Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎14r] (28/312)

if they have ever dreamed of such a thing—of their professed
designs in Asia Minor. Russia has nothing to lose by sitting
sti" as a Government-—while we are pouring troops through, the
Khyber Pass. Supposing that we bring the Ameer to terms at
once, she may regret that she pulled at the pear a little before it
was ripe, but she will feel that the recollection of another defeat
will not make the Afghans more friendly to England. If the war
proves a long one she will have time to make up her
mind as to what she shall do, and the opportunity, perhaps of
profiting by something that the chapter of accidents may have
in store for her. The Afghans may prove as little amenable
to an Jinglish occupation as the Bosnians have shown them
selves to an Austrian occupation. They may continue to give
us trouble long after the avowed resistance of the Ameer has
ceased. At all^ events, an English invasion of Afghanistan will
give the^ Russian agents abundance of opportunities both for
ascertaining the temper of our Indian subjects, and of the
semi-independent Princes particularly, and of making that
temper what they would like to see it. An Afghan war can
hardly fail to be a time of great excitement in India. Whatever
there is of discontent or of native ambition will be stimulated by
hopes of a possible disaster to the English armies. There is no
need, therefore, for Russia to put herself any more forward than she
has done already. The ball has been set rolling, and she has now
only to wait and see how much damage it will do before it stops.
These are the prospects which now confront the Government;
and when once the inevitable decision has been taken, and the
Viceroy prepares to show that England is not to be defied with
impunity, they are prospects which no act of theirs can greatly
influence. Whatever power they once had of influencing events
has passed away. They must be content to pursue, not so much
the policy which they believe to be best, as the policy which the
conduct of the Ameer (with or without Russian advice and
assistance) happens to dictate. In short, this is a matter in which,
important as it is, we are very nearly helpless. Whether we shall
or shall not submit to the insulting blow delivered by the Ameer
is the only choice before us. But since submission would mean
ruinous humiliation, we have hardly that choice either; while as
to the consequences of a blow in return, they must be pretty
much what our enemies, on deliberation, determine. And
i how does this come about ? In this way. When the Russian war
was begun the Czar was warned by certain European Powers that
he was to make no conquests in Europe : which was their concern.
But England left the Czar at liberty to make whatever conquests,
whatever acquisitions, he deemed satisfactory in Asia. And, by way
of giving us peace with honour, our Government confirmed him
in those conquests and those acquisitions. At that moment, in
the eyes of the Ameer, in the eyes of all the feast, Russia became
England 's master. ;
INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN.
The Times correspondent at Calcutta, telegraphing last night, gives the
following details respecting the stoppage of the British mission to Cabul:—
Our relations with the Ameer have assumed a very critical character. The Cabul I
ruler has at last thrown of every semblance even of outward friendliness and courtesy,
and has chosen to adopt, in preference, an attitude of marked and open hostility. Your
special correspondent with the mission telegraphs that it left Peshawur yesterday
and proceeded as far as Jumrood, a place on the actual frontier, though within
British territory. Thence it was recalled by a telegram from the Viceroy, and
; accordingly it marched back to Peshawur, This morning private advices from
! Simla, upon which absolute reliance can be placed, state that on the mission
j being ordered to march to Jumrood Major Cavagnari rode forward to Ali Musjid, escorted
jby Khyberries, in order to ask for a safe passage. The Ameer's officer, how-
i ever, at Ali Musjid positively refused to permit the mission to advance. He
I threatened resistance, and crowned the surrounding heights commanding the
route with armed men in order to dispute the passage. The interview between the
chief and Major Cavagnari lasted three hours, and, though the,former was warned over
and over again that the Ameer would be deemed responsible for his conduct, he expressed
an unflinching determination to resist the passage of the mission by force. Not the
faintest shadow of a doubt is entertained that this officer was acting under full instructions
from the Ameer, inasmuch as Mufti Shah and Akhor, two responsible officers of the
Ameer, have been despatched from Cabul to Ali Musjid within the last few days. Both
of these officers have been mentioned in Cabul news-letters as favourably disposed towards
and engaged in direct communication with the Russian Embassy. Two important facts
require to be noted—the first that this insolent rebuff occurred in presence of the two Indian
Princes attached to the mission, who were personal witnesses of the interview between Major
Cavagnari and the Ameer's officer; the second is that the Russian envoy is still residing
at Cabul, I he Mission will be now withdrawn. In view of the long-continued ungracious
and hostile conduct of the existing ruler of Afghanistan, aggravated as it is by the present
contemptuous slight offered to our national dignity, all possibility of renewing friendly
relations with this uncompromising and morose barbarian is utterly hopeless ; and even if
the prospects were still hopeful, their realization could only be accomplished at the
complete sacrifice of proper self-respect, and at the grave risk of very considerable loss
of prestige in the eyes of our Indian subjects and of our feudatory princes. In conse
quence, therefore, of the present conduct of Russia, and the future policy for us
which this conduct now decisively indicates, and against which, fortunately for India,
the Government and the English people are most fully and completely warned, this
important question of frontier policy will henceforward cease to be treated from a merely
Indian standpoint. It at once travels out of the domain of provincial into that of Impe
rial considerations, and those of the very highest magnitude. No one is more keenly
alive than the Viceroy to this new development of the question, and he clearly discerns
that it is only by the united efforts and energetic co-operation of the English and Indian
Foreign Offices that this dangerously complex state of matter can be finally brought to a
satisfactory conclusion. The Indian Government are backed by ample military resources
to enable them promptly and severely to punish the Ameer for his insulting attitude of
disrespect, but the significant fact is fully recognized that the Ameer is but the puppet,
vhile Russia stands behind as the deus ex mac hind. The measures, therefore, to be
adopted ia view of the Ameer's conduct cease to be a question of Indian policy, but are
at once resolved into a very serious problem of English foreign politics, which can only
be dealt with in strict accordance with the settled principles of the English Cabinet.