Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎96v] (196/312)

THE TIMES, MONDAY, OCTOBER 7,
ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN.
BOMBAY, O ct. 6.
Despatches published by 1 the Indian newspape rs an-
nounce that the Khyberees have declared in favour of 'the
British.
The report that it is intended to make a dash upon
Ali Musjid requires confirmation.
The Momunds are marching to join the Cabuleea.
Great enthusiasm prevails in the ranks of the Indian
army at the prospect of military operations.
LONDON, MONDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1878.
The intelligence which reaches us from India this
morning unhappily renders fainter the little hope i
that still remains that the Indian Govern. J
ment will be able to come to a peaceful un- \l
derstanding with S herb A li . Four Afghan
regiments, it is said, accompanied by six guns,
have advanced to the mouth of the Khyber ;
Pass. This movement must be taken to indicate a i
determined purpose on the A meer's part, for, as is
well known, the tribes which dwell in the moun
tains overhanging the Khyber are by no means well
disposed towards their nominal ruler. They readily
gave guarantees for the safe conduct of Sir N eville
C hamberlain's Mission, and had the matter de
pended on them alone, he would have found no
obstacle at Ali Musjid. The advance of the
A meer's troops and the severity with which he
is not unlikely to treat the defection of tribes
which have proved friendly to us are hardly
measures calculated to recover their loyalty. It
is probable, too, that their disaffection may prove
a contagious example among other tribes situated
along the frontier. We are rather too apt, perhaps,
to regard Afghanistan as a compact and united
State devoted to its ruler by personal loyalty and
strong national feeling. It would be both easy and
dangerous to under-estiwate the real strength of
S here A li , who is a determined and practised
soldier ; but it would be a mistake to suppose that
he exercises undisputed sway over all the terri
tories nominally subject to his rule. He has an
army, and he rules by the right of the strongest; but ;
he is by no means secure against domestic intrigue
and the revolt of his own subjects. The opinion is
current in India that the mere entry of British ["
troops into Afghan territory might kindle intestine
disturbance, and even bring about the deposition of ;
S here A li himself. This is a result which, taken 1
by itself, we certainly should have no reason to de
sire. We wish for nothing better than the tran
quillity of Afghanistan and the friendship of its
ruler. But if S here A li has miscalculated his own
strength and the loyalty of his subjects, we cannot
be held responsible for th-j coisequences of
his own obstinacy and wrong-hoadedness. As the
case stands at present, the relation of S here Atl to '
his own subjects is his affair rather than ours. But* :
in considering the issue of the present difficulty and
the means to be taken for removing it, we must
naturally take into account the troubles which con
front S hbre A li at home. We cannot afford to
ahow weakness in a matter of such vital moment ;
but there is no reason for a greater display of
strength than the occasion, calmly considered, de
mands.
It seems now to have been determined by the
Indian Government, as we surmised last week^
that any attempt on our part to penetrate
i into Afghanistan in force is to be deferred
until next year. This certainly does not mean that
nothing will be done, for it is quite possible that
the measures now in progress will effect all that we
have in view. But no attempt will at present be
made to march on Cabul, nor even, in all proba
bility, on Candahar. It may not be necessary to
do so at all. The full purpose of the Indian Govern
ment is not yet revealed ; but it seems evident that
Lord L yxxon and his advisers are determined to try
the effact of a strong military demonstration on the
Afghan frontier before proceeding to ulterior and
more decisive measures. For this purpose troops
will be collected at Peshawur and the garrison at
Jumrood strengthened so as to command the en
trance to the Khyber, and, if necessary, to seize the
stronghold of Ali Musjid ; the issue of the Bholan
will be secured beyond the possibility of attack; and
| troops will be advanced into the Khoorum Valley.
Troops are now in motion for the purpose of rein- !
forcing the garrison of Quetta, but it is not con- !
sidered expedient to hazard an advance on Candahar |
at present, unless, which is most improbable, an
opportunity ofFars for seizing it by a ooup de main. ,
Notwithstanding the reported advance of the
A meer's troops to Ali Musjid, it is probable
that our forces will meet with little diffi
culty in tha neighbourhood of the Khy
ber. The tribes are still friendly toward s .
us according to the latest >' accounts, and, if |
judiciously dealt with, they are not likely to
waver in their allegiance. The most important ;
of the military operations now in contemplation f
will be the occupatiun of the Khoorum Valley. It
gives us an alternative route ta Cabul, in some re
spects superior to that of the Khyber. There
are reasons, perhaps, for doubting whether
it possesses all the advantages which our
Correspondent claims for it ; but if it can be
effectively occupied, and the friendship of its in- !
habitants secured, it will advance us several stages
on the road to Ghuznee and Cabul. The valley is
fertile, the climate is comparatively mild, and the
passes over the mountains into the interior of
Afghanistan are free from serious difficulty. The
inhabitants, however, are wild, lawless, and
treacherous, and it is certain that an advance in i
this direction will have to be conducted with all I
possible caution. These three measures, then—the
reinforcement of the garrison of Quetta, the ad
vance up the Khoorum Valley, and the occupation
of the Khybor Pass as far, at least, as Ali Musjid—
though about the last there still seems to be some
doubt—are all that are immediately contemplated. ;
The winter will be occupied in serious preparations, |
in the movement of reinforcements and reserves to
wards the frontier, and in the collection of the ne
cessary stores and transport. Jf our relations with
S here A li do not improve in the course of the i
next few months, if he does not yield to a demon
stration of which it will be impossible for him to ;
mistake the purpose, there will remain no alter
native but to resort to more decisive measures in "U
the spring, when the weather is again favourable,
and when all our preparations are complete.
It is very possible that eager and impatient
critics of the Indian Government will chafe
at this apparent delay in striking a decisive
blow. The delay is partly the result of neces-
jity no doubt, for, as we pointed out on Satur-
, day. Lord Lytion was debarred from making i
warlike preparations at thej very moment that he |
was despatching a peaceful mission ; but it may 1
nevertheless rest on a sound basis of policy as well.
However faint the hope may be, it is still possible
to hope that the need for more decisive measures
1 may pass away before the time comes for them to
be undertaken. S hbre A lt is not omnipotent even
in Afghanistan, and though he may have made up
his own mind to defy the power of England and to
provoke its hostility, he may yet find that he has
reckoned without his people. They will be the first
to feel the pressure of the English advance, and
they are not so unfamiliar with a change of rulers, 1
f nor so submissive to the ruler whom they may for the
;■ time acknowledge, as to yield tamely to his will if |
1 it is opposed to their own. The course hitherto
pursued by Lord Lytton has been as moderate and
f conciliatory as the circumstances would permit, and
i though it would now be fatal to show weakness, !
there is no reason why we should not still proceed m
| with moderation. A peaceful mission has been
proposed and has been peremptorily rejected. It
is necessary to show at once that we will not brook
; the affront, and that, unless amends are promptly
; made, we are prepared to resent it. This purpose
is sufficiently shown by the military operations
now in course of execution. But, having made our :
purpose clear beyond the possibility of mistake, we j
are strong enough to be able to afford S hbre A li
another opportunity of repentance. If he avails 11
himself of it, we shall have averted a troublesome ■ '
war by our forbearance. If he still remains in- M
i tractable, he will have to take the consequences.
We have sought his friendship and proffered ours
in return. It is still his to take or to leave. But
I if he prefers our enmity, his fate must be upon his
I own head.