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Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎12v] (25/312)

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The record is made up of 1 volume (150 folios). It was created in 07 Sep 1878-19 Oct 1878. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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latest telegrams
——
THE BRITISH MISSION
TO CABUL
EEFUSAL OF THE AMEEB, TO
EECEIVE THE MISSION.
THREATENED ATTACK UPON
THE BEITISH PARTY.
(BY EASTEEN TELEGRAPH.)
(FROM OUR SPECIAIi CORRESPONDENT.)
SIMLA, StTNDAT.
After repeated delays consequent upon the
public mourning for the death of the Heir
Apparent, and the Ameer's discourteous tardi
ness in replying to the Viceroy's messenger
as to whether he would receive the Mission
or not, Sir NeTille Chamberlain started
from Peshawur yesterday. Reaching the mouth
of the Khyber Pass, he learnt that the Ameer's
commandant had advanced an outpost to the
centre of the pass, and was prepared to dispute
the passage.
Sir Neville Chamberlain had been instructed by
the Viceroy not to risk an encounter, and accord
ingly sent forward an officer (Major Cavagnari),
accompanied by two native princes and a small
escort.
After a long conference the commandant, whose
force lined both sides of the pass, declared that
he would attack the party if they attempted to
proceed. The mission was then ordered to retura
to Peshawur.
The Ameer's officer in charge of the frontier re
lations, who has been won over to Russian
interests, visited the outpost recently, as did also
the Mirakhor, who is an enemy of the English,
lie left Cabul after the Viceroy's emissary had
arrived there. Efforts have been made through
out to avoid offending the Ameer, and, in future
measures, care will be taken to avoid offending the
Afghan subjects, multitudes of whom are friendly
to us.
The British situation is serious, the Ameer
having twice formally refused to receive British
officers, or even allow them to pass through the
coimtry. He entertains Russian officers, and at
the same time threatens to fire on a friendly British
mission.
(THROUGH REUTER'S AGENOY.)
CONSTANTINOPLE, S ept . 20.
' (By telegraph from Syra.)
The envoy from the Ameer of Afghanistan who
recently arrived here is stated to be endeavouring
to induce the Porte to conclude an alliance with
Russia. :
LONDON, MONDAY, 8EPT,2X
A telegram from our Special Correspondent at
Simla states that after repeated delays Sir Neville
Chamberlain, the British Envoy to the Ameer of
Cabul, left Peshawur on Saturday. On reaching
the mouth of the Khyber Pass he learnt that the
Ameer's commandant had advanced an outpost to
the centre of the pass, and was prepared to dispute
the passage. A party, consisting of Major
Cavagnari, two native princes, and a small escort,
advanced to meet the commandant, who, after a
long conference, declared that he would attack the
party if they attempted to proceed. The mission
was then ordered to return to Peshawur. Our
Correspondent states that the Ameer's officer in
charge of the frontier relations, who has been won
over to Russian interests, visited the outpost re
cently. The British situation is considered to be
serious, the Ameer having twice formally refused
to receive British officers, or even to allow them
to pass through the country. At the same time he !
entertains Russian officers.
— L "—: " :——
Our Special Correspondent at Simla sends us
by telegraph news of the gravest importance with
regard to the mission to Cabul. The Ameer , ac-
cordinsr to the information which has reached our
Correspondent, has positirely refused to receive
Sir Nevuxe Chambeblain . He has not merely
refused to receive the English mission: he has
ordered the Khyber Pass to be occupied to its
centre, and has intimated his determination to
prevent Sir Neville Chamberlain and his party
from making their way through it. The ominous
delay in the Ameer's reply to the message of the
Viceroy , asking whether he would receive the
mission, has been followed by this momentous
decision, and the hostile words which the Ameer is
said to have let drop in open durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). do not seem
to have been spoken in a sudden fit of thoughtless
ill-temper. As the Ameer did not think jB.t to
reply in reasonable time to the message of the
Viceroy , Sir Neville Chamberlain started, our
Correspondent tells us, from Peshawur on Satur
day, and on reachina: the mouth of the Khyber Pass
he learned that the outposts of the Ameer were
already advanced to its centre, and were prepared
to dispute his advance. Sir Neville Chamber
