Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎95v] (194/312)

October 5, 1878.]
THE AFGHAN DIFFICULTY.
... The Saturday Review thinks the high authority of Lord Lawrence
will probably disturb the apparent unanimity which prevailed in
England as^ to the necessity of invading Afghanistan. Lord Lawrence's
judgment is entitled to respect, even when his arguments are not
convmcmg; but it is remarkable that he seems neither to recognize
the change of circumstances which arises from the reception of a
.Russian Envoy at Cabul nor the possible share of Russia in the recent
policy of the Ameer. It may have been prudent to tolerate the
sullen isolation of a semi-barbarous ruler as long as it was indiscriminate
or impartial, and nevertheless to resent his ostentatious preference of-a
rival Power. If the enterprise is undertaken, the mode of prosecution
must be determined exclusively by professional judgment. As regards
cost, the money must in the first instance be raised by loan, and the
payment of interest with or without a sinking fund would not impose
on the taxpayers an intolerable burden. It may be a question whether
England ought not to bear a portion of the expense, if the Govern-
"rf- 11 !- 18 satls ^ e< ^ proofs of the baleful activity of Russian intrigue
which was stimulated by the antagonism which prevailed before, if not
after, the Treaty of Berlin. If Asiatic potentates can be convinced at a
moderate cost that it is not safe to defy England at the instigation of
Russia, the war will not have been undertaken in vain. For the present it
will be prudent to accept the assurances of the Russian Government that
it has taken no part in provoking the quarrel. Russian journalists
who announce that the Afghan war has been arranged for the pur
pose of correcting the miscarriages of Berlin may libel their own country
wuh impunity All their efforts will be insufficient to lower them
ci Ar ? • brawlers who affect enthusiastic sympathy for
Shere Ah, as their predecessors, nearly forty years ago, applauded in prose
and verse the bloodthirsty treason of Akbar Khan.
U T he Spjrtdtor says Lord Lytton has neither repented nor stood firm •
but has adopted, it is greatly to be feared, a compromise combining most
£ il VI de ay Wlth • a11 the evils of rash haste - Unless the great
bulk of the telegrams received from India are intended to deceive, the
broad course of events must have been in this wiseThe Vicerov on
receiving intelligence of the rebuff at Jumr ood. determined off-hand on
a dramatic coup. Afghanistan should be entered, Cabul occupied, the
Ameer dethroned, and Britain avenged all at once, just as if the world
were an opera-house and he stage-manager. The mission was recalled
and dispersed by telegraph. Sir Neville Chamberlain, by far the
ablest soldier m the business, not being even called to Simla for
consultation on his way south, much less entrusted with command.
Orders were issued for three partially prepared corps to move "in
three days " the three days being telegraphed particularly—and General
Roberts, a man of skill and energy, was sent flying to Kohat to
begin the work. An extraordinary appeal was at the same time made
through the Times correspondent direct to Lord Salisbury, begging in
language very rarely used, for support from the Foreign Office, because
the business in its present phase was " Imperial," and not local. The
object of that prayer was twofold—to neutralize any distaste Lord Salisbury
might feel for a wild project, and to intimate that England, and
not India, must pay the bill. The -reply evidently made, if the Times
has any inspiration at all, that the affair was exclusively Indian, that
^ A yt i t0n - must take hi ? own course » and tha t England at most could only
afford help in " extraordinary expenses," a reply accentuated by a refusal
to call a Cabinet, rather cooled Lord Lytton, as did also his discovery that
ready in the mouth of an Indian departmental chief does not mean
the same as "ready" in the mouth of Count von Moltke or even of
bir Garnet Wolseley. At all events. Lord Lytton drew back, but apparently
IT J » e ^ S * a "I 0 ^ aze over this — n ot completely. He could not
rush the Ameer, as he hoped, but he could not bear to put off vengeance
till the spring. Lord Lytton, therefore, decided that something must
be done, and that something was the occupation of Candahar through
the ^olan. As regards preparations, the Spectator reads and re-reads the
1 fv 0 ^ 5 :olumDS Wlt h a sen se of bewilderment, asking each time
whether the Government is concealing its plans, or whether Lord Lytton
is really going to invade a country exactly the size of Germany-so say
the Russian staff—and with a million of fighting men in it, with less than
one Prussian regiment and four or five thousand Indians
The Economist admits that it is possible that the ill "effect which any
delay m exacting reparation from the Ameer may have upon the Indian
people has been exaggerated, but observes that six months of inaction will
afiord ample opportunity for scheming of every kind, and it must be a
sanguine mind that can suppose that either the intent or the result of this
scheming will be to the advantage of England. If nothing can be done till
the sprng the Government ought certainly to explain why Sir Neville
Chamberlains mission was thus ill-timed. The general belief is that the
adoption of a new frontier policy was the particular commission which Lord
Lytton went out to execute. If so, the demand addressed to Shere Ali must
have been for some time resolved on, and there seems no reason why the
refusal to receive it should not have been extracted from him in the
spring instead of m the autumn. If it were of any avail the Economist
would go further than this, and say that a change so important as the
adoption of a new frontier policy in India ought not to have been
made without some communication with Parliament. The Ameer left to
himself could do India but little harm. It is his relations with Russia
that make it necessary to insist upon his doing this or that: and if once
this is admitted, an invasion of Afghanistan becomes as much an incident
ot Imperial policy as an invasion of the Baltic provinces.