Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎74v] (152/312)

OPINIONS OP THE RUSSIAN
PRESS.
(By StJBMARiKE Telegraph.)
(from our own correspondent.)
■ BOMBAY, tuesday,
The latest news that has been received here from
Simla states that an opportunity has been afforded
to the Ameer of Afghanistan to make amends for
the affront he offered to the British Envoys.
In any event the Government will insist on our
troops being cantoned in a permanent position
behind Candahar.
(By Great Northern Telegraph.)
(from our own correspondent.)
ST. PETERSBURG, TUESDAY,
The Eusslci Mir, of September 30, says ;—
" The critical position of Great Britain in
Centra^ Asia should serve as a guide to us. Our
procedure in the Asiatic question should consist in
supporting the Afghan Ameer against England.
Every decisive success of our policy in Central
Asia will be an ostensible defeat of Great Britain.
Unfortunately, we do not know where our strength
lies. Were England in our place, doubtless
the very existence of our Indian Empire
would be impossible, but the English never
hesitate, as we do, before imaginary ' difficulties,
but perseveringly pursue the object they desire to
attain."
The Exchange, News of to-day considers that war
is unavoidable. " In the eyes of Englishmen,'' it
says, " Shere Ali is simply the victim of Russian
intrigue ; his chief offence lies, not in 'declining to
see the British Ambassador, but in receiving the
Russian Embassy, the repulse of the British Envoys
being ascribed to Russian influence. If the Ameer is
simply a tool in the hands of Russia one would
think that England would in such a case prepare
for attacking Cronstadt and Odessa instead of
Candahar and Cabul."
The Golos of to-day considers that England
earnestly desires to avoid war with Afghanistan,
and that all the warlike preparations sire has made
would remain but preparations if the Ameer
explained that his refusal to receive the British
ambassador was merely in fact a grievous misunder
standing, orif without any explanations he succeeded
in ridding himself of the Russian Mission in Cabul.
The Emir is not so isolated as England supposes.
This time he has not acted precipitately, but has
calculated the consequences of his refusal; his
position is better than it was in the former Afghan
war. The feeling that exists among the semi-
dependent Indian tribes, the probability of
Persia's friendly neutrality, the relations of
the Ameer to the Sultan, who fears his
conversion into an Indian Maharajah, and
lastly the assurance that in case of war he has
nothing to fear from Russia, and can therefore
leave the western and northern frontiers of
Afghanistan undefended, will greatly increase the
military chances of the Ameer in his combat with
his enemy.
According to a telegram from Constantinople in
the Politische Correspondeaz, Mussafir Khara, supposed to
be a secret agent of the Ameer of Afghanistan, has been
there since the middle of this month. His mission is said
to be primarily to prevail upon the Sultan to use his influ
ence in order to dissuade England from using any coercive
l means against Afghanistan ; but at the same time his efforts
are directed towards persuading the Sultan himself that a
Russian alliance at this moment is the best thing for all
Mahometan nations, and that the Ameer is resolved to
make common cause with the Muscovite. The telegram
adds it is a well-known fact that some months ago the
Ameer sent a letter in this sense to Sultan Abdul Hamid.
His Majesty, on his side, it is stated, a few weeks ago des
patched a secret agent to Central Asia with orders to visit
Cabul and the capitals of the other Central Asiatic States,
in order to awaken there a feeling of solidarity among all
Mahometans and to bring about a Pan-Ielamitic league,
-The mission from Constantinople referred to is probably
that of Hulussi EfFendi, a Ulema, who was sent some two
years ago ; and to whom it is alleged to be due that the
conflict between England and Afghanistan, already then
ripe, did not at once break out.
Lord Lawrence, in a letter to a morning con
temporary, says it appears to him to have been a serious
mistake organising a Mission to Cabul before having
ascertained whether Ameer Shere Ali was prepared to
received our overtures or not, and a still greater mistake
despatching the Mission until his consent for our doing so had
been received. His lordship continuesHad these pre-
cautions been observed, the affront which we have met with
would not have appeared to be so flagrant aa it now does.
But, however vexatious is the Ameers conduct in this
matter, it ought not to lead us^-to force our Mission
on him, still ■ less should it induce us to declare war
against him. It appears to be contrary to sound
policy that we should resent our disappointment by
force of arms ; for by doing so we play the enemy's game,
and force the Afghans into a union with the Russians.
