Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎33r] (66/312)

IjL^n^y /
THURSDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 26.
fLjit
'r:
If
The JVord, continuing its observations upon what
it regards as tbe unnecessarily large military escort which
accompanied General Sir Neville Chamberlain, says that
the ostensible and avowed object of his mission was, as is
well known, the establishment of regular and permanent
relations with Afghanistan ; it was essentially, according to
official declarations made both at London and Calcutta, a
mission of peace and friendship. It would appear strange
that if a person cfffering his friendship to another should
do so armed to the teeth, unless, indeed, it were with the
object of applying the well-known saying, "Be my friend,
or I will kill you." But neither between States nor
between individuals is such an application in the natural
order of things; and it must be hoped that the Government
of British India will know how to act otherwise in order to
convince Shere Ali of the usefulness of its friendship, and
to cause it to be accepted.
The pombay Gazette, received to-day, says that
at the close of the diplomatic negotiations of 1873, the main
object of which was to fix the northern boundary of
Afghanistan and thus, set a limit to the Russian advance,
it cannot be forgotten that after Prince Gortschakoff had
volunteered a declaration that Russia considered Afghanis^
tan beyond her own sphere of action, but would hold Eng
land responsible for keeping the Ameer in order and pre
venting Afghan raids across the Oxus, Mr, Gladstone
got up in the House of Commons and said England
would undertake no responsibility for the actions of the
Ameer; and so the proposed bargain fell through, leaving
Russia at liberty to take her own way in Central Asia.
Last year, again, there were futile negotiations, in the
course of which the Ameer asked for. what Sir N. Chamber
lain must now be empowered to offer him, a guarantee of
the integrity of his dominions against Russia, coupled with
a large subsidy. The grant of such terms will, of course,
be now made conditional on the occupation by British troops
of certain strategical points in Afghan territory; but the
negotiations should be carried on in a perfectly friendly
manner with the Ameer if he be inclined to listen to
reason, and, should he prove recalcitrant, English troops
should at once occupy his country, without: setting up any
pretender. A word o? caution seems to be necessary re
garding the escort which is going up with Sir N. Chamber
lain, and which is not strong enough to defend itself
against attack. The Ameer has always said that he could
not guarantee the safety of any English Resident sent to
his Court; and it appears a mistake to give Sir Neville an
escort of cavalry alone, when the addition of a couple
of horse artillery guns would free it from the risk of
being assailed and overwhelmed by a savage and treacherous 1
j euem y* ;
j JPlie Times of Indict contains the following V-—
j/ve hear from Simla that the latest advices from Cabul,
[ dated August 21st, state that the Ameer, after much per-
i suasion from the Mustaphi, attended durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). again for the
i first time. All kinds of rumours are current, as appears
1 from the following Simla telegram—" Reports are becoming
more positive that Yakoob Khan has escaped to Ghuznee,
where there is said to be some disturbance or rising.
Russian movements in that direction appear to be unknown.
Rumour says we shall force on the Mission whether the
Ameer consents or not. Quiet preparations are be
ing made to this end, and it is understood that
we may move on Herat," With a view to eventualitie?,
a contemporary makes the following suggestions :—" To
secure a position which would really dominate Cabul, a
force should be moved into the valley of the Kuram River
without loss of time. The military advantage of an occu
pation of this po~t is notorious to all acquainted with the j
topography of the frontier. The valley is extensive,- j
fertile, highly cidtivated, and capable of supplying a |
large force. It is inhabited principally by the Turj |
tribe of the Shiah sect, who are extremely well disposed
towards the British, hating their Suni rulers at Cabul.
A station constructed within five or six marches only of our
nrfi*ent fitmtier wouM he within eight or nine marches
of Cabul itse'f, with a good road leading to the capital over
the Shah Gurdun Pass, easy of approach from the Kuram
side, but somewhat long and difficult on the Afghan side.
Our own village of Thul would form a good post in connec
tion with the advance to Kuram, being about 50 miles
m rear, and Kohat would form a convenient base about
60 miles behind Thul, We should like to see this
position occupied before the Mission to Cabul sets
out. Its possession would form a very effectual ' ma
terial guarantee' for the honourable reception of the
British Envoy by the Ameer, and would (without
any hostile demonstration whatever, for the Turis
and Bangush, another tribe in the valley, would rejoice in
our advance) serve to convince the Afghans that civility to
us is their best policy. This important point in our hands, |
the Mission, with an escort considerably larger than that I
already named, might advance by the Khyber secure in the
good will of the Pass Afridis, who are far more ill-disposed
towards the Ameer than towards ourselves, and secure also
in the far mote important matter of the respect ever
accorded to visible and tangible strength and resolution.
