Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎141v] (291/312)

it is periodically threatened. Lord M ayo , at the
famous Umballa Conference, merely said that Eng
land would regard with extreme displeasure any
attack on the A meek's power. Shere Ali inferred
from that pledge that we should defend him.
Giving it a strictly legal interpretation, we, on the
contrary, held ourselves aloof from Afghan quarrels,
and left the Ameer to fight his own battles. At !
the same time Sir J ohn itawr'sarce had begun the
dangerous practice of granting him a subsidy,
which the Ameer thought was to be a yearly sub
scription, while Lord M ayo had to explain that itwas
merely a donation, ^till more perilous was the
practice of giving him presents of English arms.
On one occasion he received 5,000 Sniders, besides
10,000 Enfields. If the defiles of Afghanistan
should be made formidable by the breechloader, we
shall have to blame the trustfulness of our own
Viceroys. But it is not one Viceroy or one Ad
ministration that must be held answerable.
Sir J ohn L awrence , Lord M ayo , and Lord
L ytton , Liberal Governments and Conserva
tive, must plead guilty to the charge that
their Afghan policy has been a thing of fits
and starts, incoherent, incomprehensible by Shere
At.t , and mysterious to ourselves. If we had made
it clear either that we had no interest in Afghan
istan or that we were determined to prevent it
from falling under the influence of Russia, we
should have escaped many embarrassments. It is
necessary at last to shape so clear a line of policy
that he who runs may read. Sir J ames Ste
phen's letter is valuable because it powerfully puts
the plain and important question, whether it is
necessary for this country to possess paramount in
fluence in Afghanistan in order to insure the safety
of our Indian Empire.
Sir J ames Stephen gives an affirmative answer,
for reasons which, we think, will commend them
selves even to people who are free from any hyste
rical fear of Russia, He puts aside the idea that
the Czar's armies could at present invade India.
Such a notion cannot survive a glance at the im- j
mense distances of desert which separate Orenburg,
the frontier town of Russia, from Tashkend, the
chief military station of Central Asia, and the
equally formidable stretch of burning sand and
mountain pass which intervenes between the out
posts of Russia and those of England. Napoleon's
march to Moscow would seem an example of
prudence compared with a Russian advance from
Orenburg or from the shores of the Caspian, to the
Indus. So much is admitted by all competent men.
But Sir J ames Stephen urges that the real danger
is very different. It is, he thinks, that Russia may
gradually creep on towards our Indian frontier,
that she may annex one State after another, and
that she may render the natives as good soldiers
as our Sepoys Term used in English to refer to an Indian infantryman. Carries some derogatory connotations as sometimes used as a means of othering and emphasising race, colour, origins, or rank. , or better. Even if she should
not attack our Indian possessions, we should
ba obliged to keep up a very large army to
escape from deadly risk, and the burden might be
financially fatal. " General Kaufmann ," Sir
J ames Stephen contends, " is now at the stage
I" " at which Lord W ellesley was at the beginning
■ "of the century, though he has in the back-ground
" an infinitely greater military power than ever
" Lord W ellesley had." If that parallel is just,
it is very instructive. It would be interesting to
know how it strikes other Indian authorities, and
what they would propose to meet the danger. One
Bet of them would doubtless abide by Lord L aw
rence's policy of "masterly inactivity." The
[ndus, with some outlying positions, is,
they would say, one of the strongest lines
In the world ; let us keep that boundary, and we
may defy all the armies that Russia can ever
organize in Turkestan or Afghanistan. Let us
wait, and she will be weakened by the length of
her communications. Another set of authorities
would contend that we cannot be safe unless
we advance at the same rate aa Russia. Let
her remain, they would say, behind the belt
of Central Asiatic deserts, and we can afford to
keep all but our outlying stations behind the
! lodua. We s hould be glad to be saved fro m
I the necessity of advancing into so turbulent,
so inclement, and so mountainous a country as
Afghanistan. But wo cannot afford to let Russia
i make Cabul a centre of intrigue, or Afghanis
tan a recruiting ground. If she sends an
Envoy to the Ameer , we must send another, and
we must be paramount,
k! Such is undoubtedly the favourite doctrine in
1* India itself, and such is the view of so competent
a witness as Sir J ames Stephen . It is un-
touchecl by the quostion 'whether Shere Ali has
or has not the same kind of rights as an independ
ent Western Sovereign. He clearly cannot have i
Ithe right to menace the safety of a neighbour, and
j India must be allowed to protect itself. But again
I it would be interesting to learn from the greatest
Indian authorities what they deem the best form of
i security. Some of them would contend that sooner
or later England must annex the whole of Afghan-
stan, and that it would be better to make the
change soon than late. Russia, they would k
urge, would then find herself face to face
with a civilized Power, and have no further
excuse for pushing on her frontiers. She would
have either to fight with England or stop.
