Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎75r] (153/312)

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PROBABILITIES OF THE AFGHAN DILEMMA.
T he counsels of the Government being still confused and uncertain,
it follows that their newspapers have nothing to offer us but a
vague sort of rhodomontade, intended to have no particular
meaning. It may be useful, therefore, to attempt to find our [
way to present facts and impending probabilities.
There appears little reason to doubt now that the Government
have really made up their minds to " await the possibility of a
favourable outcome of events, adopting an attitude of armed
expectation." The truth seems to be that, on suggestions or
instructions from home, the question whether the Ameer should
be attacked immediately, or whether hostilities should be post
poned to the spring, was left for the decision of the military autho
rities. These authorities would of course decide the question
upon purely military considerations. And if they have come to a
decision, it must be a decision of this character, pure and simple.
The assumption in that case must be that after months of pre
paration the army is not sufficiently prepared to strike at once ;
and that, considering the doubtful temper of the hill tribes and
what is called the lateness of the year, it is better to run the risk of
giving Shere Ali leisure for his preparations than to take action
till next spring.
This is all very well as far as it goes ; but it is impossible to
leave political considerations out of the question without running i
other risks of very grave character. What is likely to be the
effect in India and elsewhere of the admission that, after months
of preparation for a blow that was actually expected, this proud
Government is unable to strike in return till some time next year ?
It is said, on authority, that the fine weather does not break
up till December. If so, then our soldiery had two fair months '
before them after the challenge had been delivered with studied
insult. And that being the case, all India and the East is at
liberty to contrast the hesitation of English generals with the daring
and resolution of their Russian rivals in those parts : the one
sticking on the frontier with eight weeks of good weather before
them, the other capable of carrying out such enterprises as
Gourko's over the dreaded Balkans in midwinter, and through
many feet of snow. How are such comparisons likely to act upon
the Indian, upon the whole Eastern mind ? Is it likely that they
will have no political consequences ?
Further, we are compelled to ask whether our military autho
rities, when they came to the decision ascribed to them, confined
their calculation of hostile forces to Afghanistan ?—whether they
omitted all chance of unofficial Russian or Russo-Persian assist
ance to the Afghans as belonging to the region of politics ?
Because, if so, it is extremely probable that their calculations
will be found incomplete. Six months is a long time; and
already there is good reason to believe that under certain
circumstances, presently to be indicated, that period will be so
employed as not only to place arms, money, and European
military counsel and leadership at the command of the Ameer, 1
but some hundred thousand Turcomans or so into the bargain;
not to mention the " hill tribes" whose enmity is allowed to
be of very considerable importance taken alone. It is known
that preparations are already in progress tending to this state of
things, and as time goes on we shall probably find ourselves
openly threatened with it. And why? Because the aspirations
of Russia have yet to be satisfied in other quarters.
We shall, perhaps, best describe the situation by anticipating
what it will be quite in the power of the Russian diplomatist to
say to our Government a month hence, if not immediately ; and
what, if we are not mistaken, he will say: in courteojus but
sufficiently plain language. He will say, in effect: "You have
to choose between a really very awkward war on your Indian
frontier, and certain concessions demanded by the voice of
humanity and the wishes of the Czar in European Turkey. You
can see, you do see, that your difficulty with Afghanistan
is a matter very much out of your control, and very much in
other people's. The conditions of warfare are changed with a
change of weapons; this we found out at Plevna ; and this you
will find out, perhaps, in Afghanistan. Commerce has reached the
cities of Afghanistan, and will place plenty of arms of precision
there—we ourselves have more than we know what to do with:
and, moreover, there are Bakers ot otner nations besides the
English. In the next place, you may find yourselves opposed by
hordes of Turcomans, who throw their lives away very freely. Do
not suppose that we could hold them back; or, if you fancy we
could do so, ask yourselves why, under certain circumstances,
we should restrain them voluntarily. Further, we have our
own Central Asian conquests to secure; and if your troops
march to one city and occupy it, we may find ourselves
obliged, for our own safety, to advance and occupy others,
vhich I need not name. Altogether, then, you see it will be
absolutely necessary for you, unless we are contented (let us
put it in that way if you like), to employ a very large and very