This is the method by which only England can now exert
her influence in Afghanistan and the States of Central
Asia."
r
If S here A li and his Russian friends imagined
that the " great insult done the Q ueen " would be
an unexpected blow likely to plunge the British
Government into a state of consternation and
alarm, by this time they are undeceived. Antici
pating with wise foresight such a termination to
the Mission, the V iceroy has made tc quiet pro-:
parations, which are likely to cease their quietude
and make a noise in the world ere many days.
| For it is extremely satisfactory to learn that the
Cabinet distinctly recognises the absolute neces
sity for immediate action. It is not considered
advisable ^to wait for a year or two and see
whether bhere A li may not be disposed to
j say that he regrets the unfortunate little accident,
j and that a mistake was made by subordinate
; officials. Neither will Englishmen—except, per- ,
, haps, Mr. J enkins , the member for Dundee, and i
i his friends be satisfied with the assurances of
Prince G ortsohakoee's organ, the Nord, to the
efTect that in the understanding between Russia and
Afghanistan " there is nothing to cause disquietude
on the part of England ; nothing that can create.a'
misunderstanding between the two Powers." We
prefer trusting to the opinion of such men as the
late Commissioner of Police of Bombay, whose
experiences in that capacity during the Mutiny give
special value to his views. " Speaking with an
intimate knowledge of native feeling, I say," he
| writes, "that any procrastination in meeting the
insult we have received in the Khyber Pass will be
fatal to us in India, We may put off entering
Cabul until the spring, but should at once advance
I on and seize the Khyber Pass and Candahar. To
1 procrastinate till the spring would give Russia time
to secretly supply the A meer with mitrailleuses,
&c., by means of which 100 men could keep
! 100,000 from entering the Khyber. Now, 5000
1 men might overrun and occupy Afghanistan. The
conquest of that country would give absolute
finality to our territorial development in Asia, and
secure India from all alarms for ever." "A Retired
Field Officer," whose knowledge of India is
considerable, joins heartily in the same advice.
"If we are to wait till next spring before
taking notice of the A meer's insult, the delay will
be very prejudicial to our prestige, and the A meer
might by that time have received considerable help
from Russia." It is, of course, by no means certain
that this considerable help has not already been
given, and the insolent tone of the Russian., jour-
aals mm to show & vei'j strong coavi ctm o n thvu:.
part that their triumph is a substantial one. Pro
bably, however, in this matter they have done
injustice to the wisdom of Lord L vtion's calcula-
j t:oiis. He, it is to be hoped and presumed, when
j counting his enemies, has left a Ifljeral balance for
the " moral support "—including troops, arms,
and ammunition—of the A meer's Russian friends,
and has not committed what was once before the
terribly fatal mistake of under-estimating his
adversary's strength.
So much has been proved about the excellence
of the rocket as a weapon of ofence, that it is to
be sincerely hoped tbe expeditionary forces to
Afghanistan will be well supplied with this most
effective missile. During the Ashantee war the
rocket was proved not only to have a most destruc
tive, but at the same time a most demoralising, i ;
effect on tbe warriors of King C offee . When
well started, in many cases the missile takes
a most peculiar serpentine coarse, and, bending
about, maims and injures to the right and left
of it for a considerable distnnce. The rocket
also, agamst a light stockade, such as the
Afghans would be very likely to make use of, is
more destructive and effective than any field shell
or shot invented, for on meeting with steady re
sistance it still keeps on pounding away until the
whole charge is burnt out. On the Gold Coast this
last instance of its efficacy was frequently ob-
arorqfY -v w'H t -—-r—— !
J 0 sao;ji3nb Jd^um oqij joj s;uq auoj oq. joqwiq 1
'soxzoiTiaiRi Auvxnm axr 7 t
•somojoo ifBiuudgj 01^ jo jfyta
ottf o* pij^anq os eat? qoxqAV 'oouo^sixa in avou
pjfcfuaaapip pin? 01^ ^strrege 'inre' 'sjjt.i
Su^sa^oad ^[pno[ eat? seAiGsiuai^ sm?q
uaqM puv 'ajttstieui apisaSoa'joj qous ^ Cwj jo .
