Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎13v] (27/312)

FIRST-FRUITS OF ENGLISH POLICY IN
EASTERN AFFAIRS.
T o-day 's news from India is the most striking comment which
events have yet supplied on Lord beaconsfield's declaration
that the Russian Government had become most pacific, having
at last seen that " a restless and warlike spirit is one that must
debase and perhaps even ruin their country." Apparently this
statement must be taken as applying only to Europe—where
Russia, having got pretty much all that she could hope to get,
may naturally feel that there is no longer any occasion for rest
lessness or any need for war. At any rate, it is not true of
Asia. If there is no restlessness about Russia, why has she
sent a mission to Cabul ? If the warlike spirit has been finally
laid to rest, why have her agents moved the Ameer to resort to
measures indistinguishable from open hostility ? The refusal to
receive an English mission is not a sudden resolve on the Ameer's
part. He has no doubt been slowly making up his mind to
it in the interval during which he has delayed giving a definite
answer to the Viceroy's request. Tired of waiting. Sir Neville
Chamberlain started from Peshawur on Saturday and returned
there the same day. In that time he had satisfied himself as
to the nature of the Ameer's intentions. At the mouth of the
Khyber Pass he heard that the centre of the pass was occupied
by the Ameer's troops, and sent forward Major cavagnari,
accompanied (for what reason is not very clear) by two Indian
Princes, to ask for a safe passage. The Commandant, who a
short time before had had a visit from the Afghan officer who has
charge of the frontier relations, declared, that he would attack
the mission if it attempted to come through the pass; and, as p
three hours' conference made no change in his resolution, Majc*
cavagnari returned and the mission was at once ordered b^ck
to Peshawur. The situation is very well summed up in the tele
gram from the Simla correspondent of the Daily News. The
Ameer " entertains Russian officers, and at the same time
threatens to fire on a friendly British mission." The designs of
Russia may not be "warlike:" indeed, considering how much
profit she may reap from the present state of affairs without
moving a soldier, it is highly probable that they are not; but
they certainly are not free from that restlessness which Lord
Beaconsfield assured us had been brought into discredit at
St. Petersburg, through the boldness of his own policy.
The Government have now two choices open to them. They
may put up with the Ameer's refusal and try to persuade their own
subjects and those of Shere Ali that they really never cared
much about an English mission to Cabul, and that if the Ameer
really dislikes the idea there is no reason why he should have r
one forced upon him. This alternative may at once be dis
missed. Even a Government which had blundered into the
scheme of a mission could not accept so direct an insult as this,
much less a Government which regards the mission as part of
a policy which has only been adopted after much deliberation.
That the Viceroy will take some measures to compel the Ameer
to grant what he has just refused may be assumed. After this
point has been reached, however, there may remain a further
choice for the Government to make ; or, rather, they may have to
face a choice which they cannot themselves determine. A war
with the Ameer may either involve a declared and official war with
Russia, who stands at his back, or it may involve an undeclared
and unofficial war with her. It will be open to Russia to
encourage the Ameer in his refusal, to declare that his unwil
lingness to see the English establish themselves in Afghanistan
is perfectly justifiable, and to add that Russia will see with
pain and displeasure an independent Sovereign in alliance with
the Czar coerced into a condition of dependence. This would
probably lead to an official war with Russia. On the other hand,
Russia, having brought the Ameer to the point of threatening to
fire upon Sir Neville Chamberlain if he attempted to enter
his territories, may think she has done enough for present pur
poses. She may proclaim herself perfectly neutral as between
England and the Ameer, and may even go the length of with
drawing her embassy in order not to give any pretext lor suspicion
on the part of England. This would be quite compatible with
rendering very substantial assistance to the Ameer in the event
of his determining to quarrel with the Indian Government. There
would be abundance of sympathy with the Ameer in Russia;
and, even if sympathy were wanting, the trading Spirit could be
trusted to furnish the Afghans with such supplies and arms as
they might need. Russia would stand to Afghanistan in much
the same relation as she stood to Servia when Servia was at war
with Turkey. She would be in the background, capable of
becoming an ally under certain circumstances, and looked to for
intervention and mediation in the event of the war going rapidly
and decisively against her h umble friend.
This policy seems to offer so many advantages to Russia that
she may fairly be expected to adopt it. An Afghan war will
certainly cost England a large sum of money. It will probably
cost her some considerable number of lives. It will tend to
concentrate the attention of the Government on the remoter East,
and so tempt them to forget or postpone any active prosecution—