Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎77r] (157/312)

Ameer to England lias caused an iminenGe sensation through India;
to-morrow we are assuied that preparation for avenging such an
affront has been from the beginning a part of Lord Lytton's
policy. What is to be believed ? and if the Indian Government has
long been holding itself in readiness for an Afghan war, how are we
| to dispose of the unanswerable criticism by Lord Carnarvon on the
5 Indian policy of the Government—its selection of such a time as
| this, above all others, for provoking the disaffection of the large
feudatory princes of India by hints that it will be necessary to
6 incorporate their soldiers with the army of the Queen ? Again, it is
| confidently asserted by eminent authorities in England that we cannot
be said to have taken adequate precaution against risks unless we
have provided for the contingent despatch of a considerable military
force from England. Is this, or is it not, the view of her Majesty's
Ministers! The country has a right to be informed on each of these
points, and therefore it appeals, from the slavishly mystifying state
ments of a gagged press, to the right feeling and sense of a Government,
Now that an Afghan difficulty has again to be faced, ifc may be worth
while to call attention to a work, On the Practicability of an Invasion of .
British India, by Colonel Evans, which some forty years ago formed the
subject of warm discussion by the Asiatic Society and others interested in
Indian affairs. The gallant author referred to contemplated the possibility
of Eussia subjecting the whole of Tarkestan, taking the route of Khiva,
Bokhara, and Balkh, in one campaign; and then assumed that another
campaign would see the Muscovite flag carried over the Hindoo Ooosh -
to Cabul, and thence by Peshawar to the Indus. Except in the matter of
time, this programme has been at all events partially carried out; and who
shall say that another forty years may not find it fulfilled, at least as far as ►
Cabul 1 Though I, for one, believe there will ba many a Czar before a '
British Empress or Emperor cexses to rule on the Indus.
I understand that the remarkable series of leading articles in the Times
on the Afghan question, which have attracted so much attention during the
last few days, in consequence of the simplicity which characterises the
construction of the sentences, the profound yet varied suggestions which
they contain as to what may or may not be the consequences of a policy
which might or might not be advisable in the event of certain circumstances
occurring which may or may not occur, are by the able pen of its chief
proprietor, while the interesting telegraphic despatches from India, upon
which they are based, are dictated by the Viceroy himself. I am puzzled
to say which I admire the more—the vigorous policy of Lord Lytton or the
vigorous pen of Mr. Walter.
Though the papers have pretty generally agreed that General Crawford;
! Chamberlain is to have the command of the expedition against Afghanistan,
I believe there is no doubt that Sir Frederic Haines, the Commander-in-l
Chief in India, will go in person. General Haines is a soldier of wide expe-l
rience, who has served in many Indian campaigns. His strong points are|
common sense and a clear head. He is in close accord with the Viceroy J
\ and he can be trusted to control without checking the independence ofl
action of the many good men he will have about him. Advices so far point|
to the probable postponement of the campaign till the spring; but I think
i these reports are intended to mislead. We may hear at any moment tha |
j the Peshawar army is actively engaged, and that at least the passes wil |
be seized before the winter arrives.
The Afghan business has taken that very unforeseeing animal, thJ
j British Public, by surprise ; but no one can doubt that in India this clouc I
I in the East has been looming in the distance for some years past. It wa; |
| seen after the meeting of Lord Mayo and Shere Ali that the latter was onb I
{ half satisfied with the terms he obtained, and also that he could not per-J
I sonally be depended on; nor had he even sufficient authority over hii 1
: Sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. to make him an ally worth having, even if he could have beei I
j depended upon. From that time the Indian Government looked upon th< I
annexation of Afghanistan as only a question of time, and took its measure: I
accordingly. This, there is little doubt, was the cause of the Afridi expe l
—'--iju - -iV—r 1 —K-iVr •• tv-n-nivrT +r> hring those troublesome hill-men t J
cpojjo p'eq u oonpoad ppiojA. pssnjoj 'soptsoq f soqsm £ oo^ oqq.
f soT}T]od jfyjBd ao jtyaisd o^ oouoaojoa ou suq—ao^tn pmosjad u— jo ^trrod
i 13 S83p3Tn uoon^) OTJJ, , "mpog; ^ soLm^u^odTuoyj pojo^S 0.M4
Troi^aodpoo siq aoj pat^ojc 13 su taiq uodn possojd uooq s-eq qoiTpa. 'oSisjood
| oip. Stn^dsoou /q puo jjm Iiossnjj opo pioq; 'jp? aaqje s-TBoddu ij
' says crraoAi anx xvhm
91^ 0^ sp-eq iCtm s}T spuij dpj^ sdd^uij^ aiopq asd^p
Jium poTiod jaq^ouB qons i!;u9xv\^ uisq; ojoui joj uopuo^j ui ooutj
-rajojjad auo^jopun ^ou s^q X^jd QifjQ oqq. uodn gjreadsg^qg
10 uoqt3;u9said9j; eu; Suiujgouoo snouno aay ouav ^uuin isajaiut tttav
. ' .. /•'' t /' •' /•» .. > > r~t t ' ll.
