Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎33v] (67/312)

ltdi Wtdt fyiXU"
HOW WE STAND WITH RUSSIA.
All the news from India points to an immediate attack on the
Ameer, who seems to be, not merely through the volunteer insolence
of a half-instructed servant but directly and personally, answerable
for the defiant insult levelled at the Government of India. A
plan of campaign has already been formed, and considerable
bodies of troops are on the march to punish the Afghan chief
And it is agreed even amongst the most discordant of our political
factions at home that nothing else could be done with honour or
safety.
But Shere Ali is not the only person to be dealt with in
this business. To all observers it appears as nearly certain as any
thing can be that, however rash, intemperate, and sudden may be
the temper of the Ameer, he would not have brought an English
army into his country without the encouragement of a Power which
he naturally deems a stronger one than the Power he defies.
Those who doubt that he is working at the instigation of
Russia are very few indeed ; nor have the Russians shown them
selves at all inclined, so far, to deny that they have mixed for us
this little new imbroglio. By-and-by, however, they probably will
deny it—officially, " with civil leer." Meantime it does not appear
that we have any proof of the instigation which everybody believes
in ; and without proof it would be rash to act upon such a belief.
So much we may all agree upon. But we wish to point out that
whether the Ameer is or is not acting in hostility to England
at the instigation of Russia, or encouraged by Russian promises, is
not the whole question. The Ameer may or may not be a tool
employed by Russia to harass, weaken, and humiliate England, i
But, even though it may be capable of demonstration that he is i
nothing of the kind, the fact remains that Russia has herself to
answer for an independent act of hostility to England. The
despatch of a mission to Cabul, the contrivances, whatever
they may have been, by which she ensured its establishment
there, are a complete breach of the pledges upon which the
peaceful relations of the two Governments in that regioii r were
well understood to rest. The Russian Government has been
\allowed to carry its so-called civilizing mission in the East up to
our very gates, on promises and pledges of the most unequivocal
kind that no attempt would be made to disturb our own civilizing
mission within those gates : by interference in Afghanistan, for
instance. As we have already said, those engagements were made,
not by one provincial governor to another ; they were demanded >
by her Majesty's Government of the Czar's Government, and
they were entered into because it was understood and acknow
ledged on both sides that Russia's interference in Afghanistan
would be and must be regarded as a menace to the British
Empire. If the Russian Government asserted that we had
no ground for complaint as long as the operations of their
generals and diplomatists fell short of certain territorial limits-
fell short, specifically, of Afghanistan—they have always allowed
that transgression beyond them might properly enough be taken as
a blow aimed at England in the East. Well, put the conduct of
the Ameer entirely out of the question, and that blow has been |
delivered. The Russians may set up an excuse for their doings
at Cabul—such doings are never without excuse of some sort— j
but they cannot possibly deny, even if they care to do so, that
the despatch of their mission to Cabul was a deliberate rupture
of an understanding upon which peace between the two nations in
the East was based. Equally with the conduct of the Ameer, and
quite apart from it or from any implication in it, the Russian mis
sion is a mark of hostility and an act of defiance. Equally with the
conduct of the Ameer, it cannot be recalled ; it cannot be undone ;
in any case much of its worst effects, so far as we are con
cerned, must remain, after any amount of mere explanation and
apology. This being the case, we should like to know what course :
her Majesty's Government propose to take as to Russia, as well as
to the Ameer. Thrashing the Afghans will be no remedy for the ;
Russian injury and affront, which is a thing apart from the defiant
insolence of an independent Eastern prince, even though for that
too we have to thank the "great and friendly Power" of which
the Czar is chief. Of course we know the difficulties into which
the miserable weakness and credulity of our Government have
led them, and how much they may be hampered, not only by
electioneering considerations at home, but by the continuance
1 and augmentation ot their troubles abroad. We know how hard
it must be to brag of peace with honour one day, and
the next to plunge into demands for explanation of the
Power they boasted of having " cowed." But it is plain that
the conduct of Russia cannot be allowed to pass without
explanation and remedy^ unless we mean to proclaim that we
are content to put up with any number of Khivan pledges, and
are resigned to whatever course of action the exigencies of
Russia may suggest in the East. It seems all the more necessary
to take measures of this kind considering the language of the
i Russian press, which does not dissociate its Government from the