Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎140v] (289/312)

"JhvsS bcjriS*
ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND AFGHANISTAN.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—A sound state of public opinion upon such
ajsubject as the present position of affairs on the
- North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. of India can, I think, best
be formed by a separate consideration of the
various questions involved in it. One question is,
Whether the conduct pursued for some years past
towards the Ameer of Cabul has or has not been
judicious ? A second question is. Whether he has
or has not grossly insulted a British Agent ? A third
< question is. Whether in dealing with an Asiatic ruler
like Shere Ali the common rules of European in
ternational law have any application whatever ? A
fourth question is, Whether in any circumstances
anything can be gained by an Afghan war ? This
suggests three other questions—thus, fifthly, Is it
true that our present frontier is exceedingly weak 1 \
Sixthly, Is it true that it is possible to make it as
strong as it is at present weak by occupying military
positions north of the passes through the mountains
and by establishing satisfactory relations with the
; mountain tribes ? Seventhly and lastly, Is it true
that, whatever may have been the case in former
times, the advance of Russia and the probability of !
a Russian and Afghan alliance make the strength
ening of our frontier (if it requires strengthening,
and if it can be strengthened) a matter of pressing
importance ?
The last question does not arise unless the fifth :
and sixth are both answered in the affirmative, but
all the others are entirely independent of each
other. The first, second, third, and fourth of these
questions I do not wish to discuss. The materials for
a full discussion of the first are not yet before the
public ; the second requires no discussion; the
third, though interesting, I shall pass over. The
fourth question resolves itself iuto the fifth, sixth,
and seventh. As to the fifth and sixth questions, I
know that many persons eminently capable of form
ing an opinion would say " Yes " to each. My own
opinion upon them is, of course, valueless ; but, ;
whatever it may be worth, I think that the argu
ments to show the weakness of our present frontier '
are very strong, and that the arguments to show
the possibility of strengthening it by the occupation
of advanced positions are also strong, subject how-
L;' ever to the condition that some way of establishing
satisfactory relations with the frontier tribes can be
devised ; for if they are hostile, any advanced posts
[; occupied by us at the mouth of or beyond the
passes would be in a critical position. How-
^ ever, in order to raise the question which I wish to
discuss, I must assume that each of these questions
is answered in the affirmative.
The question, then, to which I wish to address
myself is. Whether the advance of Russia and the
probability of a Russian and Afghan alliance make
the strengthening of our frontier (if it requires
strengthening and if it can be strengthened) a
matter of pressing importance ? The question
thus stated and qualified I should answer de-
1 cidedly and unequivocally in the affirmative.
If 1 am right, it does not, of course, follow
that we ought to go to war with the Ameer, or to
refuse any offer of peace which he may make ; but
; it does follow that we are in a position of danger,
against which whatever precautions may be proper
should be taken whenever an opportunity for taking
them occurs. The danger which I apprehend is that
the Russians may, partly by force and partly by |
persuasiun, obtain an ascendency throughout Central
Asia, including Persia and Afghanistan, which
. would enable them at any time to form an army
resembling our Indian army in its composition, but
composed, as far as the native troops go, of
better materials than any part of our native army,
except the Sikhs. Our very best soldiers would !
; feel that Afghans or Tathans, officered and led by
, Russians, would be worthy antagonists. If such
! an army were formed and if our frontier then re-
; mained as it now is, India would be open at any
moment to an invasion which would tax the
strength of the Empire to the utmost, and which j|
might easily prove its ruin. To guard against such
a catastrophe it would, upon the formation of such
an army—our present frontier being retained—be
come necessary to increase enormously our present
army, and to spend immense sums on fortifi
cations. This would not only grievously im-
j| poverish a very poor country, but it would
lock up in India a large part of our
necessarily small English army, and it would
enable the Russians at any time to bring pressure
I to bear upon us in Europe by threatening lo invade
India. If we were known to lie under such a threat,
| our position in India would be scarcely tenable at all. !
J; Such fears are often treated as chimerical. The dis- p
ta, \ Ce between the Russian and the Indian frontiers, I
and the nature of the obstacles to be traversed' be-
| fore a Russian army could invade India are enume-
; rated rs if the danger apprehended were the
i j concentration of a great Russian army tit Oren-
I "urg, or even at Tashkend, and their march
j upon Peshawur or Shikarpur. No reason
able person entertains such apprehensions. The
| danger ^ lies not in a single march, but in a
; I succession of conquests or alliances ; such alliances
s as a great European Power can impose on native
states, each of which would give Russia a new
• i in i w
( TCcnmrng-erotmcrTrmj a-fravrme - m ^gBmSris.
