Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎13r] (26/312)

A caitimity
which thus far has been almost unique in our
history is not likely to come upon us again juat
now. It is not, therefore, because of the memo
ries of the inglorious and fearful retreat from Cabui
and the annihilation ot an army, that we are
driven to condemn the kind of enterprise on which
the Government of to-day seem resolved to enter.
We should condemu it even if all its immediate
. operations were secure of a complete success, and
it is perhaps as well to remember that all the
earlier movements in the former enterprise were
successful. We got all that we professed to want
at that time; only we could not keep it. It
melted away from us, or rather it exploded in |
our hands. We occupied Cabul to much the
same purpose as N apoleon occupied Madrid or
Moscow. But even if a far more prolonged and
: showy success were to be obtained for our enter-
prise of to-day, it would still be open to the
: gravest objections on every principle of sound
■,! statesmanship, whether we profess to be influenced
. by considerations of political morality or guided
only by the dictates of selfish ambition. We
may become masters of Cabul; we may set up a
s ! camp there, that is to say, and we may be able to
; maintain it. But we shall thereby have weakened
instead of strengthening our Indian Empire; we
shall have lidded to and not taken from the in- I
tluence of Russia in the affairs of Asia. We j
shall convince Persia that she is to be the !
next victim to our Imperial policy ; and, indeed, |
■: there is nothing to justify a conquest of Cabul I
which would not also justify the conquest of j
I Persia. The statesmen of Eussia must be less
■'plausible of tongue than we all take them to be if
they fail to persuade many an Asiatic Prince that
| the new Imperial policy of England leaves him no
choice but a Russian alliance or the loss of his
independence.
Nothing can be more reasonable than the re-
. marks which Lord CarNabvon has just been
making on this very subject. The late Secretary
: for the Colonies had not, indeed, heard at the
time when he was making his speech the important
news which we publish to-day. But he spoke appa
rently in the tone of one who did not expect anything
much more satisfactory, and he frankiy expressed
his conviction that what we ought to dread more
than even any imminent war is the con
quest or the occupation of Afghanistan. If,
as he says, we are fearful of the intrigues
of Russia it would be far better to meet her
in fair fight in Europe than to condemn our
selves to such a theatre of war as Afghanistan.
Not one Viceroy, bui a succession of Viceroys,
has laid it down. Lord C arnarvon truly says,
as a principle of our Asiatic policy that we should
abstain from entangling ourselves in the affairs of
Afghanistan. All in a moment that wise and
wholesome principle, commended and upheld
by some of the best of the race of great states
men who governed India for us, and kept India
for us, has been abandoned. The new policy
which gave significant indications of its activity '
immediately on the appointment of Lord L ytton
is in full flight now. We have got into a condition j
of things which seems to allow our statesmen in
office to act with an absolute disregard for
public opinion, or for historical precedents; and it
seems almost idle to think of counteracting
any of their projects by the mere influence of sober
reason. If the public in general could even now
be brought to understand how vast and vague are
the responsibilities into which we are being forced
without consent or knowledge of ours, with what
complications and dangers, what certain sacrifices,
aad what possible disasters the future is charged.
for us by the policy now opening its operations,
^ there might even yet be some national outcry
raised strong enough to interfere with the euter-
! prises of a reckless and theatrical ambition. Hut
even this possibility is dependent on the chancf ol
the public being allowed to know of any enterprise
before it has gone its way too frtr to be recalled.
If any evil should come of this Cabul mission
the historical responsibility will only rest on thei
people of England, inasmuch as they have allowed
men to govern them who never consulted them in
advance. That is indeed a serious responsibility;
but it cannot be said that the English people knew
of this particular enterprise or gave it in advanc*
even a passive or tacit approval.