We ought not, indeed, to be surprised that the Ameer has
acted as he has done. From the time of the Treaty of
1857 the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan refused to .allow
us to have a Mission at Cabul, or even to send one there as
a temporary arrangement, solemnly assuring us that such
a step would lead to mischief, and not to peaceful rela
tions with the Afghans. We accepted his excuses. In
1869 the present Ameer affirmed the same policy.
Whatever may be his own faults and shortcomings,
he has never concealed from ua his views on this
subject. What occurred at the meeting in Peshawur to
wards the end of 1876 between the Ameer's agent and Sir
Lewis Pelly has not actually transpired, but I believe that
our wishes on the subject of a Mission to Cabul were at
that time reiterated, though in vain. The old policy was
to bear with the Afghans as far as we could reasonably do
so, and to. endeavour by kindness and conciliation to bring
about friendly relations, gradually leading them to see that
their interests and ours did not conflict. Of late, however,
we have seemed to think that we understood the
interests of the Afghans better than they did them
selves, We appear to think that we can, in
short, force our policy on them without their taking
offence at such conduct. What are we to gain by going to
war with the Ameer? Can we dethrone him without turn
ing the mass of his countrymen against us ? Can we follow
the policy of 1838-39 without, in all probability, incurring
similar results ? If we succeed in driving Shere Ali out of
Cabul, who can we put in his place ? And how are we to in
sure the maintenance of our own creature on the throne,
except by occupying the country ? And when is such an
occupation to terminate. I have no doubt that we can clear
the defiles and valleys of Afghanistan from end to end of
their defenders, and that no force of Afghans could
stand against our troops when properly brought to bear
against them. The country, however, consists of mountain
ranges, for the most part broken up into rugged and diffi
cult plateaux, where brave men standing on the defensive
have considerable advantages; and when we force such
positions we cannot, continue to hold them. The cost of
invading such a country will prove very great, and the
means for so doing must be drawn from elsewhere. The
country held by the Ameer can afford neither the money
nor the transport, nor even the subsistence in adequate
quantity for the support of the invading army. It is
impossible to foresee the end of such a war, and in the
meantime its prosecution would utterly ruin the finances of
'India.
" And noo, ma freens," said the good old Scotch
Minister, at the end of his petition for all sorts and
conditions of men—'■ And noo, ma freens, let us
pray for the puir Deil . There's naebody prays for
the puir Deil ." Lord Lawrence seems to look
upon the Ameer of Cabul as being in a somewhat
similar position as the puir Deil . And certainly it
is not often that so very near an approach to
unanimity is to be found among us as marks the
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ao oiqisggjgB ajom v pnannuoogj ijou ppioo sa\. spntum
sq^doaoiuoq joj 9q^ in «oooo aaqijo . Cjoag sapgsi
puB ssaoons qguoaoq^ b p9a9iqob seq boooq biiiabjbh
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puB 'Aj^unoo siq; id Xio^siq ^sud aqq. jo Aq^joAi b-bm. q
ifaBrt b Auid pjbavjoj Jfooj; qqStin uoT^Bjanag SuuoA
tiaq^ 'uot^Bonpa m s^uauiaia om ^ 'esoq; auiquioo p^noo
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OPINIONS OP THE RUSSIAN
PRESS.
(B y S ubmarine T elegraph.)
(ir OM our own correspondent.)
■■J* BOMBAY, Tuesday,
The latest news that has been received here from
Simla states that an opportunity has been afforded
to the Ameei? of Afghanistan to make amends for
the affront he offered to the British Envoys.
In any event the Government will insist on our
troops being cantoned in a permanent position
behind Candahar.
(B y G reat N orthern T elegraph.)
(from our own correspondent.)
ST. PETERSBURG, Tuesday,
The Russki Mir, of September 30, says :—
" The critical position of Great Britain in
Central Asia should serve as a guide to us. Our
procedure in the Asiatic question should consist in
supporting the Afghan Ameer against England.
Every decisive success of our policy in Central
Asia will be an ostensible defeat of Great Britain.
Unfortunately, we do not know where our strength
lies. Were England in our place, doubtless
the very existence of our Indian Empire
would be impossible, but the English never
hesitate, as we do, before imaginary ' difficulties,
but perseveringly pursue the object they desire to
attain."