But we do not understand Sir James Stephen
to propose so hazardous an enterprise. To con
vert Afghanistan into a British possession would
not, of course, be an impossible task for an army
and a Government which have built up the marvel
lous fabric of British India ; but it would te so
costly and troublesome that no responsible
statesman would propose it except as a last
i resort. Sir James Stephen is content to urge
that we must warn the Russians off the ;
ground. He does not, indeed, raise any outcry
, aboiit their treachery, and he thinks that their ^
! generals are acting in much the same fashion
as our own would behave if placed in a
i similar position. Shrill complaints of Muscovite
encroachments will scarcely, in truth, commend
themselves to any one who looks to the history of
! India. But if it does not become a great nation to }-
waste time in fruitless accusations, it is the duty of
such a nation to guard its own interests at all hazards.
Hence we may insist that the task of ruling India
.shall not be made needlessly expensive either by the
whims of Shere Ali or the ambition of General
Kaufmann . Sir James Stephen assumes that we
fshall never be secure so long as we retain our pre- 1
j sent frontier. It may be so. There are few 1
questions which tho military authorities could
more profitably discuss. The public would be
glad to hear all that can be said for and against the
proposal to extend our boundary. Much will depend,
no doubt, on the tone of the letter from Shere Ali
which is said to be on the way from Cabul. Much
will depend, also, on the action of those Russian
friends of his on whom we do not waste words of
blame, but whom we watch. In any case,
however, we must make the empire more secure
than it has been since Shere Ali came to the
Throne andGeneralKAUFMANN has been near enough
to pay him political courtesies. The Ameer's
pledges would not suffice, because, however honour- ,5
able he may be, he has not the power to keep the
Afghans in one definite way of action. His people
are a set of warring clans rather than a compact
nationality, and he himself is the foremost of many
chieftains rather than an absolute monarch. Even
the great ability of his father could not keep
down fatal feuds, which ended in a too memor
able war of intervention. Shere Ali himself was
once dethroned, and he had to fight in order 1
to regain the supreme authority. It would be i
rash to say whether his power is even now secure,
or how far he commands the support of the chiefs.
It would be ridiculous, therefore, to stake the
safety of the Indian Empire on the word of a ruler
who may seem nearly absolute to-day and be an
exile to-morrow. We must protect ourselves, and
it is for the statesmen and the soldiers of India to
say what form the new precautions should take.
On the one hand, the civil rulers will urge that we
have already more territory than we want, and that
any needless addition of mountainous, barren land,
peopled by turbulent tribes, would be specially
unwelcome. That consideration will, no doubt, be
j very strongly urged by all who are responsible for '
the finances of India. Still, the question to be j
— , . * ■ ■ ! J i J_l
etio Aire pip J8A9U oqM 'sgitredcaoo a^qqnq ssajpaa o; a8M .orI
pot pip ieq^ sb op qoa [[ iav
-un «<I ^9 pnR 'Sauiseq pooS « »At!q ^ im s^saas^dt paqsaA
ij^qa 'rao^oq oqij 0!j pa; jis eq fjm noi^senb epqM. aqi) q^eqij
no jfyej sjapioqareqs 'sawtj; ayj; m ejojaq aouo
uoppoia punoaS jsao Stnof) -gAij jaj ptre oai^ oq. sabred
TI 8 I0 J roooa jo pxre 'eSB^auApij oqqnd v aq jfiM
aiaqi q^qq paa aq; tq puq jfBqs a/a. jC[qtssod 'qqSq ouqoap
aqi jo uoiqonpojqm aq; o; SntMO 'jtiooo aaAaq/Bq^ og
•sjaiara as'Ea] Mon iCaq; sv sasod
-xnd oiqseroop joj jtessooan snqBreddw aq; asuaj o; sja/Aod
SaumboB saiatjdnioo qu quiq pug 'Sannaq prnr Satqooo i
ioj evS Sai;i330ApB ere sjaq;o ptre suaraaxg aossajo.tj
■saatiqaaqap
no ^anora asrej o; pamoypj aq osps pjnoM sioqoaitp aq;
pan < noi;oTi'B Xq otjqnd aq; o; pajajp bbm ; i ;T!qq noiaipaoo
no pasrej eq o; paMOj jb aq ppaoAs. ajora spxresnoq; anios go
p3;idi30 Avatt ptre '000'OScf ^ ( J n na;;uM aq pjnoAv 'papnad
Fit is periodically threatened. Lord MayO j at the
famous Umballa Conference, merely said that Eng
land would regard with extreme displeasure any
attack on the Ameer's power. Shere Ali inferred
from that pledge that we should defend him.