-sod ax^ apupxa suopiau eAja^ eoaeiui
sa^tjaj^ aq; uaqM. de^s efe'irea^s b ' bi siqj, •
rmuajamu vxiv g^n joj lumo Trrm m smnirn«k
fjut/KMy f
ftjjr:
The Nord, continuing its observations upon what
it regards as the unnecessarily large military escort which
accompanied General Sir Neville Chamberlain, says that
the ostensible and avowed object of his mission was, as is
well known, the establishment of regular and permanent
relations with Afghanistan ; it was essentially, according to
official declarations made both at London and Calcutta, a
mission of peace and friendship. It would appear strange
that if a person cfflfering his friendship to another should
do so armed to the teeth, unless, indeed, it were with the
object of applying the well-known saying, "Be my friend,
or I will kill you." But neither between States nor
between individuals is such an application in the natural
order of things; and it must be hoped that the Government
of British India will know how to act otherwise in order to
convince Shere Ali of the usefulness of its friendship, and
to cause it to be accepted.
The Bombay Gazette, received to-day, says that
at the close of the diplomatic negotiations of 1873, the main
object of which was to fix the northern boundary of
Afghanistan and thus, set a limit to the Eussian advance,
it cannot be forgotten that after Prince Gortschakoff had
volunteered a declaration that Russia considered Afghanis^
tan beyond her own sphere of action, but would hold Eng
land responsible for keeping the Ameer in order and pre
venting Afghan raids across the Oxus, Mr, Gladstone
got up in the House of Commons and said England
would undertake no responsibility for the actions of the
Ameer; and so the proposed bargain fell through, leaving
Bussia at liberty to take her own way in Central Asia.
Last year, again, there were futile negotiations, in the
course of which the Ameer asked for . what Sir N, Chamber
lain must now be empowered to offer him, a guarantee of
the integrity of his dominions against Bussia, coupled with
a large subsidy. The grant of such terms will, of course,
i be now made conditional on the occupation by British troops
of certain strategical points in Afghan territory ; but the
negotiations should be carried on in a perfectly friendly
manner with the Ameer if he be inclined to listen to
reason, and, should ho prove recalcitrant, English troops
should at once occupy his country, withoi^t setting up any
pretender, A word of caution seems to be necessary re
garding the escort which is going up with Sir N, Chamber
lain, and which is not strong enough to defend itself
against attack. The Ameer has always said that he could
not guarantee the safety of any English Besident sent to
his Court; and it appears a mistake to give Sir Neville an
escort of cavalry alone, when the addition of a couple
of horse artillery guns would free it from the risk of i
being assailed and overwhelmed by a savage and treacherous !
j enemy, |
j JP'ie Times of India concains the following T—
\Ae hear from Simla that the latest advices from Cabul,
[ dated August 21st, state that the Ameer, after much per
suasion from the Mustaphi, attended, durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). again for the
1 first time, All kinds of rumours are current, as .appears
< from the following Simla telegram—"Beports are becoming
more positive that Yakoob Khan has escaped to Ghuznee,
where there is said to be some disturbance or rising.
Bussian movements in that direction appear to be unknown.
Bumour says we shall force on the Mission whether the
Ameer consents or not. Quiet preparations are be
ing made to this end, and it is understood that
we may move on Herat." "With a view to eventualities,
a contemporary makes the following suggestions :—" To
secure a position which would really dominate Cabul, a
force should be moved into the valley of the Kuram Biver
without loss of time. The military advantage of an occu
pation of this po't is notorious to all acquainted with the
topography of the frontier. The valley is extensive,-
fertile, highly cultivated, and capable of supplying a
large force. It is inhabited principally by the Tuij
tribe of the Shiah sect, who are extremely well disposed
towards the British, bating their Suni rulers at Cabul.
A station constructed within five or six marches only of our
vn-Ment fittntier wwuid he withia ei^ht or ttiae marchea
oi Oabul itse f, with a good road leading to the capital over
the Shah Gurdun Pass, easy of approach from the Kuram
side, but somewhat long and difficult on the Afghan side.
Our own village of Thul would form a good post in connec
tion with the advance to Kuram, being about 50 miles
m rear, and Kohat would form a convenient base about
60 miles behind Thul. We should like to see this
position occupied before the JVlission to Cabul sets
out. Its possession would form a very effectual ' ma-
terial guarantee' for the honourable reception ot the
Biitish Envoy by the Ameer, and would (without
any hostile demonstration whatever, for the Turis
and Bangush, another tribe in the valley, would rejoice in
our advance) serve to convince the Afghans that civility to
us is their best policy. This important point in our hands,
he Mission, with an esco.t considerably larger than that
already named, might advance by the Khyber secure in the
good will of the Pass Afridis, who are far more ill-disposed
towards the Ameer than towards ourselves, and secure also
iu the far more important matter of the respect ever
accorded to visible and tangible strength and resolution,
his is the method by which only England can now exert
er influence in Afghanistan and the States of Central
Asia."