lain was instructed by the Viceuoy not to risk
an encounter ; and indeed it is obvious that he
could not proceed to force his way, no matter
what strength he could command, without
some further parley. It would be necessary
to try to find out why the Ameer
declined to receive our mission before proceeding
to compel him to receive it. A conference was
therefore opened with the officer of the Ameer,
/ but the result was only to show that the occupa
tion of the pass by the ruler of Cabul was delibe
rate and hostile. The Ameer's officer declared that
he would attack the English party if they deter
mined to advance. Nothing was left for the
English mission but to return to Peshawur. Thus
for the second time the Amber has refused to receive
an English mission, or to allow English officers to
pass through his country. More thaw once before
he sought to establish an alliance with us, but his
overtures, or at least the conditions with which
they were accompasded, were rejected. Not unlike
this was the story of Dost Mohammed . .So tar
as human intelligence can judge, Dost Moham-
| Med was sincere in desiring an English aliiance to
| strengthen him against the influence and the
ambition of Russia. He became our enemy when
he found that to all appearance we were deter
mined to treat him as an enemy. If the Ameer of
Cabul is now resolved to show himself our foe,
the probabilities are that he has fancied himself
driven to assume that attitude by the significant
movements of our new Imperial policy.
It is not possible, we presume, that the Viceroy
of India will accept the refusal of the Ameer as
one puts up with the churlishness of a sullen
tanner who refuses to allow him to pass
through a field, or that of an ill-conditioned
picture-buyer who declines to j.et a stranger
look at his art treasures. When the mission was
j determined on, the Viceroy and the Home Go
vernment must either h^ve felt certain that it
would be received or they must have made up
I their minds as to the course to be pursued in the
event ot a refusal. That course, we presume, can
hardly have been to allow the whole incident to
drop, and the " Imperial policy " to be snubbed
at its very first movement. We fear, there
fore, that we must expect to see some steps
taken to force a way for us into a con
ference with the Ameer , and a resumption
of the principle of active intervention in
the affairs of Cabul. Now, we may say at once
that if we approved of the policy which our
Government appear to have in view, we should
not be deterred from recommeuding it merelv by
the example ot what happened iu the same
regions nearly forty years ago. Nothing could
indeed be more disastrous and more ghastly
than the failure alike of our political enter
prise and of our principal military opera
tions , then. But it is hardly possible that
such utter collapse and ruin could come upon
an English commander and an English army
again. The unjustifiable in 1 ervention which we
attempted then wus brought to confusion and
shame by the preposterous incapacity and '
mismanagement of those on whom the re-
sponsibiiity was left of upholding the political
and military credit of England.

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Content

Press cuttings from British and Indian Newspapers regarding the Afghan War (today known as the 2nd Afghan-Anglo War), negotiations in Cabul [Kabul], the British Government's policy with regards to the Indian Frontier, and the movements of the Russians during the war.

The cuttings have been taken from a number of newspapers including the Pall Mall Budget , The Pall Mall Gazette , The Globe , The Times , The Pioneer Mail , The Standard , The Daily News , The Daily Telegraph , The Evening Standard , The Saturday Review , The Spectator , The Morning Post and The World .

Extent and format
1 volume (150 folios)
Arrangement

The cuttings have been arranged in the scrapbook in chronological order and the pages of the book have been tied into three bundles ff 1-46, ff 47-96 and ff 97-142

Physical characteristics

Foliation: This file has been foliated in the top right hand front corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. of each folio with a pencil number enclosed in a circle.

Written in
English in Latin script
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Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎12v] (25/312), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F126/24, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100024093679.0x00001a> [accessed 26 June 2026]

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