Giving it a strictly legal interpretation, we, on the
contrary, held ourselves aloof from Afghan quarrels,
and left the Ameer to fight his own battles. At
the same time Sir John Lawrence had begun the
dangerous practice of granting him a subsidy,
which the Ameer thought was to be a yearly sub
scription, While Lord Mayo had to explain that it was
merely a donation. IStill more perilous was the
practice of giving him presents of English arms.
On one occasion he received 5,000 Sniders, besides
10,000 Enfields. If the defiles of Afghanistan
should be made formidable by the breechloader, we
shall have to blame the trustfulness of our own
Viceroys. But it is not one Viceroy or one Ad
ministration that must be held answerable.
Sir John Lawrence , Lord Mayo , and Lord
Lytton , Liberal Governments and Conserva
tive, must plead guilty to the charge that
their Afghan policy has been a thing" of fits
and starts, incoherent, incomprehensible by Shere
Axi , and mysterious to ourselves. If we had made
it clear either that we had no interest in Afghan
istan or that we were determined to prevent it
from falling under the influence of Russia, we
should have escaped many embarrassments. It is
necessary at last to shape so clear a line of policy
that he who runs may read. Sir James Ste
phen's letter is valuable because it powerfully puts I
the plain and important question, whether it is j
necessary for this country to possess paramount in
fluence in Afghanistan in order to insure the safety
of our Indian Empire.
Sir James Stephen gives an affirmative answer,
for reasons which, we think, will commend them
selves even to people who are free from any hyste
rical fear of Russia, He puts aside the idea that
the Czar's armies could at present invade India,
Such a notion cannot survive a glance at the im
mense distances of desert which separate Orenburg,
the frontier town of Russia, from Tashkend, the
chief military station of Central Asia, and the
equally formidable stretch of burning sand and
mountain pass which intervenes between the out
posts of Russia and those of England. Napoleon's
march to Moscow would seem an example of
prudence compared with a Russian advance from
Orenburg or from the shores of the Caspian, to the
Indus. So much is admitted by all competent men.
But Sir James Stephen urges that the real danger
is very different. It is, he thinks, that Russia may
gradually creep on towards our Indian frontier, f
that she may annex one State after another, and
that she may render the natives as good soldiers
as our Sepoys Term used in English to refer to an Indian infantryman. Carries some derogatory connotations as sometimes used as a means of othering and emphasising race, colour, origins, or rank. , or better. Even if she should
not attack our Indian possessions, we should
be obliged to keep up a very large army to
escape from deadly risk, and the burden might be
financially fatal. " General Kaufmann ," Sir
James Stephen contends, " is now at the stage
" at which Lord Wellesley was at the beginning
" of the century, though he has in the back-ground
" an infinitely greater military power than ever
P" Lord Wellesley had." If that parallel is just,
it is very instructive. It would be interesting to
know how it strikes other Indian authorities, and
what they would propose to meet the danger. One
Bet of them would doubtless abide by Lord Law
rence's policy of "masterly inactivity." The
tndus, with some outlying positions, is,
they would say, one of the strongest lines
In the world ; let us keep that boundary, and we
may defy all the armies that Russia can ever
organize in Turkestan or Afghanistan. Let us
wait, and she will be weakened by the length of
her communications. Another set of authorities
would contend that we cannot be safe unless
we advance at the same rate as Russia. Let
ber remain, they would say, behind the belt
of Central Asiatic deserts, and we can afford to
keep all but our outlying stations behind the
Indus, We sh ould be glad to be saved fro m
the necessity of advancing into so turbulent,
so inclement, and so mountainous a country as
Afghanistan. But wo cannot afford to let Russia
make Cabul a centre of intrigue, or Afghanis
tan a recruiting ground. If she sends an
Envoy to the Ameer , we must send another, and
we must be paramount.