I
THURSDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER 26.
If S here A li and his Russian friends imagined
that the £< great insult done the Q xjeeit " would be
an unexpected blow likely to plunge the British
Government into a state of consternation and
alarm, by this time they are undeceived. Antici
pating with wise foresight such a termination to
the Mission, the V iceroy has made u quiet pre-:
paiations, which are likely to cease their quietude
and make a noise in the world ere many days.
For it is extremely satisfactory to learn that the
Cabinet distinctly recognises the absolute neces
sity for immediate action. It is not considered
advisable ^to wait for a year or two and see
whether S here A li may not be disposed to
, say that he regrets the unfortunate little accident,
j and that a mistake was made by subordinate
I officials. Neither will Englishmen—except, per-
j haps, Mr. J enkins , the member for Dundee, and
j his friends be satisfied with the assurances of
Prince G ortschakoff's organ, the JVord, to the
effect that in the understanding between Russia and
Afghanistan " there is nothing to cause disquietude
on the part of England ; nothing that can create.a'
misunderstanding between the two Powers." We
prefer trusting to the opinion of such men as the
late Commissioner of Police of Bombay, whoso
experiences in that capacity during the Mutiny give
special value to his views. " Speaking with an
intimate knowledge of native feeling, I say," he
i writes, 1 ' that any procrastination in meeting the
insult we have received in the Khyber Pass will be
fatal to us in India. We may put off entering
1: Cabnl until the spring, but should at once advance 1
on and seize the Khyber Pass and Candahar. To :
procrastinate till the spring would give Russia time
to secretly supply the A meer with mitrailleuses,
&c., by means of which 100 men could keep
100,000 from entering the Khyber. Now, 5000
men might overrun and occupy Afghanistan. The
conquest of that country would give absolute
finality to our territorial development in Asia, and
secure India from all alarms for ever." "A Retired
Eield Officer," whose knowledge of India is
considerable, joins heartily in the same advice.
"If we are to wait till next spring before
taking notice of the A meer's insult, the delay will
be very prejudicial to our prestige, and the A meer
might by that time have received considerable help
from Russia, ' It is, of course, by no means certain
that this considerable help has not already been
given, and the insolent tone of the Russian., jour
nals trtViup to show Si vei'y strong conYic tion q k ^9% .
part that their triumph is a substantial one. Pro
bably, however, in this matter they have done
injustice to the wisdom of Lord L vtion's calcula
tions. He, it is to be hoped nnd jpresumed, when
counting his enemies, has left a liberal balance for
the " moral support "—including troops, arms,
and ammunition—of the A meer's Russian friends,
and has not committed what was once before the
terribly fatal mistake of under-estimating his
adversary's strength.
So much has been proved about the excellence
of the rocket as a weapon of offence, that it is to
be sincerely hoped the expeditionary forces to ^
Afghanistan will be well supplied with this most
effective missile. During the Ashantee war the
j rocket was proved not only to have a most destruc- ■
| tive, but at the same time a most demoralising,
; effect on the warriors of King C offee . When
| well started, in many cases the missile takes
j a most peculiar serpentine coarse, and, bending
t about, maims and injures to the right and left
of it for a considerable distance. The rocket
also, against a light stockade, such as the
Afghans would be very likely to make use of, is
more destructive and effective than any field shell
or shot invented, for on meeting with steady re- i
sistance it still keeps on pounding away until the
whole charge is burnt out. On the Gold Coast this
last instance of its efficacy was frequently ob
servable during the attacks and bombardments of
the native villages. When the rockets first fired
struck the well-constructed buildings or stockades,
as no harm seemed to be done, for the moment a
feeling of disappointment was felt by every one
engaged in action ; but in the course of a few
seconds it was discovered that the rockets which
at the first blow failed to destroy the resistance offered
to them, yet by their perpetual pounding movement
did in the end more real work than a good battery of
light artillery. Again by this "pounding," the
rocket in the Afghan passes could not fail to be
most successful, if only directed against the rocks
in the near neighbourhood of the mountaineers.
On meeting with sharp-pointed surfaces it would
strike and turn right and left, ascend and descend,
and cause general consternation all round. Above
all, too, be it remembered as the " passes " cannot
fail to cause great difficulty in transit of any sort,
we should bear in mind that the rocket requires no
gun nor mortar to start it, but is fired from a
lightly constructed frame, of very little Weight and
occupying but little compass.