Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎96r] (195/312)

england and afghanistan.
Tho.'Times observes that there can be no doubt that the Cabinet has
to-day a very serious question before it. On its judgment and decision
will depend in the main the future of our frontier policy in India. For
the moment the course of Lord Lytton and the Indian Government is clear.
They have one thing to do, and they are called upon to do it with prompti
tude and energy. It is possible that they may not be able immediately to
take the decisive measures which have been somewhat prematurely attributed
to them. But we cannot blame Lord Lytton and his military advisers for a
delay which circumstances have forced on them. The Indian Govern
ment would have laid itself open to just blame if it had despatched its
envoy, bearing a message of peace, in the midst of hostile preparations and
menacing movements of troops and stores towards the Afghan frontier.
If Lord Lyttcn is to be blamed at all, it is for having risked the failure
of an important mission at a moment when the swift approach of winter
might make it difficult, in case of failure, to take ulterior measures. We
are asked by our candid friends to believe that we cannot rely on our
Indian troops. It is not impossible that we may be as well-informed
on that point as our neighbours. When it became known in India that a
native contingent was to be brought to Europe, our difficulty was not to
find troops on whom we could rely, but to select from those who were
only too eager to come. Such proofs of eager loyalty are worth a good
deal more than the surmise of a neighbour whose disinterestedness is not
entirely beyond question. Indeed, we should not hesitate, if need were,
to increase the strength of our native army without fear of diluting its
loyalty, and if it becomes necessary to employ it in an Afghan campaign,
we shall do so without misgiving. On the other hand, bitter experience has
long ago taught us the folly of under-estimating the magnitude of the task
that may be before us. It is far better to wait a few weeks now and make
sure of our course, than to rush headlong into a struggle of which no man
can yet see the end. . , • , ,
The Standard says that whatever may be the resolutions at which the
Cabinet will arrive to-day, there is one which it hopes does not admit of
doubt. It will be decided, we must assure ourselves, and the decision must
be promptly made public, that no part of the cost of the Afghan war will
be laid upon the Exchequer of India. Upon this point a bold course is
alone consistent at once with prudence and with justice. There are two
elements to be taken into consideration—the political origin of the war
upon which we are embarking, and the capacity of India to yield the
resources needed for carryiug on that war. The Cabinet will, of course,
weigh these matters well; but it is impossible to believe that they can
come to any other conclusion than that the war is essentially an Imperial
war, and that India is unable to pay for it without the risk of a strain
sufficient to disorganize her whole financial system. Justice and prudence,
therefore, concur in warning us not to trifle with difficulties which,
formidable enough at present, may become infinitely more so under
the combined pressure of war and financial disaster. If the cost
should even prove as heavy as that which we had to pay for the
chastisement of ^Theodore of Abyssinia, it would be no more than what,
with a very slight increase of taxation, we could clear off in a couple
of years. With India the case is very different. That the Afghan
war is an Imperial war is as plain as that two and two make four. It
has notoriously been provoked by the malign intermeddling of Russia,
as a counterstroke to the check which she received when the Treaty of San
Stefano was exposed in Lord Salisbury's Circular. To meet the blow is
not only a necessity of our Imperial position in the East, but a corollary
from the principles we have publicly declared to be the foundations of our
European policy. •
ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN.
The Bombay correspondent of the Standard telegraphs yesterday as
follows :—
The commencement of hostilities may take place at any moment. Four of the
Ameer's infantry regiments, with six guns, are stated to have arrived in front of Ali
Musjid, a short way up the Khyber Pass, and have advanced to within three miles from
Jamrud, at which place a detachment of British troops has already arrived. Much
larger bodies of Afghan troops are on their way down, and these threaten to attack the
Khyberees for having allowed the mission to penetrate the Pass. This would , throw the
Khyberees and neighbouring hill tribes into our hands, and it is expected that we shall at
once render them assistance in case they are attacked by the Ameer's troops. It is
probable that our first advance will now take place in the Koorum Valley, as we can
thus assist the Khyberees, who, in case of defeat by the Ameer, could then fall back upon
us. Afghan troops, with guns taken from the Fort of Ali Musjid, occupy some of the
minor passes. Contrary to telegrams from the frontier some days since, Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. Goolam
Hussain, our envoy, has not yet returned, At Peshawur it is thought probable that
he will, when he arrives, be accompanied by an emissary of the Ameer. A telegram
from Mooltan states that the troops are still massing at Deri Ghazi Khan.
The Daily Telegraph publishes a despatch from Simla which says :—
Every native regiment detailed for active service has been augmented by 200 men,
and every troop of cavalry by sixteen sabres. This order does not aflfect the remainder
of the native army. The concentration of troops on the frontier goes on rapidly. The
best informed persons think that the season is too far advanced for a movement direct
upon Cabul. The occupation of the Kooram Valley and Candahar, immediately prac
ticable, will probably compel the Ameer to submit, or cause his deposition by his own
subjects. Further operations against Cabul, if found necessary, can be more easily
effected in the spring.
According to the same authority, great indignation has been felt by Anglo-
Indians at the letter published by Lord Lawrence. Telegraphed all over India,
it has, the correspondent says, " produced an impression of the existence of
ivpoVnpcG nnd timiditv at home."
I ndia.
The news from India chiefly relates to the Afghan mission, which, when the
mail left, was on its way to Peshawur. The native noblemen who accompanied
the mission were, the Indian papers state, Maharajah Pertab Singh, brother of
the Maharajah of Joudhpore and Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. Obed-Oollah, a Mussulman nobleman,
and uncle of the Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. of Tonk. The Times of India states that the Indian
Government had for bidden a ny newspaper special correspondents to accom
pany the expedition.