The Exchange News of to-day considers that war
is unavoidable. "In the eyes of Englishmen,it
says, '' Shere Ali is simply the victim of Russian
intrigue ; his chief offence lies, not in declining to
see the British Ambassador, but in receiving the
Russian Embassy, the repulse of the British Envoys
being ascribed to Russian influence. If the Ameer is
simply a tool in the hands of Russia one would
think that England would in such a case prepare
for attacking Cronstadt and Odessa instead of
Candahar and Cabul."
The Golos of to-day considers that England
earnestly desires to avoid war with Afghanistan,
and that all the warlike preparations she has made
would remain but preparations if the Ameer
explained that his refusal to receive the British
ambassador was merely in fact a grievous misunder-
standihg, or if without any explanations he succeeded
in ridding himself of the Russian Mission in Cabul.
The Emir is not so isolated as England supposes.
This time he has not acted precipitately, but has
calculated the consequences of his refusal; his
position is better than it was in the former Afghan
Avar. The feeling that exists among the semi-
dependent Indian tribes, the probability of
Persia's friendly neutrality, the relations of
the Ameer to the Sultan, who fears his
conversion into an Indian Maharajah, and
lastly the assurance that in case of war he has
nothing to fear from Russia, and can therefore
leave the western and northern frontiers of
Afghanistan undefended, will greatly increase the
military chances of the Ameer in his combat with
his enemy.
According to a telegram from Constantinople in
the Politische Correspondenz, Mussafir Khara, supposed to
be a secret agent of the Ameer of Afghanistan, has been
there since the middle of this month. His mission is-said
to be primarily to prevail upon the Sultan to use his influ
ence in order to dissuade England from using any coercive
means against Afghanistan ; but at the same time his efforts
are directed towards persuading the Sultan himself that a
Russian alliance at this moment is the best thing for all
Mahometan nations, and that the Ameer is resolved to
make common cause with the Muscovite. The telegram
adds it is a well-known fact that some months ago the
Ameer sent a letter in this sense to Sultan Abdul Hamid.
His Majesty, on his side, it is stated, a few weeks ago des
patched a secret agent to Central Asia with orders to visit
Cabul and the capitals of the other Central Asiatic States,
in order to awaken there a feeling of solidarity among all
Mahometans and to bring about a Pan-Mamitic league.
The mission from Constantinople referred to is probably
that of Hulussi Effendi, a Ulema, who was sent some two
years ago ; and to whom it is alleged to be due that the
conflict between England and Afghanistan, already then
ripe, did not at once break out,
Lord Lawrence, in a letter to a morning con
temporary, says it appears to him to have been a serious
mistake organising a Mission to Cabul before having
ascertained whether Ameer Shere Ali was prepared to
received our overtures or not, and a still greater mistake
despatching the Mission until his consent for our doing so had
been received. His lordship continues:—Had these pre-
cautions been observed, the affront which we have met with
would not have appeared to be so flagrant aa it now does.
But, however vexatious is the Ameers conduct in this
matter, it ought not to lead ua^o force our Mission
on him, still ■ less should it induce us to declare war
against him. It appears to be contrary to sound
policy that we should resent our disappointment by
force of arms ; for by doing so we play the enemy's game,
and force the Afghans into a union with the Russians.
We ought not, indeed, to be surprised that the Ameer has
acted he has done. From the time of the Treaty of
1857 the late Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan refused to allow
us to have a Mission at Cabul, or even to send one there as
a temporary arrangement, solemnly assuring us that such
a step would lead to mischief, and not to peaceful rela
tions with the Afghans. We accepted his excuses. In
1869 the present Ameer affirmed the same policy.
