Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎32v] (65/312)

ing language. Each letter breathes a pre-eminently
conciliatory spirit, and Shkrk Ali to the last has
been treated as an independent and . reputedly
friendly Prince. The studious moderation exhibited
throughout the crisis redounds greatly to the
credit of our Government, and stifles the adverse
criticism raised in some quarters, to the effect
that Lord L ytton was striving to precipitate a
rupture ■with Russia. To every reasonable man
it was, and is, evident that it would be impossible
to preserve our position in India i| we permitted
Russia to settle down as the presiding genius among
the Afghan people ; and the despatch of the mission
of Genen# A bramov was the first step towards
effecting that object; its reception an^ continued
residen ce in t he capital the first tokens t hat i t might
be successful, let our diplomatic equammity was
unruffled, and we still observed the same friendly
attitude we had ever maintained towards the
A meer . The hostile action of the Commandant of
Ali Musjid has been promptly answered by the
military preparations which are being made
throughout North-west India. Troops are being
drawn together at the frontier in all directions. One
column is being concentrated at Mooltan for a
forward movement through Scinde. This will be
composed of eight thousand men, of whom more than
half will be English troops. Another force drawn
from Peshawur and Attock is advancing through
the Kohat Pass and from the Indus, to secure com
munication between Peshawur and Kohat, and,
having effected this, is to advance on Thull, which
commands the eastern entrance of the Khurum Pass.
Six thousand men will be concentrated at Thull within
the next week, and by this corps the Khyber Pass can
be out-flanked if necessary. The occupation of the
valley of Khurum, which is of great strategical
importance as being parallel to the Khyber, and as
dominating the Afghan district of Khost, has often
been advocated during our border troubles, and
now, in view of a more serious danger, is about to
be carried out. A third, and the largest, column is
being formed at Peshawur, and the nucleus for
this will be the present garrison and the
regiments intended to comprise the camp of exer
cise which was to be held at Hassan Abdal.
This column will probably number fifteen thousand
men. The movements of the second and third
columns will at first be restricted to securing the
Khurum and Khyber Passes, which will be done by
our troops holding the entrances, and by arrange
ments with the Khyber Malliks, who will be freely
subsidised. But the work before the first column
is more arduous, and with its movements the
interest of the early stages of our military
preparations will consequently be more closely
bound up.
The troops which are assembling at Mooltan can
be rapidly conveyed by the Indus Valley Railway
to either Sukhur or Lafkhana, whence it is an easy
march to our frontier post at Jacobabad. From
Jacobabad to Dadar there is a good road, and at
both of these places there is, or was recently, a con
siderable number of troops. Beyond Dadar the
Bholan Pass begins, and at the western
extremity of it lies Quettah, the garrison of
which was lately augmented by Jacob's rifles.
From Jacobabad to Quettah the distance is
one hundred and eighty miles, of which the
Bholan Pass occupies seventy. In 1839 five days
were occupied in traversing the Bholan alone ; but
since then many of its difficulties have been
smoothed down. The column now concentrating
at Mooltan, when joined to the garrisons of
Jacobabad, Dadar, and Quettah, should give an
available fighting force of ten thousand men, and
with that army the whole of Southern Afghanistan
might be subdued before the cold weather sets in
in December. With great rapidity this force
might be at Quettah on the 16th of October,
and Candahar, which is one hundred and
fifty miles to the north, could be occupied
before the 10th of November. But, so far as the
military arrangements go at present, it is intended
to pause when the passes west of Peshawur and
Kohat have been secured, and when the small
garrison of Quettah has been raised to the dimen
sions of an army. Our columns will then halt to
observe the effect, and our future action will
be* guided entirely by the events that may
take place within Cabul itself. It is probable
that insurrections will break out among the
ever-discontented Afghans, who, although to
some extent overawed by S here A li's successful
campaigns in 1868-69, have not so far acquiesced in
his rule—rendered unpopular, too, by the institution
of various reforms in their national customs after
I the Umbala Durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). , when his affection for us was
in its first glow—as to make, it certain that it will
not be challenged from within as soon as danger
shows itself from without. And it will be by the
course of events within Cabul that our subsequent
military action will be regulated. We concentrate our
columns on various points of the frontier, and by
seizing the passes we make sure of an entrance
into Afghanistan when the moment comes for such
a step, and we await in that expectant attitude
the further development of events. If those
demonstrations serve to bring S here A li to his
senses so much the better, and we shall receive
his excuses in no half-hearted spirit of satisfaction.
But it is not probable that S here A tj will so
quickly quail before the storm which he has raised,
1 and which, when he sent his instructions
to A li M usjid , he must have anticipated.
He has not lived during the various epochs
of Anglo-Afghan history since we first entered
Cabul without knowing that our power was
something more than a name ; and the promp
titude with which this country resented
his reception of the Russian Envoy must have
: apprised him that no trifling would be tolerated by
i us in the question of how England and Afghanistan
were to be related in the future. Yet he has
flung down the glove, and by whom has he been
' urged to commit this act of hostility 1 Are we to
suppose that it was simply some insane pride, or a
| mistaken notion of his own power and resources,
! which bade him decline to receive our Mission,
and impelled him to frame his refusal in
I the most discourteous and offensive manner ?
It may be so, but if it is there is little
chance of S here A li coming to his senses. His
pride will forbid him to abandon a line of action
»which was decided upon in a hasty moment and in
an outbreak of petulance, and he will pursue his
mad career to the bitter end.
On the other hand, if he has defied us either at
the instigation of General A bramov , or through an
unfounded belief that Russia would support him
against the exercise of force on our side, then he
may yet render us complete reparation if he find
that the Russian authorities in Europe are
resolved to repudiate the whole arrangement, and
that he will not receive that support to which he
believes his hostility to England has entitled him,
and upon the promise of which he, trusting to the
delusive phrases of the Russian Envoy, has grown
so bold. The extracts we publish from the Qolos
and other Russian journals clearly show that,
although there is great satisfaction at the prospect
of an Anglo-Afghan war, no intention or desire has
yet been manifested to support the Afghan ruler
in arms against this country. The St. Peters
burg News considers a war between England
and Afghanistan to be simply a local one, yet, with
i a strange perversion of logic,asserts that an alliance,
j "indispensable to S here A li ," between Russia and
I Afghanistan would " by no means compromise the
relations between Russia and England." We
; fear this amicable view will scarcely find favour
i amongst Englishmen, who cannot but attribute
i to Russian policy and intrigue more than to
i anything else the remarkable impulse S here
j A li's sentiments have received since Russian
agents first began to break ground in Cabul after
the Khivan campaign. Nor will S here A li him
self much approve of so benevolent an intention,
which, if carried out, would leave him powerless in
our hands. The principal danger then will be
encroachments under Russian auspices against Balkh
and Herat, The Persians, who always assail Herat
the moment an Afghan Ameer is engaged elsewhere,
will be instigated to repeat the attempt of M ahomed
1 S hah in 1838, and the discomfiture of S here A li
in Cabul will be the signal for A bderrahman
K han's appearance in Balkh. The immediate
danger from Russia is to the outlying dependencies
of Cabul when their master shall have been over
thrown, and it is in many senses a very grave
j peril. There is another contingency infinitely
more serious, but that is, if the Russian press
i reveals the national mind, or rather that of the
| Government, barely probable. The time has not
yet arrived for Russia to interfere actively and
prominently in Cabul, nor would she be wise at
the present time to attempt it; and she will most
probably permit S here A li to be crushed while she
strives to absorb the Balkh region for her minion
i A bderrahman , and to place Herat in safe hands.