V
Ameer to England has causec
d aiiTTmraense sensation through India;
to-morrow we are assured that preparation for avenging such an
affront has been from the beginning a part of Lord Lytton's
has been from the
What is to be believed! and if the Indian Government has
long been holding itself in readiness for an Afghan war, how are we
to dispose of the unanswerable criticism by Lord Carnarvon on the
Indian policy of the Government—its selection of such a time as
this, above all others, for provoking the disaffection of the large
feudatory princes of India by hints that it will be necessary to
incorporate their soldiers with the army of the Queen ? Again, it is
confidently asserted by eminent authorities in England that we cannot
be said to have taken adequate precaution against risks unless we
have provided for the contingent despatch of a considerable military
force from England. Is this, or is it not, the view of her Majesty's
Ministers ? The country has a right to be informed on each of these
points, and therefore it appeals, from the slavishly mystifying state
ments of a gagged press, to the right feeling and sense of a Government.
Now that an Afghan difficulty has again to be faced, it may be worth
while to call attention to a work, On the Practicability of an Invasion of
British India, by Colonel Evans, which some forty years ago formed the
subject of warm discussion by the Asiatic Society and others interested in
Indian affairs. The gallant author referred to contemplated the possibility
of Russia subjecting the whole of Tarkestan, taking the route of Khiva,
Bokhara, and Balkh, in one campaign; and then assumed that another
campaign would see the Muscovite flag carried over the Hindoo Coosh
to Cabul, and thence by Peshawar to the Indus. Except in the matter of
time, this programme has been at all events partially carried out; and who
shall say that another forty years may not find it fulfilled, at least as far as
Cabul 1 Though I, for one, believe there will be many a Czar before a
British Empress or Emperor ceases to rule on the Indus.
I understand that the remarkable series of leading articles in the Times
on the Afghan question, which have attracted so much attention during the
last few days, in consequence of the simplicity which characterises the
construction of the sentences, the profound yet varied suggestions which
they contain as to what may or may not be the consequences of a policy
which might or might not be advisable in the event of certain circumstances
occurring which may or may not occur, are by the able pen of its chief
proprietor, while the interesting telegraphic despatches from India, upon
which they are based, are dictated by the Viceroy himself. I am puzzled
to say which I admire the more—the vigorous policy of Lord Lytton or the
vigorous pen of Mr. Walter.
Though the papers have pretty generally agreed that General Crawford
Chamberlain is to have the command of the expedition against Afghanistan
I believe there is no doubt that Sir Frederic Haines, the Commander-in
Chief in India, will go in person. General Haines is a soldier of wide expe
rience, who has served in many Indian campaigns. His strong points are
common sense and a clear head. He is in close accord with the Viceroy,
and he can be trusted to control without checking the independence of
action of the many good men he will have about him. Advices so far point
to the probable postponement of the campaign till the spring; but I thini
these reports are intended to mislead. "We may hear at any moment tha
the Peshawar army is actively engaged, and that at least the passes wil
be seized before the winter arrives.
The Afghan business has taken that very unforeseeing animal, thj
British Public, by surprise ; but no one can doubt that in India this clouc|
in the East has been looming in the distance for some years past. It wa
seen after the meeting of Lord Mayo and Shere Ali that the latter was onl;
half satisfied with the terms he obtained, and also that he could not per
sonally be depended on; nor had he even sufficient authority over hi
Sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. to make him an ally worth having, even if he could have bee:
depended upon. From that time the Indian Government looked upon th<
annexation of Afghanistan as only a question of time, and took its measure:
accordingly. This, there is little doubt, was the cause of the Afridi expe
dition, it being absolutely necessary to bring those troublesome hill-men
book before we could invade Afghanistan. Partly by force of arms, parti
by subsidising, the Afridis and other border tribes have been made ouj
friends, and little difficulty is now anticipated with them or other hill tribe
on the frontier.
Another step of the Indian Government was to obtain a trustworthy
map of Afghanistan. This was difficult, as the Ameer would on no prete^
whatever allow Englishmen, still. less English officers, into his countrjJ
But, partly by native surveyors, partly, no doubt, by English officers i;
disguise, a map has been prepared, and was published at Calcutta last yeai
It is on a large scale—four miles to the inch—and, all things considered
fairly accurate. A great deal of information has been obtained on the all-
y j important subject of by-paths, by which mountain-passes can be turned, as
Shere Ali is likely to find to his cost when the war begins. Immense stores
of ammunition and provisions have been accumulated at Peshawar and
Eawul Pindee, in readiness for the coming campaign. The occupation of
Quettah last year was another step towards Cabul, as this move gave us the
command of the Botan Pass, which is practicable for artillery, and has
doubtless been improved since it has been in our hands. A work was pub
lished by Mr. Hughes, a Bombay Civil servant, last year on Baluchistan,
in which all possible information as to that country—in which the Botan
Pass and Quettah are situated—military itineraries of all the chief routes
in Baluchistan, are given, and in which the distances, the difficulties of the
road, the facilities for obtaining food, fodder, firewood, and water, are care
fully noted from surveys by English officers. Altogether, if we fail—which
there is little fear of our doing—in Afghanistan, it will certainly not be
from want of due preparation.