Such is undoubtedly the favourite doctrine in
India itself, and such is the view of so competent
a witness as Sir James Stephen . It is un-
touched by the question whether Shere Ali has
or has not the same kind of rights as an independ-
/ent Western Sovereign. He clearly cannot have
|the right to menace the safety of a neighbour, and
ijlndia must be allowed to protect itself. But again
1 t would be interesting to learn from the greatest
Indian authorities what they deem the best form of
V, security. Some of them would contend that sooner
or later England must annex the whole of Afghan-
stan, and that it would be better to make the
change soon than late. Russia, they would
urge, would then find herself face to face
with a civilized Power, and have no further
excuse for pushing on her frontiers. She would '
have either to fight with England or stop. ;
But we do not understand Sir James Stephen
to propose so hazardous an enterprise. To con-
vert Afghanistan into a British possession would
not, of course, be an impossible task for an army
j and a Government which have built up the marvel
lous fabric of British India ; but it would le so
costly and troublesome that no responsible
statesman would propose it except as a last
^ i resort. Sir James Stephen is content to urge t
that we must warn the Russians off the
, ground. He does not, indeed, raise any outcry |
about their treachery, and he thinks that their |
generals are acting in much the same fashion
i as our own would behave if placed in a
| similar position. Shrill complaints of Muscovite
encroachments will scarcely, in truth, commend
themselves to any one who looks to the history of
India. But if it does not become a great nation to
waste time in fruitless accusations, it is the duty of
such a nation to guard its own interests at all hazards.
Hence we may insist that the task of ruling India
.shall not be made needlessly expensive either by the
whims of Shere Ali or the ambition of General
Kaufmann . Sir James Stephen assumes that we
shall never be secure so long as we retain our pre- 1
; sent frontier. It may be so. There are few I
questions which the military authorities could
-more profitably discuss. The public would be t
glad to hear all that can be said for and against the J
proposal to extend our boundary. Much will depend, :
no doubt, on the tone of the letter from Shere Ali
which is said to be on the way from Cabul. Much
will depend, also, on the action of those Russian :
friends of his on whom we do not waste words of ?
blame, but whom we watch. In any case,
however, we must make the empire more secure
than it has been since Shere Ali came to the |
Throne and General Kaufmann has been near enough
to pay him political courtesies. The Ameer's [!|
pledges would not suffice, because, however honour- ij;
able he may be, he has not the power to keep the
Afghans in one definite way of action. His people
,j are a set of warring clans rather than a compact
^nationality, and he himself is the foremost of many
chieftains rather than an absolute monarch. Even
the great ability of his father could not keep
down fatal feuds, which ended in a too memor
able war of intervention, Shere Ali himself was
once dethroned, and he had to fight in order
to regain the supreme authority. It would be
rash to say whether his power is even now secure,
or how far he commands the support of the chiefs.
It would be ridiculous, therefore, to stake the
safety of the Indian Empire on the word of a ruler
who may seem nearly absolute to-day and be an
exile to-morrow. We must protect ourselves, and
it is for the statesmen and the soldiers of India to
say what form the new precautions should take.
On the one hand, the civil rulers will urge that we
have already more territory than we want, and that
any needless addition of mountainous, barren land,
peopled by turbulent tribes, would be specially
unwelcome. That consideration will, no doubt, be
very strongly urged by all who are responsible for
the finances of India. Still, the question to be ;
answered is mainly military, and the last word
must be said by the soldiers. Although they will I
ij not be invited to give their final decision until
I Shere Ali has given his, they cannot too
soon begin to consider in what respect the North-
jWestern frontier is weak, and how far they would
push it towards the Oxus, They will have to look,
of course, at much more than the best means of
foiling immediate danger. They will have to bear
in mind that if Cabul is in future to obey foreign
influence, the source of that influence must be, not
Taskkend, but Calcutta, Such a fact may be
stated in no temper of hostility to any Power, but
simply in a spirit of precaution. There is much
wisdom in the closing words of Sir James
Stephen on that subject. Speaking of the Russians
he says,—" I believe that we are destined to be
" neighbours in Asia, and I see no reason why
" wo should not be thoroughly friendly neigh-
" bours; but perfect independence is the condition
" upon which alone friendship and cordial good
" offices are possible, and if we meet upon
" terms which give them great military advan-
" tages over us, we should not be independent."
Sir James Stephen points out the safest as well
as the most dignified course ; but the first step
, towards it must be a reversal of the hesitating
I policy which has left Shere Ali and General Kauf-
Imann uncertain how far we should go to guard
Afghanistan from foreign authority.