Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎74r] (151/312)

concluded in 1873 waa to secure the peace of Central
Asia. At that date it was supposed to be in danger,
chiefly from the hostile designs of the Afghan
Ameer upon the territory of Bokhara. In his
despatch of January, 1873, Prince Gortschakoff
lays special stress xipon the necessity of England"
using all her influence with Shere Ali " to induce
him to maintain a peaceful attitude, as well as to
insist upon his giving up all measures of aggression
or further conq\:est." The " material and moral
ascendancy" of Great Britain were recognised as
giving her a title to a direct inierference with the
Ameer , with a view to the restraint of his bellicose
enterprises against his neighbours, and Prince
Gorxschakoff declared that in the assurance that
England would exercise this influence lay "a real
guarantee for the maintenance of peace." In
singular contrast with these amiable senti
ments is the language of the Russian organs of
to-day, who openly speak of the necessity of
giving support to the Afghans, and threaten
us with the creation of another Servia on our
Indian frontier. What has happened, we may ask
again, to render null and void the understanding of
1873 1 Are we to understand that Russia means,
in revenge for her disappointments at Berlin, to
revive her old policy of chicane and intrigue in
Afghanistan ? On this point the official disclaimers
are in strange contrast with the offensive language
of the litisski Mir and the Golos —language which
would not have been permitted had those dis
claimers been sincere.
It cannot be long before we have an answer
to the question as to who is our enemy in
Afghanistan. In the meantime, we can afford
to allow the partisans of Russia such gratifi
cation as may consist in witnessing the affront
which has been put upon Great Britain by Shere
Alt . If it be true, as the tone of the Russian
organs seem to indicate, that Russia has made up
her mind to bring to an immediate issue the long
contest for the sovereignty of Asia, we are at
a loss to understand the terms of the official answer
which is reported to have been made to England's
demand for an explanation. The mission of
General Stolieteff , it is said, although decided
upon at a time and under circumstances which no
longer exist, was only intended as an act of cour
tesy to the Ameer of Afghanistan . Such an
explanation betrays its insincerity in its ludicrous
self-contradictions. If the sending of the mission
to Cabul was a measure inspired by the time and
circumstances—in other words, by the fear of a
rupture between England and Russia on the
Turkish question—it was no mere act of courtesy
to the Ameer . If a simple act of courtesy had
been intended, then there was no necessity for
quoting the time and circumstances in its justifica
tion. The confession that Russia is disposed to be
courteous to the Afghans only when she is troubled
by England in Europe is a piece of naivete for
which we could scarcely have given credit to
Russian diplomacy, but it is one which England
will not fail to note as giving the clue to Russian
policy in Central Asia. After this explanation of
the motives which induce Russia to send
her envoys into Afghanistan, we can hardly
want any excuse for resenting the rejection of
our Ambassador, and for regarding it as a deli
berate affront, intended to cover a hostile
design. The exchange of courtesies between
Russia and Afghanistan is, by the Russians them
selves, allowed to be a political act, and as such is
clearly a violation of the existing engagement
between the two Powers. It is unnecessary to
establish any direct connection between the visit of
General Stolieteff to Cabul and the turning back
of General Chamberlain at Ali Musjid. It is
sufficient to know that an act of something less
than courtesy towards us on the part of the Ameer
of Afghanistan has followed upon the courtesies
extended to him by Russia. At any time and in
any circumstances it would be imperative upon
us to take notice of the insult and to punish the
audacity of its perpetrators ; but the presence of a
Russian agent in Cabul renders it doubly incumbent
upon us, for the sake of our own honour and for the
interests of our dominion in India, that we should
lose no time in exacting a swift and stem
reparation.
Li r ^
- SOIirARY OF NEWS.
We learn from Bombay that, according to the
latest news received there from Simla, an oppor
tunity for making amends has been afforded to the
Ameer. Our Correspondent adds that, in any case,
the Government will insist on "a permanent posi
tion being assigned to our troops behind
Candahar. The Russian newspapers are still full
of articles on this topic. The Musski Mir advocates
a support of the Ameer on the ground that everv
success of Russian policy in Asia wOtild bq aT;
ostensible defeat of Great Britain. The Exchange
News considers war unavoidable. . '
OPINIONS OF THE MORNING
PAPERS.
