Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎14v] (29/312)

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LONDON, TUESDA Y, SEPTEMBER 24, 1878.
The rejection of our Mission by the Ameor
of Cabul is a turning-point in our North-Western
Frontier policy. The despatch of our Envoy was a
step taken openly in the view of the whole world,
i and it is impossible that we should be con
tent with simply retracing it and allowing our re
lations with the Ameer to continue on their former
footing. The first question that will be asked in
this country is, what are we to do next ? The
answer, we are bound to suppose, has been already
well considered by the Government. Nothing has
happened which must not have been foreseen as at
least possible, nothing for which it was not
incumbent on us to be prepared beforehand.
The crisis is scarcely a surprise. Events for
some time past have made it almost certain that
it would come at some time or other, and by
our own choice it has come now. But the reasons
for which we adopted our present frontier policy
are as strong as ever, and the danger of
mere inaction is even more distinctly visible.
If the Ameer of Cabul is determined not to
be our friend, it is just as well that we
should learn the fact in good time. There
is nothing just now that can make him for
midable as our foe. If he persists in refusing the
demands we may see fit to make upon him, he
can calculate upon no effectual support outside his
own territory. Our reckoning will be with him,
and with him alone, and such a prospect can hardly
be thought alarming. There is nothing worse before
us than one of those troublesome little wars to
which we have so often found ourselves committed
in every quarter of the globe. A comparison of
resources in such a case is well-nigh ridiculous.
We are, of course, by far the stronger, and can
choose our own way with the certainty of follow
ing it at our will. We have no love for the adven
ture, but we shall have no thought of shrinking
from it if its necessity is clear.
We need not conclude, as yet, that we shall be
obliged to resort to force before we can establish
satisfactory relations with Afghanistan. There is
room still left for an explanation of what has
happened. We are not very hopeful that such an
exp anation will be given, but it will be at least in
cumbent on us to ask for it. The Ameer of Oabul
has not yet s ated his own case. The resistance
offered to our Mission was the act of a subordinate,
and it may possibly be disclaimed by the Ameee
himself. In any case, we shall be compelled to wait
for soma months before we can begin operations. If
we have to deal a blow, it would be all the
belter for being sharp and decisive, and at
any rate must come with an irresistible force.
Time, however, will be required before our prepa
rations can be complete. Nothing, probably, can
be done until next spring. During winter the
mountain passes would be found blocked with snow,
and winter begins early in the passes. There is
no need for us to be hasty. We can wait our own
time, and it will suit us in every way to allow our
discourteous neighbour the fullest opportunity for
reconsidering his conduct. The news that we are
preparing to move will not be without its effect.
To insult a British Envoy may bo agreeable
enough and safe enough for the moment ; but
when it is evident that the insult will not
be suffered to pass unpunished, the case
is a good deal altered. We have put up with
so much from Shere Ali , and have been so ex
ceedingly anxious not to give him needless offence,
that he is possibly inclined to fancy that we shall
put up with anything he may be pleased to
offer. We trust for his own sake, and for
ours too, that he may become aware of
his mistake before he is overtaken by its conse
quences. We shall not turn aside now from
the frontier policy we have deliberately determined
to follow. If there are obstacles in the way, we
shall know how to deal with them. We have
formed the opinion that it is not safe for us to
leave Afghanistan to itself. What we most
wish is that the ruler of that country should
be an independent and a friendly potentate. If
Shere Ali w ill take that position, we shall have
nothing more to ask of him. We cannot suffer him
to be unfriendly and independent too. Our frontier
must be secured in any case, and if Shere Ah will
not help us in this matter, we shall know how to
obtain what we want without his help. More
over, the rebuff he has given us has been so openly
dealt that we cannot put up with it.
| p p| | It will not be
for long that the English Envoy can be turned
back by the Ameer's orders. Our envoy will
come next, not to request admittance, but to de
mand it ; if, indeed, meanwhile the Ameer himself
does not see the blunder ho has made and sue for
the Mission which he has just so contemptuously
repelled. We still hope that war may be
averted ; but if war must come, better a little war
now than an open trouble for some years, fol
lowed possibly by a great war which we may
be less well placed ^for meeting. Our Mis
sion to Cabul has been no momentary freak,
undertaken without deliberation or without careful
i weighing of contingencies. It has been one step in
the course of a policy on which we have resolved.
We know what we have been aiming at, and why ;
and there is nothing in the refusal of the Ameer to
receive our Mission which can operate to change
our settled views.
We must expect, of course, that our Afghan
policy will find unfavourable critics in this country.
The difiicully to which we have been brought is
obvious. The mischief we have been endea
vouring to avert is less obvious, though not
less certain for those who 'have the eyes to
sea it. Lord Carnarvon , in his speech on
' Saturday, blamed our meddling in any way with
the affairs of Afghanistan. It was not, apparently,
by a love of peace that he was led to this view.
1 On the contrary, he seemed to think that
there would be no great harm in our pick
ing a quarrel with Russia and fighting it out
on ground of our own choosing. What he did
dislike was that the scene should bo laid in Afgha
nistan. The absence of Russia as a combatant
he really seems to have considered as a mere cir
cumstance of no special account. Mr. Baxter , in
a speech we report this morning, took the same
view of our Afgha n policy. Not to interfere at all
was the only advice which either he or LordV
Carnarvon had to offer. They will discover
in our telegram of yesterday what will no
doubt seem to them abundant confirma
tion of tho justice of their remarks. The : :
result they predicted is now seen not to j
be unlikely to follow. We will give them credit
for their sagacity, though, indeed^ it scarcely |
required any special insight into affairs to find out |
this much. We may still complain that they do not |
tell us of any other policy which we could have |
chosen with more safety. To do nothing is easy for [
a time ; but if others are to be busy while we are ;
inactive, it may prove by and by that it would have |
been better if we had been busy too. The man !
who leaves his house-door open, and thus l
invites intrusion or depredation, is not
generally thought to have deserved praise by
such a display of masterly inactivity. But our two
critics are not in agreement on every point. Lord
Carnarvon suggests that we should fight Russia ;
Mr. Baxter thinks we should do wisely to
come to an understanding with Russia. This, how
ever, is just what we have tried to do ; and our pre
sent difficulty has arisen in great measure from a
breach of agreement on the part of Russia. They
come together again on the terrible prospect of a war
with Afghanistan. To do Lord Carnarvon justice,
he is apprehensive that we shall succeed in
the end. What he most fears is the con
quest of the country, and its occupation bv
England. Mr. Baxter has no such dread as this
before his eyes. He is content to remind us of
the issue of a former war, and from this
he draws the conclusion that we should do well to
keep clear of so proved] a danger for the future.
The lesson appears to be that we are no
match for a petty Asiatic chief, and that,
once defeated, we are to acknowledge our
master for all time to come. There is room for
criticism as to the moment chosen for pressing
our Mission to Cabul, as to the extreme
notice courted to its rejection, and possibly as to the
credentials under which the Mission itself was sent.
But when we are told only that we ought to leave
Afghanistan alone, we can show good reasons for
following another policy, and can only wonder that
neither Lord Carnarvon nor Mr. Baxter should
seem to be aware that such reasons exist.