
reasons for fidelity. As to the army, it is not
during war that mercenary troops are untrust
worthy. They are faithful enough in the face of
the enemy. An enormous number of native levies,
of one sort or another, were raised during the
Mutiny, and the mutineers had no more relentless
enemies than men of their own colour. As to the
mass of the population, my belief is that if a
Russian army crossed the Indus to-morrow, the
first and last thought of the bulk of the people
would be to hide their valuables safely and to wait
to obey the winning side. In one word, I am far
from wishing to see the English take up a position
of hostility to the Russians. I believe that we are
destined to be neighbours in Asia, and I see no
reason why we should not be thoroughly friendly
neighbours ; but perfect independence is the con
dition URpn which alone frieadshi m .and cordialff ggd
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LONDON, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1878.
In another column we publish an interesting and
able letter by Sir J ames S tephen on England, ^
Russia, and Afghanistan. It is on the question of
the hour, and it is from the pen of a man who has
a good right to be heard. He knows India from
his experience as the legal member of the Council
at Calcutta ; and, what is equally important, his
political and legal work has made him acquainted
with England, a country which has still to be dis
covered by many Anglo Indians. His letter is emi>
nently practical. It is so practical that the writer The lowest of the four classes into which East India Company civil servants were divided. A Writer’s duties originally consisted mostly of copying documents and book-keeping.
declines to discuss the question whether and how
far the Indian Government is responsible for the
awkward position in which it is now placed.
Such a discussion would, in truth, be mis
chievous if it were intended to show that we
ought now. to hold our hands. S here A li , who
keeps himself informed of all that is said in Eng
land, would draw fatally false inferences from
vague censures of past Viceroys. But, if we
begin by admitting that what has been done cannot
be undone, and that the north-western frontier of
our Indian Empire must be made safe at all hazards,
it is useful to prepare for the duties of the future
by confessing the mistakes of the past. Let it be
admitted, then, that our relations with S here A li
have not been a miracle of foresight. Quite naturally,
he disliked England when he came to the Throne,
because she had been the enemy of his father,
D ost M ahomed ; and perhaps he had some rea
son to think that the policy of our Viceroys was
equivocal. When he invited us to say whether we
should guarantee his power against the Russians,
we declined to give any pledge. The truth is that
the English Government had not made up its mind j
whether the possession of Afghanistan was, in case
of emergency, necessary for the defence of India.
Nor would any Viceroy pledge himself to defend
the A meer's Throne against the chieftains by whom