THE INDIAN CRISIS.
It cannot be long, observes the Standard, before we have
an answer to the question as to who is our enemy in Afghan
istan. In the meantime, we can afford to allow the par
tisans of Russia such gratification as may consist in wit
nessing the affront which has been put upon Great
Britain by Shere Ali. If it be true, as the tone of
the Russian organs seem to indicate, that Russia has
made up her mind to bring to an immediate issue
the long contest for the sovereignty of Asia, we are at
a loss to understand the terms of the ofhcial answer
which is reported to have been made to England's
demand for an explanation. The mission of General Stolie
teff, it is said, although decided upon at a time and under
circumstances which no longer exist, was only intended as
an act of courtesy to the Ameer of Afghanistan. Such an
explanation betrays its insincerity in its ludicrous self-con
tradictions. If the sending of the mission to Cabul was a
measure inspired by the time and circumstances—in other
words, by the fear of a rupture between England and Russia
on the Turkish question — it was no mere act of
courtesy to the Ameer. If a simple act of courtesy
had been intended, then there was no necessity for
quoting the time and circumstances in its justifica
tion. The confession that Russia is. disposed to be
, courteous^ to the Afghans only when she is troubled by
England in Europe is a piece of naivete for which we could
scarcely have given credit to Russian diplomacy, but it is
one which England will not fail to note as giving the clue
1 to Russian policy in Central Asia. After this explanation
of the motives which induce Russia to send her envoys
into Afghanistan, we can hardlj want any excuse for
resenting the rejection of our Ambassador, and for regard
ing it as a deliberate affront, intended to cover a hostile
design. _The exchange of courtesies between Russia
and Afghanistan is, by the Russians themselves,
allowed to 4?e a political act, and as such is
clearly a violation of the existing engagement
between the two Rowers, It is unnecessary to establish any
direct connection between the visit of General Stolieteff to
Cabul and the turning back of General Chamberlain at Ali
Musjid. It is sufficient to know that an act of something
less than courtesy towards us on the part of the Ameer of
Afghanistan has followed upon the courtesies extended to
him by Russia. At any time and in any circumstances it
would be imperative upon us to take notice of the insult
and to punish the audacity of its perpetrators; but the
presence of a Russian agent in Cabul renders it doubly in
cumbent upon us, for the sake of our own honour and for
the interests of our dominion in India, that we should lose
no time in exacting a swift and stern reparation.
The Times says If hostilities are determined upon, it
will be the statutable duty of the Government under the
Act of 1858 formally to communicate the fact to Parlia
ment ; so that if Parliament meets at the usual time, : the
policy of the Government will have to be submitted tci the
judgment of both Houses very early in next year. It will
then be for Parliament to determine what course shoul'd
ba taken to meet the cost of the war, if war is un
happily forced on us. In such a case the course pursued
in< Regard to the Persian war in ,1857 will doubtless be
held Jafurnish an important precedent. Lord Palmerston's
Government asked the House to reimburse the Indian
Treasury for a portion of the extraordinary expenses
of that war. They had given the East India Company a
conditional promise of assistance, dependent for its com
pletion, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer was careful to
explain, on the assent of the House. The arrangement
made and ultimately sanctioned by Parliament was that
the ordinary expenses of the troops should be defrayed by
the Company, but that her Majesty's GovernmentTshould
defray a moietj' of the extraordinary expenses. It is true
that the vote was justified by the Government on the
special ground that the finances of Indiahad been grievously
disturbed in consequence of the Mutiny; but, if India
was poor then, it is no richer now, and tho fact remains
that England undertook her share of the expenses of a
war in which England was interested on behalf of India.
If again we are forced into a war on behalf of India, it is
probable that Parliament will feel, now as then, that
India's interest is England's too, and that we have no
right to shrink from a necessary war because India is too
poor to bear the expense. It is well to keep out of war if
we can, and if we fight to fight only in a just and honour
able cause ; but if we once let it go forth to the world that
we shrink from a necessary war because India is too poor
and England too niggardly or too indifferent to pay for it,
we shall soon find that such ill-timed economy is ruinous as
well as disgraceful.