Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎32r] (64/312)

Russian clauses introduced into the Berlin Treaty
by Count Andrassy and Lord Beaconsfield."
The Novoe Vremya of to-day says :—
" The English Press will probably either urge the
disaffection of England's numerous Indian subjects,
as an excuse for putting up with the insult, or
it will advocate a war with Shere Ali. In either
case the situation in India removes every proba
bility of Great Britain's interference with the
results of the Berlin Conference."
(B y S ubmarine T elegraph.)
(from our own" correspondent.)
PARIS, WEDNESDAr.
In an article on the Afghan difficulty, the Debats
expresses the opinion that the refusal of Shere Ali
to receive the English Mission is a Russian revanche
for the Treaty of Berlin and the occupation of
Cyprus. The Debats thinks that the conciliatory
process advocated by some organs of English
opinion may be attended with danger. " Such a
course," it says, " would be unobjectionable if
the English had only the Ameer to deal with, but
it should not be forgotten that the Russians are
behind him, and that if the English take their
time the Russians will certainly lose none."
The Nord, of Brussels, in its issue of Tuesday,
returns at greater length to the subject of the crisis
in India brought about by the stoppage and rejec
tion of the British Mission to Cabul. Recalling
its observations of a few days ago that " the question
of Afghanistan is treated by the London press with
the absence of sang froid, and with the febrile
agitation which characterises the English Govern
ment," it says that 24 hours have happily sufficed
to bring about a certain degree of sang froid and
to call forth a sounder judgment on the part of
English journalists. They are still, says the Nord,
very much enraged against Shere Ali, but they
leave Russia out of the question ; they demand
that the Ameer shall be "chastised," but add that
care must be taken not to bring Russia into the
conflict. Perhaps this appeasement may make
further progress in a few days ; but at present the
situation is far from being clear. The only fact
as yet known is that General Sir Neville
Chamberlain's Embassy has returned to Peshawur,
one of Shere Ali's officers, posted on the frontier
with considerable forces, having opposed his further
progress. As for the letter which the Ameer
should have sent in reply to that from the Viceroy
of India announcing the approaching departure of
the Embassy, the most perfect silence continues
to be preserved. It would, however, be interesting
to know its contents, and what has become of it.
It was clear, from the telegram from Bombay
announcing this exchange of letters between the
i Viceroy and the Ameer, that the Embassy was to
await Shere Ali's reply before proceeding towards
Cabul. Has Sir Neville Chamberlain done so 1 Upon
this point nothing is said; and it is necessary that
some light should be thrown upon the matter before
the incident can be properly appreciated. It may,
perhaps, be objected that it was sufficient that the
arrival of the Embassy was notified to the Ameer
in order to secure it a becoming reception, and that
the reply of the Ameer to this notification being
looked forward to as favourable, it was useless for
Sir Neville Chamberlain to delay proceeding on his
journey. Such an objection would be plausible
enough if it were a question of an ordinary mission ;
but this was not the case. Sir Neville Chamber
lain had a large military following, consider
ably exceeding the customary and legitimate pro
portions of an escort. It is doubtful whether the
Russian Mission, of which so much has been said
during the past few weeks, went to Afghanistan
surrounded by a military paraphernalia so unusual I
for an embassy. There was, continues the Nord, '
no necessity for Sir Neville Chamberlain taking
with him so considerable a military force ;
and it is not absolutely impossible that Shere Ali, »
whilst showing a disposition to give the Viceroy of
India's Envoy the best of receptions, should have
begged him to leave behind a portion at least of the
corps d'armee forming his escort. If such were the
case, it would be difficult to attribute all the fault to
the Ameer. When, a few years ago, the Cabinets of
London and St. Petersburg endeavoured to arrive
at an understanding as to the spheres of their
respective influence in Asia, they came to the
conclusion that a pacific, direct, and permanent
action of each of the two Powers was the best
means of assuring the maintenance of tranquillity
in those reaions. Russia consented to accept
her portion of the responsibility ; but England
refused. Now, Afghanistan is the most important
of the States which depend, more or less directly,
upon England. Russia not having received, from i
the English Government, so far as concerns Afgha
nistan, the guarantees of securitj" which she herself
was disposed to give to England respecting the
Khanates under its dependence, it followed that no |
other recourse remained to it but to endeavour to
secure those guarantees f rom the Amee r of Afgha
nistan himself, by entering into direct relations I
with him. The events which have transpired in |
Asia during the past year ; the defeat of the Kash-
garians ; the suppression of the State of Yakoub- I
Beg ; and the flight of the former Khan of Kho- 1
kand—who took refuge in Afghanistan in
the hope, no doubt, of finding assistance for
the recovery of his throne — all these con
stitute a state of things somewhat precarious,
against the eventualities of which Russia was
bound to guard herself; and the pacific and friendly
attitude of Afghanistan is evidently one of the most
important elements of security. Such, it appears to
the Nord, is a sufficient explanation of the Russian
I Mission to Cabul. It depended upon England that
I no Russian Embassy should ever put its foot into
Cabul. England disregarded the opportunity ; and
what she refused to do in the interest of the
security of Russia, the latter must necessarily do
for herself. There is nothing in this which' is not
very natural; nothing to cause disquietude on the
part of England ; nothing that can create a mis-
( understanding between the two Powers.