| Surely we may learn, if from nothing else yet from
i our own history, how possible this is. Who, when
the Sikhs all but defeated Lord Hardinge at Pe
rezes hah in the beginning of 1846, would have
imagined that in 185'r the Punjab would form the
basis of our operations against the North-West Pro
vinces,and that the great instrument of victory over
the mutineers at Delhi and Lucknow would be an
army marching from the north southwards, largely
composed of Sikhs officered by Englishmen ? Take,
again, the conquest of the Punjab itself. How
easily it might at one time have been proved to be
utterly impossible that the English should ever
take Lahore. It might have been demonstrated
that India could not be conquered without a great
army ; that England never could or would col
lect a force greater than the one * sent on the
Walcheren Expedition for the invasion of India,
land it at Bombay or Calcutta, and march it to
Lahore, and that the attempt, if made, could only
result in failure. The demonstration would have
I been correct, but irrelevant. England performed
the operation in quite a different way.
A handful of Englishmen obtained political
power in Bengal, and, by raising native armies and
; forming. native alliances, gradually subdued the
whole country. That is just what the Russians can
do, and probably are doing, in Central Asia. It is
perfectly true that General Kaufmann has a small
Russian force under his orders. It was reported
the other day that he proposed to collect 20,000
men on the Oxus. I should be surprised to hear
;that he could do so ; but, however that may be, his
|p force is probably as large as the European army
which was in India in 1841. It is also perfectly
l ^ true that the Russian head-quarters in Turkestan
are still at a considerable distance from Afghan
istan; but the British frontier was quite as far from
TC-'J the other side of Afghanistan when Afghanistan
was occupied by British troops.
In short, the difference between Russian power
in Central Asia and British power in India is, in
my opinion, principally this. General Kaufmann
is now at the styge at which Lord Wellesley was
at the beginning of the century, though he has in
the background an infinitely greater military power
than ever Lord Wellesley had. Lord Wellesley's
position in 1803 was in many ways anxious and
insecure enough, but several comparatively old-
j established dynasties found him a terrible enemy.
Look, then, at the present position of the Rus
sians, and see what light is thrown on their pro-
bable intentions and policy. Their position in
f;" Central Asia is much more anxious and precarious
than ours in India. Their head-quarters in Turke-
stan are at Tashkend, which is separated from
the Caspian by the Khivan and from Orenburg bv
i the Kirghiz Steppe. They have no communica'-
tion between Turkestan and the Caspian, but they
are making great efforts to get one, as is shown by
the fact—for a fact I believe it to be—that they
retain an establishment at Krasnovodsk (on the
eastern coast of the Caspian), although their
attempt to communicate with Khiva from it was
? und 1 t00 ex P en sive for their purposes, and that
• they have advanced from Krasnovodsk to Kizyl i
Arvat, which is on the road to Merv, on the west I
and from Turkestan to Charjoui on the Oxus, which I
is about 130 miles from Merv, on the east. These i
movements can have no other object than that of
connecting the°Caspian witlr ! Turkestan ; and the
result, if the plan is carried out,will be to establish
a communication between the Caspian and Turke-
j stan along the Afghan frontier, through popuktions
either bitterly hostile or recently subjugated and
desolate steppes. The distance from Tashkend by
Merv to the Caspian is about 750 miles. It is
about as far as from Calcutta to Delhi; rather
further than from Dover to Cape Wrath. How
then, it may be asked, can a small number of
(Russians, struggling with such difficultiea as these
^ c ^ sta,nt "om all reinforcements and from Ej
their base of operations, be objects of fear to such a
Power as British India ? I answer, for reasons
exactly similar to those which ought to have led the
successors of Akbar and Aurungzebe to look with
dread upon Colonel Clive, his handful of Europeans
, i and his wretched Bengalee allies. Great enter-
j prises are undertaken by unsettled, anxious •
| people with their fortunes to make, not by those
; who have made their fortunes ; and the Russians in
lurkestan fulfil these conditions. Whatever our
objects may be, they beyond all doubt wish to gain
a definite frontier. I hey have been in search of "one
| tor much more than 100 years. They have crossed .
I ? he . ir ghiz steppe, they have conquered or
.humiliated the Khanates, in search of it ; they
| are now face to face with a country and a popula-
. tion winch exercise their utmost vigilance, and they !
must feel that their only safety lies in an advance
which will give them rest for the sole of their feet. ;
Such a frontier they would find in the Hindoo
Koosh and its passes. That is still at some
distance ; but if in the meantime they can
f rrar, g e an alliance with Afghanistan, it will
oe a great step towards their object and
a great security to them. It must be re-
membered that if it is reasonable for us to bo
; ra , , them, it is not quite unreasonable for
' tijem 1° b8 af raid of us. Peshawur and Tashkend
| are about the same distance from the Oxus, but
, eshawur is much nearer to the resources of Eno-- ;
land than Tashkend to the resources of Russia. The
j Turcomans do not love the Russians, and a defeat