Whatever may be his own faults and shortcomings,
he has never concealed from ua his views on this
subject. What occurred at the meeting in Peshawur to
wards the end of 1876 between the Ameer's agent and Sir
Lewis Pelly has not actually transpired, but I believe that
our wishes on the subject of a Mission to Cabul were at
that time reiterated, though in vain. The old policy was
to bear with the Afghans as far as we could reasonably do
so, and to endeavour by kindness and conciliation to bring
about friendly relations, gradually leading them to see that
their interests and ours did not conflict. Of late, however,
we have seemed to think that we understood the
interests of the Afghans better than they did them
selves. We appear to think that we can, in
short, force our policy on them without their taking
offence at such conduct. What are we to gain by going to
war with the Ameer? Can we dethrone him without turn
ing the mass of his countrymen against us ? Can we follow
the policy of 1838-39 without, in all probability, incurring
similar results ? If we succeed in driving Shere Ali out of
Cabul, who can we put in his place ? And how are we to in
sure the maintenance of our own creature on the throne,
except by occupying the country ? And when is such an
occupation to terminate, I have no doubt that we can clear
the defiles and valleys of Afghanistan from end to end of
their defenders, and that no force of Afghans could
stand against our troops when properly brought to bear
against them. The country, however, consists of mountain
ranges, for the most part broken up into rugged and diffi
cult plateaux, where brave men standing on the defensive
have considerable advantages; and when we force sxich
positions we cannot continue to hold them. The cost of
invading such a country will prove very great, and the
means for so doing must he drawn from elsewhere. The
country held by the Ameer can afford neither the money
nor the transport, nor even the subsistence in adequate
quantity for the support of the invading army. It is
impossible to" foresee the end of such a war, and in the
meantime its prosecution would utterly ruin the finances of
*lndia. ... -■ ....
(c And noo, ma freens," said the good old Scotch
Minister, at the end of his petition for all sorts and
conditions of men—" And noo, ma freens, let us
pray for the puir Deil . There's naebody prays for
the puir Deil ." Lord Lawrence seems to look
upon the Ameer of Cabul as being in a somewhat
similar position as the puir Deil . And certainly it
is not often that so very near an approach to
unanimity is to be found among us as marks the
general utterance in reference to the uncivil poten
tate. So Lord Lawrence may fairly be admitted
as Advocatus Diaboli, and very ingenious is the
defence he sets up. In the first place, he main
tains, the little difficulty in which we find ourselves
is entirely of our own creating. If we had not
sent any Mission until assured of the Ameer's
willingness to receive it, the Mission not despatched
could not have been turned away.- In the second
place, we had no business to send a Mission at all.
Lord Lawrence has heard it contended that no
nation has a right to isolate itself and refuse in
tercourse with its neighbours. But this, he
thinks, is surely only a penalty of civilisation.
The Ameer of Cabul has chosen the better part
and remained a barbarian, so his right to stand
in the way of the general interests of mankind
remains unimpaired. And, finally, if we do go
to war with this privileged potentate, Lord Law
rence is very clear that we shall, at all events,
gain nothing by it. He has " no doubt but that we
can clear the defiles and valleys of Afghanistan from
1 end to end of their defenders," but the country con
sists of mountain ranges, " where brave men
standing on the defensive have considerable ad
vantages, and when we force such positions we
cannot hold them." The argument in this latter
case is not, perhaps, quite so clear as might be
| wished. To the ordinary mind it would seem as
! though the defensive strength of a position was on
the whole rather an aid than obstacle to holding
: it. But that of course is a detail, and one whiclT
in such an argument may, perhaps, be passed by.
It was no doubt also from momentary forgetful-
ness that, while pleading that we have been from
the first altogether in the wrong and the Ameer of
Cabul altogether in the right, he speaks of Shere
Ali as having " aggravated his offence by the mode
in which he has resisted our overtures, more par-
j ticularly in the threat of his Mir Alshor at Ali
Musjid to shoot Major Cavagnari if he did not
turn back." True, Lord Lawrence thinks we
" should not bear hardly " on the poor Ameer on
this account. But surely, if that potentate's bar
barism is to be accepted as full justification of
his peremptory refusal to have anything to do with
us, it should, & fortiori, sanctify the highly barbaric
manner in which that refusal has been enforced.
The important point, however, of Lord Lawrence's
letter is the practical suggestion he makes as a
substitute for the course proposed. He has no
doubt, he tells us, but that " if we promise to give
up forcing a mission " on Shere Ali , he in return
will make any apology we can "reasonably" call
for. Which, if we are to accept his lordship's con
tention that no apology whatever is " reasonably "
due, is no doubt perfectly correct. The only ques
tion is—with ail possible respect for Lord Law
rence's authority on Indian matters—how many
Englishmen will be found to agree with him on
this head ]