Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎73v] (150/312)

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LONDON, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 2.
We learn from Bomtay that, according to the
latest news received there from Simla, an oppor
tunity for making amends has been afforded to the
A mebe . Onr Correspondent adds that, in any case,
the Government will insist on a permanent posi
tion being assigned to our troops behind
^ Candahar. The Russian newspapers are still full
; of articles on this topic. The Hun ski Mir advocates
a support of the A meer on the ground that every
; success of Russian policy in Asia would be an
ostensible defeat of Great Britain. The Exchange
News considers war unavoidable. The Golos, how
ever, thinks that England would not go beyond
her present preparations if the A meer explained
| that what took place was done with a misunder-
1 standing. *
OPINIONS OP THE RUSSIAN
PRESS.
(B y S ubmarine T elegraph.)
(from our own correspondent.)
BOMBAY, tuesdat,
The latest news that has been received here from
Simla states that an opportunity has been afforded
to the Ameer of Afghanistan to make amends for
the affront he offered to the British Envoys.
In any event the Government will insist on our
troops being cantoned in a permanent position
behind Candahar.
(B y G reat N orthern T elegraph.)
(from our own correspondent.)
ST. PETERSEUEG, TUESDAY.
The Eusski Mir, of September 30, says :—
" The critical position of Great Britain in
Central Asia should serve as a guide to us. Our
procedure in the Asiatic question should consist in
supporting the Afghan Ameer against England.
Every decisive success of our policy in Central
Asia will be an ostensible defeat of Great Britain,
Unfortunately, we do not know where our strength
lies. Were England in our place, doubtless
the very existence of our Indian Empire
would be impossible, but the English never
hesitate, as we do, before imaginary difficulties,
but perseveringly pursue the object they desire to
attain."
The Exchange News of to-day considers that war
is unavoidable. f£ In the eyes of Englishmen," it
says, " Shere Ali is simply the victim of Russian
intrigue ; his chief offence lies, not in declining to
see the British Ambassador, but in receiving the
Russian Embassy, the repulse of the British Envoys
being ascribed to Russian influence. If the Ameer is
simply a tool in the hands of Russia one would
think that England would in such a case prepare
for attacking Cronstadt and Odessa instead of
Candahar and Cabul,"
The Golos of to-day considers that England
earnestly desires to avoid war with Afghanistan,
and that all the warlike preparations she has made
would remain but preparations if the Ameer
explained that his refusal to receive the British
ambassador was merely in fact a grievous misunder
standing, or if without any explanations he succeeded
in ridding himself of the Russian Mission in Cabul.
The Emir is not so isolated as England supposes.
This time he has not acted precipitately, but has
calculated the consequences of his refusal; his
position is better than it was in the former Afghan
war. The feeling that exists gjnong the semi-
dependent Indian tribes, the probability of
Persia s friendly neutrality, the relations of
the Ameer to the Sultan, who fears his
conversion into an Indian Maharajah, and
lastly the assurance that in case of war he has
nothing to fear from Russia, and can therefore
leave the western and northern frontiers of
Afghanistan undefended, will greatly increase the
military chances of the Ameer in his combat with
his enemy.
That England, holding that the insolence of the
Ameer of A fghanistan is not unconnected with the
presence of a Russian Envoy at the Court of Cabul,
should seek for an explanation of the character
and objects of General S touetefp's mission, is a
perfectly natural proceeding, which should surprise
nobody, least of all those partisans of Russia
who have been pleased at the slap in the face "
which England has received from S here A li . We
cannot too early take measures to prove who is
our real enemy in this Afghan business, with whom
we have to deal, who it is that has given us this
sonfflet, whom we are making ready to punish.
Is it against Afghanistan that we are setting our
troops in motion, or is there any Power behind ?
I Even if we were not justified by the courtesy of
| nations and by all the axioms of diplomatic etiquette
in asking such a question of Russia, we have a special
right to do so under the express conventions which
exist between the two countries. The relations
between England and Russia in regard to
Afghanistan are such as do not exist between
any other two Powers regarding any other territory
in Europe or in Asia. Even in the absence of i
any understanding defining those relations it is
impossible that s uch a step as that which the Ameer
of A fghanistan "has taken in putting this open,
and wanton affront upon the British Government
can pass without bringing England into some kind
of conflict with Russia. The very explanations and
: excuses of the Russian Press, in their mixture of
| 'naivete with effrontery, are sufficient to prove, what,
I indeed, all Europe already understands, that in the
act of the Afghan ruler the agents of Russia are
more or less directly implicated. To contend that
Russia has a right to send her Ambassadors to
any country she pleases is as superfluous as to
; argue that this mission to Afghanistan is one oi
pure courtesy is impertinent. The picture which
has been drawn of a noble Asiatic Chief particularly
opposing himself to the insidious designs of a
treacherous and rapacious Power is a romance
which can hardly impose upon any one out of
Russia. The case is a very simple one, our
judgment upon which is to be guided by no senti
mental considerations of the good which Russia
or the evil which England may intend for
j Afghanistan, but by reference to the engagements
mutually binding those two Powers in their
dealings with that State. It is barely six years
since the long series of negotiations between Russia
and England on the subject of their relations in
Central Asia was concluded, with what we have
hitherto been led to believe were certain specific
engagements, mutually entered into by the Govern
ments of those countries. On the part of Russia a
pledge was given—not less precise or solemn than
any of those numerous assurances which have been
received from that quarter—that Afghanistan
should be regarded as outside the sphere of
Russian influence. On the part of England
there was an undertaking, interpreted by Mr.
G ladstone , in 1873, as a "moral assurance,"
that the British Government would so far make
itself responsible for the conduct of S here A li as
to answer for his not disturbing the peace of
Russia's neighbours and feudatories in Central
Asia.
There can be no pretext for saying that we have
departed from either the letter or the spirit of our
! engagement. We have, it is true, refused to main
tain a British Envoy at the Court of S here
, A li , but if by this omission we deprived
ourselves of the means of executing the duty
with which we were enirnsted, we gave by it
at least a proof of our singular disinterestedness
and scrupulousness. Had the British Government
been actuated by the insidious and rapacious designs
with which it pleases the Russian Press at present to
endow them, they would not have waited till now
| to send an Embassy to Cabul. They not only had
a perfect right to do so, but might even be thought
specially bound to do so by their engagement
with Russia. Herein lies the material distinction
between the two Powers. England, whose
dominion immediately borders that of the Afghan
ruler, had distinctly made herself responsible to
Russia for his good conduct, and, therefore, might
legitimately keep an agent in Cabul. Russia,
whose dominion at no point touches that of the
A meer , had as distinctly pledged herself to regard
Afghanistan as outside the area of her political
influence. Nothing has happened, since Prince
G ortschaeoff gave his pledge to Lord C larendon
in 1869, to alter the relations between the two
Powers in Afghanistan. The object of the under
standing between the two Governments which was