LONDON, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26.
We publish to-day the text of the letters which
the Viceroy of I ndia addressed to the Ameer of
A fghanistan before the departure of the Mission
to Cabul. It will be recollected that in 1876 com
munications were sent to S here A li with a view to
improve the relations between him and the British
Government, but he took no notice of them. On
the 14th ult. the V iceroy wrote to him again,
pointing out that in consequence of recent
events at Cabul he had deemed it necessary to
send to him a special Envoy of high rank,
who would converse with him personally
on urgent affairs, adding that the welfare
and tranquillity of both States would best be
assured by a full and frank statement of the present
position. In consequence, however, of the death
of the Heir Apparent to Cabul the V iceroy sent
a second letter expressing his sympathy, and adding
that he had postponed sending the Mission until
the usual period of mourning had elapsed. Our
Bombay Correspondent also telegraphs the text of
the letter which Sir N eville C hamberlain
addressed to the A meer's commandant in charge of
the Khyber Pass—with what result has already
been made public. We also publish the views of
the Russian press on the critical position of affairs.
We publish this morning several telegrams from j
our Indian Correspondents, who give us the text of '
the V iceroy's two letters to S here A li , as well as
of Sir N eville C hamberlain's note to F aiz
M ahomed K han , the Governor of the Khyber
f fort of Ali Musjid. The tone of those letters,
it will be observed, is eminently conciliatory i
and friendly. Lord L ytton in his first communi
cation, dated the 14th of August, addresses the S
A meer as a trusted friend and ally, with whom
there is necessity to discuss matters of grave
importance ; and Sir N eville C hamberlain
emphasises the fact that our recent arrangements
with the Khyberees for a safe conduct relate simply
to the present occasion, and are intended in no sense
to weaken S here A li's Suzerain rights. Lord
i L ytton's second letter, bearing date the 23d August,
was called forth by the death of the heir apparent,
A bdullah J an , and in it his Excellency expressly
mentions that, despite the urgency and importance
of the matter, he does not desire to trouble his
Highness with matters of State until a proper j
interval had elapsed for mourning. To neither of I
those letters did S here A li deign to reply. Our
Bombay Correspondent aptly reminds us that the
A meer committed a similar act of discourtesy in
1876, although that offence must be held to
have been condoned by the Peshawur negotiations
in January, 1877. Sir N eville C hamberlain was
on one point more explicit than the V iceroy . * He
had made his arrangements, he said, with the hill-
men for a safe-conduct to Ali Musjid, and he
requested a reply to his communication before the
18th inst.; in the event of his receiving no
reply he must adopt such measures as seemed
best suited to promote the object the Indian
Government had in view. No reply came, i
and after giving the Afghan officer three days' ,
grace, the C hamberlain Mission set out from
Peshawur on the 21st inst. Major C avagnari
preceded it through the Khyber, and having reached
• Ali Musjid was compelled to return to Jumrood
in the manner' already known-.to us. The im
portance of the text of the V iceroy's letters is
that it proves that even the aggravated, unfriendly |
conduct of S here A li during several years, and i
the surprise that attended the announcement that i
a Russian Mission had been received at Cabul,
did not move Lord L ytton to make use of threaten-