Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎76v] (156/312)

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FALSE GUIDES AND DUMB ORACLES.
A n Afghan war in which no reverse is anticipated, but which, if any |
reverse occur?, may call the whole military forces of the Empire into |
action, is imminent; the vast bureaucracy that constitutes the Indian f
Government throbs with the excitement of preparation and expectancy; |
the anxiety of the English public grows more intense daily, and the
Secretary of State for India is in attendance on the Queen at N
Balmoral. The other members of the Cabinet are in different parts, |
more or less remote, of the United Kingdom, and the Duke of (Jam-
bridge is about the only high official who in a critical and perplexed I
time is actually at his post. As nearly as possible twenty-four years ago i
there appeared a leading article in the Times which sounded the first I
notes of the death-knell of the Aberdeen Government. The newspaper t
gave a general support to the Ministry of the day; but it was not, as
it has since become, its echo, its flatterer, and its slave. It was stiil |
4 the Thunderer,' was still independent, and had not yet condescended |
to hang with mercenary tremors on each passing Ministerial breath. |
We were then involved in the Crimean war. Parliament had risen ;
for the long vacation, and the Premier and his colleagues were |
scattered over the holiday pastures of politicians, as if nothing par
ticular was going on. The Times drew attention to this apparent •
indifference to the national interests at a supreme moment. Things I
were not progressing satisfactorily in the East, and Ministers were |
taking the world with as much apparent easiness as if the only |
campaign about which they had to think were that against the I
partridges, the pheasants, and the grouse. Not that change of scene
was to be denied to over-worked and over-worried statesmen. But
change of scene being necessary, why not, suggested the Times—
which, if it knew, was then indifferent to the fact, which has since
transpired from the memoirs of Koyalty, that Lord Aberdeen was
staying at Balmoral in consequence of the express wishes of his
Sovereign—why not make the experiment of selecting a convenient
spot for Ministerial relaxation on the South Coast?
But the spirit of a calculating sycophancy now reigns at Bearwood
and Printing-house-square; and the journal which should be, as it I
I has been, the instructor and the trusted adviser of a nation is degraded I
to the registrar of the design?, and the aspiring panegyrist of the policy, I
of a Cabinet. It would be vain now to expect from it anything more I
than apologies for inaction or the blustering praises of extemporised I
' swagger. If, indeed, it could speak with the voice and courage of 1854,
we should long since have had the question asked, why, at a juncture
l ull of menace to the Asiatic portion of our Empire, and straining
to the utmost the departmental resources of the office over which
Lord Cranbrook presides. Lord Cranbrook himself should be stationed
six-hundred miles from Westminster. The Viceroy of India is the
subordinate of the Secretary of State; and if there ever could be a ,
jtime when it was important that the Secretary of State should
! be in the capital of the Empire to confer with skilled advisers on ^
the complex details of a delicate and difficult military enterprise,^ as [;
well as with the Indian Viceroy, it is the present. The Indian
Council at Westminster can at least boast the membership of men of I
great experience, both military and civil. If their characteristic '•
quality is not statesmanship, they have knowledge. It is clear that
the speedy success of the English arms in Afghanistan will greatly
depend upon careful attention to the business points of warfare—upon
the sto rage of adequate pr ovisions th e supply of the exact milita ry [g
equipment wanted, the judicious selection of the times and seasons at
which the more active work of the expedition is commenced. It is
not less clear that if the Secretary of State is to form a just opinion on
these subjects, it must be after personal and daily interviews with his
advisers, as well as after careful perusal of official reports. Nor will
| it be denied that this is work which can only be done on the spot,
| within the precincts of the office which Lord Cranbrook administers,
In all these matters time is an essential element. The Duke of
| Cambridge, as we have said, has returned to his post. But Lord
| Cranbrook, even supposing he should have left Balmoral before these
linetS are published, mu&t have had much to settle last week which
could have been only settled in London, or must have postponed
many matters which ought to have been settled at once.
Prudential considerations, by which are meant the tactical laws of
party, are said to have had much to do with the assumption of this
attitude of apparent indifference by the Cabinet. Lord Salisbury advo-
| cated the immediate presence of Lord Cranbrook in London, and the
I issue of summonses for a Council without delay. The advice was
I declined by Lord Beaconsfield, for reasons which have doubtless much
in them that is plausible. The policy that commended itself to the
^ Premier was to minimise the importance of the Afghan episode, and not
| to alarm the country by a hurriedly-convened meeting of Ministers. For
the same reason, it may be presumed, the Ministerial speakers of last
| week—among whom was Sir Michael Hicks-Beach—scarcely touched
on Shere Ali's rejection of the English mission. Coincidently with this,
we have had a conflicting series of inspired telegrams in the Times,
I One day we are told that Afghanistan must be annexed, and the Ameer
deposed. The next it is hinted that the necessities of the case may for
the present be met if the Himalaya passes which lead to Afghanistan
I arc occupied. To-day it is announced that the affront offered by the