File 5257/1919 'Persia: the Military Commission' [‎59v] (123/534)

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t ■ Qvpras-e Persian official. The Commission consider that more
reification of the tribes by a just and consistent policy of
administration than by internal security it is pointed out that,
8. In connection with the question nt R . fleS) p ersian GoYermnent
with the possible exception suppression of disorder, and that
has at present no force ^ country is due largely to the presenr
the semblance of order in.P^ j recommend that these troops shorn,
of British droops, Oommisswn^ge ^ y^ persian amy has had a fair start
not be withdrawn until t _ ^ g of the p 0 p U lace opposed to the agreement, it i s
probabk^KndeaYOurs wiU be made to create disturbances as soon as the British
officer commences his task.
^^hlTet general Report the Commission have considered it advisable to
“tte Imed*™ mifnSned if*. t**m Government is that the,r foht...
valne if negligible and that their exiatence is a serious obstanle to the creat™ oi
S SSentlmy it ***, unfortnnatelv, imposs.ble te wipe them out and rtart»,
a clean slate Practicallv no Persian officers exist with the training ana experience
neoew for the command of a squadron or company but there are lamentably many
with ranks equivalent to those of colonel, general and field-marshal for whom posts
hive to be found The existing War Office, beyond providing shelter for aged officers
and an income for the friends of Ministers, has no value.
Armed Forces Considered Necessary.
10. In their general Report the Commission have recommended the formation
of a uniform force into which the various existing formations should be merged
No difficulty is anticipated except in the case of the Cossack Division. It is considered
that the continued existence of this force in its present form is incompatible with
any successful scheme of reorganisation and that, whatever the. difficulties, it must
disappear and that, like all other existing formations, become part oi the new
uniform force. The Commission consider that the retention of any Russian oiheers
is impracticable except for a short period during the process of reorganisation, it
any can be found willing to co-operate. It must be realised that the retention ol any
part of the Cossack Division as an independent force under Russian officers will
simply create a centre and focus for intrigue, which will hamper if not render
impossible the task of reorganising the Persian army._
11. In framing their scheme for the reorganisation of the new uniform force,
the Commission have kept in mind the necessity for allowing from the outset as much
real initiative as possible to Persians possessing the necessary minimum or
intelligence and integrity. But they have had, unfortunately, to go further than this
in their Report in consideration of the fears of their Persian colleagues, fears which
appear to be largely due to the present temporarily disturbed political situation, and
they have had to make concessions which, however desirable they may be politically,
are not in the interests of military efficiency. The entire absence of British officers
with certain units (vide paragraph 298 of the Report) is a case in point and a high
standard of efficiency cannot be expected from such units. They consider that, in
practice, it is essential to economy and efficiency during the period of reorganisation
that British officers should have complete control of funds and the promotion and
appointment of Persian officers.
personal, (f
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Suggestion
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Medical.
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A rms and Munitions.
12. Owing to the heavy financial burden that will be incurred by the initial
outlay necessary for the army the Commission suggest that the necessary arms,
munitions, &c., be supplied by His Majesty’s Government on the most generous terms
possible.
Finance.
13. The Commission i recommend that the funds allotted annually for army
expenditure should be secured beyond all doubt by being a first charge on revenues
or loans or otherwise, as a continuance of the existing uncertainty of payment in the
army would result in a complete lack of confidence in the British officers employed.
Bers,
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